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The approach and landing phase of flight is statistically the most dangerous part of flying. 
While it only accounts for 4% of flight time, it represents 49% of commercial jet 
mishaps. One key to mitigating the risks involved in this flight segment is the stabilized 
approach. A stabilized approach requires meeting rigorous standards for many flight 
parameters as the aircraft nears landing. Exceeding any of these parameters results in an 
unstable approach (UA). The energy management (EM) accomplished by the flight crew, 
represented by the EM variables in the study, influences the execution of a stabilized 
approach. 
While EM is a critical element of executing a stabilized approach, there appears to 
be a lack of studies that identify specific EM variables that contribute to UA probability. 
Additionally, several possible moderating variables (MVs) may affect the probability of a 
UA. Fortunately, modern jet transport aircraft have Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) 
systems that capture a wealth of information that enable the analysis of these EM 
variables. This study used FDM data to answer the questions about what influence a set 
of EM variables has on the probability of a UA event. The analysis also determined what 
impact a set of possible MVs, not directly related to EM, has on these EM variables 
influence. 
iv 
The analysis used logistic regression (LR) to investigate FDM information. The 
LR provided estimations of odds ratios for each of the variables and the interaction 
factors for the MVs. These statistics defined a model to evaluate the influences of the EM 
and MVs, providing answers to the research questions posed. The results determined the 
model was a good fit to the data but had poor discrimination. The model supported three 
of the original seven EM hypotheses and none of the 28 MV hypotheses.  
The study identified three specific EM variables that significantly influenced the 
probability of a UA event. Of the MVs, only one significant influence was revealed but 
was opposite that hypothesized. Identifying the EM variables, and examining their 
impacts, shows their importance in preventing UAs. Further, the results help prevent 
future UAs by informing the design of training programs. Additionally, the current effort 
fills gaps in the current body of knowledge, as there appears to be a lack of studies in the 
areas investigated. 
A gap in the body of knowledge filled by investigating an area of limited research 
and the results provide practical application in the analysis of EM-related events. 
Aviation safety practitioners now have additional information to identify trend issues that 
may lead to the increased probability of a UA event. Finally, this study was one of very 
few granted access to actual operational FDM information by an air carrier. The data 
were crucial in evaluating the proposed model against real-world flight operations, 
comparing theory to reality. Without access to such closely held information, the research 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Commercial aviation is an extremely safe mode of transportation. Over the 58 
years from 1959 through 2017, the worldwide commercial jet fleet flew 1,453 million 
flight hours during 772 million flights. During this period, there were 1,989 commercial 
aviation accidents worldwide, of which 626 resulted in fatalities, yielding an accident rate 
of 1.37 x 10-6 accidents, with 4.31 x 10-7 fatal accidents, per flight hour. For the ten years 
from 2008-2017, the numbers are about 544 million flight hours, 387 accidents, and 55 
with fatalities. The rate for the 2008-2017 period is 7.11 x 10-7 accidents, with 1.01 x 10-7 
fatal accidents, per flight hour (Boeing, 2018). These statistics illustrate a significant 
increase in aviation safety. 
The approach and landing phase of flight is statistically the most dangerous part 
of flying. The 2014 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Safety Report 
shows that, for the air carrier accidents in 2013, 61% occurred in the approach and 
landing phases of flight, as depicted in Figure 1. During approach and landing, the pilot 
flying must bring the aircraft down from cruising altitude to touchdown at a specific point 
on the ground, in the appropriate configuration, within a narrow range of airspeed and 
vertical velocity, and in a flight attitude that ensures a smooth transition from air to 
ground. Digression from desired parameters in any of these areas increases the risk of a 




Figure 1   
Percentage of Accidents by Phase of Flight   
 
Note. Adapted from “2014 Safety Report,” by International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), 2014, p. 13. 
 
To mitigate these risks, pilots utilize the concept of the stabilized approach. This 
concept evolved with the advent of jet-powered airliners in the 1950s and ‘60s. Pilots 
discovered that newer technology jet transport aircraft, with lower drag coefficients 
allowing for higher speed, did not slow as readily as piston and turboprop aircraft, nor did 
the engines respond as quickly when pilots reacted to low-speed situations (Charles, 
2000). Advisory Circular (AC) 91-79A states that at no later than 1000 feet above 
touchdown in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) or 500 feet above touchdown 
in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), the pilot flying should have the aircraft 
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established on the correct final approach course and glidepath, at the appropriate airspeed 
and vertical velocity, and in the correct configuration (Federal Aviation Administration 
[FAA], 2018c). Figure 2 provides a depiction of the stabilized approach concept. The 
pilot monitoring (PM) calls out deviations, which the pilot flying (PF) must acknowledge 
with positive corrections initiated. Significant deviations result in an unstable approach 
(UA), requiring abandoning the approach and bringing the aircraft back around for 
another approach attempt (Albright, 2014). 
 
Figure 2 
Stabilized Approach Concept   
 
Note. Adapted from “Air Traffic Procedures Bulletin, 2019-1,” by FAA, 2019, p. 2. 
 
The flight crew strives to prevent these deviations by careful control of the 
airspeed and altitude, along with other approach parameters, to control the aircraft’s 
energy state. An aircraft’s energy state in flight consists of three components: potential, 
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kinetic, and chemical. The potential energy is the aircraft's altitude above the ground, 
kinetic energy is the aircraft’s airspeed, and chemical energy is the fuel onboard the 
aircraft (Merkt, 2013). In level, constant airspeed flight, the potential and kinetic energy 
states are stable, while burning fuel to create enough thrust to overcome drag decreases 
the chemical energy level. Changing aircraft configuration, such as retracting or 
extending the landing gear, can change the amount of drag resulting in a change in the 
fuel burn rate. The fuel’s chemical energy may also increase either the kinetic energy by 
increasing the airspeed, the potential energy by increasing the altitude, or both 
simultaneously. 
Further, the flight crew can interchange energy between potential and kinetic 
forms. Allowing the aircraft to slow in a climb converts some kinetic energy into 
potential energy. Likewise, if the aircraft accelerates in a descent, some potential energy 
is converted into kinetic energy. In aviation, the term energy management (EM) refers to 
control of the three energy states. As described by Airbus, EM is “. . . continuously 
controlling each parameter: airspeed, thrust, configuration and flight path, and in 
transiently trading one parameter for another” (Airbus, 2005, p. 2). Flight crews perform 
EM by maintaining the altitude and airspeed within the desired parameters, and 
controlling the rates of change of both. 
Establishing the aircraft on the correct final approach course and glidepath, at the 
appropriate airspeed and vertical velocity, and in the correct configuration, results in the 
aircraft being at a particular energy level. Too little energy results in landing difficulties 
such as excessive sink rate, which may generate a hard landing, or landing with an 
excessive pitch attitude, which may result in a tailstrike (Airbus, 2005; Veillette, 2016). 
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Too much energy may also result in landing difficulties. The aircraft may float, 
producing a long touchdown, which reduces the runway available to decelerate to taxi 
speed. A touchdown with excessive speed can result in excessive braking, leading to 
brake overheating, brake fires, and blown tires. If there is insufficient runway remaining 
to decelerate, the aircraft may depart the runway into or beyond the overrun (Veillette, 
2016). It is incumbent on the flight crew to properly manage the aircraft’s energy state to 
execute a safe approach and landing. 
Proper EM is the key to setting up and executing a stabilized approach, beginning 
at the initial descent from cruising altitude. For example, as the aircraft begins the initial 
descent from cruise altitude, it usually starts from a stable airspeed and altitude cruise. If 
the pilot changes the flight path from level flight to descent without changing the thrust 
or configuration, the aircraft will accelerate. The configuration must be changed to 
increase drag, or thrust reduced, to maintain a stable airspeed. If the new descending 
flight path is steep enough, the reduction of thrust to idle may not prevent acceleration. In 
such a case, a configuration change that would increase drag, such as extending spoilers, 
would also be required to maintain airspeed. During the descent from cruise altitude, the 
crew should be striving to arrive at the final approach fix (FAF) at the desired 
configuration, altitude, and airspeed (Veillette, 2016). Early awareness that the aircraft is 
higher than desired allows the PF to correct the energy state by slowing earlier to 
compensate for the additional descent needed. Too much airspeed may require an earlier 
configuration to increase drag and, therefore, deceleration. As noted by Airbus (2005), 
“decelerating on a 3-degree glide path in clean configuration usually is not possible” (p. 
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3). The earlier any deviations from the desired energy state are detected, the more EM 
options are available to the aircrew. 
Other factors have the potential to influence the flight crew's EM. “A high level of 
mental workload is associated with an increased risk of pilot operational errors” (Zhang 
et al., 2019, p. 829). Improper EM is considered a type of operational error. 
Environmental factors, such as conducting the approach during day or night lighting 
conditions, may influence EM via changes in pilot performance (Zhang et al., 2019). 
Flightcrew-related factors, such as the experience of the pilot flying the approach or 
continuously high pilot task loading, may also impact pilot performance, and thus EM 
(Keller et al., 2019; Wanyan et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019). Additional factors, such as 
whether the approach is hand-flown by the pilot or accomplished on autopilot, may have 
an impact on EM as well (Mouloua et al., 2019). During flight, the Flight Data 
Monitoring (FDM) system is continuously recording EM variables. 
Flight Data Monitoring systems make it possible to review the EM practices of 
the flight crew and their success in controlling the energy state of the aircraft throughout 
the flight. The terms FDM and Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) are often 
used interchangeably; this study used FDM for consistency. These systems record 
hundreds, even thousands, of parameters at rates up to 32 hertz and at very high fidelity 
(SAFRAN, 2012). Ground analysis of these data allows for the creation of even more 
data calculated from recorded information. Through the analysis of FDM information, it 
may be possible to learn if EM practices exhibited during the descent and approach 
phases of flight can indicate the probability of a UA event occurrence. 
7 
 
The current literature regarding EM appeared to mostly focus on three primary 
areas: continuous descent operations (CDO), prevention of loss of control incidents, and 
energy awareness aids for pilots. Continuous descent operations involve minimizing or 
eliminating level-flight segments during the descent phase of flight. The intent of CDO is 
to minimize fuel consumption, emissions, and noise (Prats et al., 2014). Studies in the 
area of preventing loss of control focus on maintaining sufficient energy to safely 
maneuver the aircraft at all times (Merkt, 2013). Additionally, studies have been 
conducted over the years to examine ways to use the technology available at the time to 
provide pilots with some form of indicator in the cockpit to provide a visual 
representation of the energy state of the aircraft (Baker, 2017; Noyes, 2007; Zagalsky, 
1973). Thus, the current literature in the field of aircraft EM has focused on efficiency, 
safety, and situational awareness, but lacked a focus on the relationships between EM, 
potential moderating variables (MVs), and UA events. 
Statement of the Problem 
The most critical phase of flight is the final approach and landing phase. Although 
it accounts for only 4% of the flight time, it is where 49% of commercial jet mishaps 
historically occur (Boeing, 2018). One of the keys to improving the safety of the final 
approach and landing phase of flight is to utilize the stabilized approach concept (FAA, 
2018c). Many variables impact the accomplishment of a stabilized approach, some of 
which are captured directly via FDM. Post-flight analysis of the FDM information may 
reveal others. Thus, the flight parameters that are indicators of EM practices can be found 
or derived from the FDM information. 
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Since EM is a critical component of a stabilized approach, poor control of EM 
variables will likely increase the probability of UAs. The EM variables related to UAs 
had not been identified through a statistical study of the FDM information available. If a 
specific relationship can be identified between an EM variable and the probability of a 
UA event, the EM variable can be considered a UA predictor. Unfortunately, current 
practices in the airline industry only tabulate UAs that have occurred and do not 
proactively address any such predictor EM variables. The current literature appeared to 
lack studies investigating possible relationships between EM variables and UA events. 
Additional detail on the current literature is provided in Chapter II. 
Non-EM variables, such as environmental conditions or flight crew related 
factors, may exert an influence on the predicting EM variables. Like the EM variables, 
the FDM system may capture some of these variables. Others may require calculation 
from the FDM information. Still others may be found outside of the FDM system 
altogether. These MVs may either increase or decrease the effect a predicting EM 
variable has on a UA event’s probability. Identifying these MVs and their effects provide 
further clarity on the relationships between EM and UA events. The review of current 
literature on the possible influences these MVs might have on EM as related to UAs 
revealed an apparent lack of such studies. Again, the literature review in Chapter II 
provides additional detail. 
Purpose Statement 
The intent of this study was to utilize statistical analysis to identify relationships 
between the EM variables found in FDM information and the probability of the 
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occurrence of a UA for a particular flight. In addition, the study sought to identify 
possible relationships between MVs and the EM variables that influence UAs. 
Significance of the Study 
The study seeks to identify the relationships between certain flight variables and 
UA events using FDM information. The analysis herein should lead to an improved 
understanding of the EM predictors of UA events, and the influence of possible MVs. 
The outcome of the study should make valuable contributions, both practical and 
theoretical. 
The practical contributions of this effort are in the area of aviation safety. By 
identifying the relationships between EM variables and UA events, safety practitioners 
have new information to investigate UA events. The results also provide those tasked 
with developing training programs for flight crews with information to create focused 
training modules identifying critical EM variables. Increased awareness of these EM 
issues enables pilots to be more vigilant at the key EM points, to prevent errors. Increased 
awareness may also help pilots recognize sooner when a critical EM problem has begun, 
facilitating quicker corrective actions. With this enhanced knowledge, flight crews are 
better equipped to avoid the EM errors that have a high probability of leading to a UA, 
thus increasing flight safety. 
In addition to its practical contributions, the study provides theoretical 
contributions to the body of knowledge by exploring areas that appeared neglected in the 
current literature. A review of the current literature appeared to reveal a lack of 
significant research of aircraft EM variables concerning UAs. The current literature also 
seemed to lack significant investigation into the possible impact any MVs may have on 
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how these predicting EM variables affect the occurrence of UAs. Identifying the EM 
variables and possible MVs that influence the probability of a UA event is the first step in 
filling these research gaps. The study also identified significant areas for further research 
to expand further the body of knowledge in this area. 
Research Questions 
The genesis of the current study was examining how the EM variables influence 
the occurrence of UA events. The flight crew executes the descent from cruise flight 
through the approach and landing following generally accepted rules-of-thumb and 
standard operating procedures. How well the flight crew performs the descent and 
approach is recorded by the FDM system, which allows for analysis of the EM variables 
selected. Three of the EM variables, late start of descent, high speed below 10,000 feet, 
and use of spoilers on descent, cover the descent phase. The remaining four, distance to 
the destination at landing gear extension, airspeed at landing gear extension, distance to 
the destination at flap extension, and airspeed at flap extension, address the approach 
phase. The overall question of the impacts these EM variables exert on UA probability 
was broken down into seven hypotheses, each related to an element of the descent and 
approach reflected in an EM variable. 
The review of the literature regarding the EM variables and UA events revealed 
other non-EM factors that impact UA events, as well as other approach and landing phase 
events. Four of those non-EM factors, lighting, experience (by proxy of who is flying), 
duration of flight, and automation use, are identifiable within the FDM information. It 
was postulated that these non-EM factors might exert a moderating influence on the EM 
variables, leading to the expansion of the study to include a second research question on 
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how these four factors, now the MVs, may moderate the influence of the EM variables. 
Since each relationship between EM and MV pair is likely to be different, this resulted in 
an additional 28 hypotheses related to the MVs. The research questions and associated 
hypotheses are presented below. 
1. Research Question (RQ) 1: What are the impacts of EM variables on the 
occurrence of UAs? 
Hypothesis (H) 1a1: A longer delay in the start of descent is associated 
with an increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H1b1: High-speed below 10,000 feet is associated with an increase in the 
probability of having a UA. 
H1c1: Higher airspeed at gear extension is associated with an increase in 
the probability of having a UA. 
H1d1: A shorter distance to destination at gear extension is associated with 
an increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H1e1: Higher airspeed at flap extension is associated with an increase in 
the probability of having a UA. 
H1f1: A shorter distance to destination at flap extension is associated with 
an increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H1g1: Using spoilers on descent is associated with an increase in the 
probability of having a UA. 
2. RQ2: How do MVs moderate the effects of EM variables on the 
occurrence of UAs? 
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H2aa1: A longer delay in the start of descent, when moderated by reduced 
lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2ba1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by reduced 
lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2ca1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by reduced 
lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2da1: A shorter distance to destination at gear extension, when 
moderated by reduced lighting, is associated with a further increase in the 
probability of having a UA. 
H2ea1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by reduced 
lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2fa1: A shorter distance to destination at flap extension, when moderated 
by reduced lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability 
of having a UA. 
H2ga1: Using spoilers on descent, when moderated by reduced lighting, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2ab1: A longer delay in the start of descent, when moderated by pilot 
inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the probability of 
having a UA. 
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H2bb1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by pilot 
inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the probability of 
having a UA. 
H2cb1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by pilot 
inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the probability of 
having a UA. 
H2db1: A shorter distance to destination at gear extension, when 
moderated by pilot inexperience, is associated with a further increase in 
the probability of having a UA. 
H2eb1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by pilot 
inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the probability of 
having a UA. 
H2fb1: A shorter distance to destination at flap extension, when moderated 
by pilot inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the 
probability of having a UA. 
H2gb1: Using spoilers on descent, when moderated by pilot inexperience, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2ac1: A longer delay in the start of descent, when moderated by 
decreased duration, is associated with a further increase in the probability 
of having a UA. 
H2bc1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by decreased 




H2cc1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by decreased 
duration, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2dc1: A shorter distance to destination at gear extension, when 
moderated by decreased duration, is associated with a further increase in 
the probability of having a UA. 
H2ec1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by decreased 
duration, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2fc1: A shorter distance to destination at flap extension, when moderated 
by decreased duration, is associated with a further increase in the 
probability of having a UA. 
H2gc1: Using spoilers on descent, when moderated by decreased duration, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2ad1: A longer delay in the start of descent, when moderated by non-
automated flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of 
having a UA. 
H2bd1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by non-automated 
flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2cd1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by non-
automated flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of 
having a UA. 
15 
 
H2dd1: A shorter distance to destination at gear extension, when 
moderated by non-automated flight, is associated with a further increase in 
the probability of having a UA. 
H2ed1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by non-
automated flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of 
having a UA. 
H2fd1: A shorter distance to destination at flap extension, when moderated 
by non-automated flight, is associated with a further increase in the 
probability of having a UA. 
H2gd1: Using spoilers on descent, when moderated by non-automated 
flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
The number of EM variables and MVs mandates a large number of hypotheses. 
Due to the complexity and number of hypotheses for RQ2, a hypothesis identification 





RQ2 Hypothesis Identification Matrix  
 Moderating Variables 
EM Variables Lighting Experience Duration Automation 
Late Start 2aa 2ab 2ac 2ad 
High Speed 2ba 2bb 2bc 2bd 
Gear Speed 2ca 2cb 2cc 2cd 
Gear Dist 2da 2db 2dc 2dd 
Flap Speed 2ea 2eb 2ec 2ed 
Flap Dist 2fa 2fb 2fc 2fd 
Speed Brake 2ga 2gb 2gc 2gd 
 
Note. Dist = Distance. 
 
Delimitations 
While the study's investigative approach applies to all phases of flight, the data 
analysis will be limited to identifying relationships between UAs and EM variables, and 
possible MVs only. Since approach and landing phase mishaps are the most common, 
addressing this area has the highest potential to positively impact aviation safety 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2014). Analysis of the variables in multiple 
phases of flight would substantially increase the time required to process the FDM 
information. Only the flight phases from the initiation of the descent from cruise to the 
final approach have a substantial effect on UAs. Therefore, while the approach may help 
identify other such deficiencies in other phases of flight, the inclusion of flight phases 
outside those indicated would have added little, if anything, to the investigation. 
The present study focused on the relationships between identifiable EM variables 
and UAs, and the impact of possible MVs on that relationship. While there may be other 
non-EM variables that influence UAs, such variables were not relevant to this 
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investigation. These non-EM variables were also not captured by the FDM system. 
Further, the inclusion of various other possible predictors of UAs could distort the studied 
variables' effects. The study excluded the examination of UA predictors that were not 
related to EM and the MVs to avoid such potential distortion.  
The FDM dataset was limited to the 20 months provided by the PA. This dataset 
included all flights where the airborne systems captured valid FDM data between April 
1st, 2016, to November 30th, 2017. Any impacts on the occurrences of UAs related to 
changes to operational procedures or regulations taking effect after November 30th, 
2017, are not reflected in the data. 
Limitations and Assumptions 
Only one airline participated in the larger EM/FDM project, limiting the sample 
to a single airline. Concerning the results, the significance lies in the analysis process 
itself, rather than the dataset. While the dataset was crucial to the study, the analysis 
process is of greater importance. The analysis successfully identified several EM variable 
predictors of UAs within the sample dataset; the resulting analysis process should be 
repeatable with any other airline's FDM information. Additionally, the analysis process 
may apply to other issues for which FDM information is available and other phases of 
flight.  
It was assumed that similar jet transport aircraft are affected by the same EM 
variables and MVs in the same or very similar fashion. Aerodynamic principles of large, 
swept-wing commercial jet airplanes are similar among all manufacturers (Carbaugh et 
al., 1998). The fleet of aircraft used by the PA consisted of single-aisle, twin-engine 
turbojet transport aircraft seating between approximately 100 and 200 passengers and 
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maximum takeoff weights between 120,000 and 210,000 pounds. Energy management 
characteristics within this class of aircraft will vary little among models or manufacturers. 
Therefore, the results of this study should be generalizable across similar jet fleets. 
It is common among jet air carriers that promotions to Captain are seniority-
based. Pilots are hired as First Officers (FOs) and gain experience operating the carrier's 
aircraft, company Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and destinations under a 
Captain's supervision. The most senior FOs usually fill vacant Captain positions through 
a seniority bidding process. Therefore, Captains will likely have more experience in the 
PA’s aircraft and SOPs. The Captain will likely also have more experience operating into 
the PA’s destinations. Thus, it was assumed that Captains have more experience than 
FOs.  
Since the dataset was constrained to a single airline, this limitation may introduce 
biases related to the airline's culture, the airline's training program, and the culture of the 
ethnographic region from which the majority of pilots within the population originate. 
Fortunately, the PA’s operating standards, procedures, and training comply with ICAO 
standards. Compliance with ICAO recommendations provides standardized regulations 
internationally. While there may be some procedural differences between airlines, the 
results should be applicable to any airline operating the same type aircraft within the 
same regulatory structure. Nations that are ICAO member states agree to establish a 
regulatory environment for air carrier operations and training, as well as air navigation 
standards, that conform to ICAO standards and recommended practices. Aircrew training 
is addressed in ICAO document 9868, Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Training 
(ICAO, 2015). It was assumed that all airlines operating from ICAO member states 
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comply with very similar operations standards and practices. It was also assumed that all 
such airlines are using similar training programs. Thus, the PA’s operating practices, 
standards, and training programs were very similar to many other airlines operating 
worldwide. This commonality with many other airlines significantly assists in the 
generalizability of the study across differing pilot groups. 
The assumptions above, that the effects of EM variables and MVs are similar 
across similar jet transport fleets and that operating standards, practices, and training are 
similar across pilot groups and airlines, homogenizing global airline industry operations, 
are foundational to the study. The findings of this study should be generalizable to other 
airlines operating under ICAO rules within their aircraft fleets that are similar to the type 
used in this study. The fleet of aircraft used by the PA consists of single-aisle, twin-
engine turbojet transport aircraft seating between approximately 100 and 200 passengers 
and maximum takeoff weights between 120,000 and 210,000 pounds. Energy 
management characteristics within this class of aircraft will vary little among models or 
manufacturers. And ICAO-compliance provides standardized regulations internationally. 
There may be some procedural differences between airlines, but the results should be 
applicable to any airline operating the same type aircraft within the same regulatory 
structure. Therefore, while this effort's specific outcomes are limited to the PA, the 
process should be generalizable to other airlines. 
Summary 
The approach and landing phase of flight is identified as having the most 
considerable risk of an accident. The concept of the stabilized approach seeks to 
minimize variation from the ideal approach parameters to reduce this risk. Proper 
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execution of a stabilized approach requires sound EM practices. Other variables may 
exist that influence EM. Exceeding the allowable variation results in a UA, which 
increases the risk of an accident. Analysis of FDM information may help identify 
relationships between EM, the possible MVs, and UAs. 
The following chapters examine the current literature in these areas and identify 
gaps in the literature. The study is explained, including the research methods selected, the 
population and sampling scheme, and the process of collecting and analyzing the data. 
The results are presented, along with conclusions and recommendations that arose from 
the research. 
Definitions of Terms 
14 CFR Part 121 Part 121 within Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations which contains the operating requirements 
for domestic, flag, and supplemental air carrier 
operations (FAA, 2020). 
Analysis Ground Station Software suite used to review, interpret, and analyze 
FDM information downloaded from the aircraft. 
Energy Management The control and exchange of altitude, airspeed, thrust, 
and drag to establish the aircraft in the desired energy 
state. 
Flag Operations Any U.S. air carrier operations, utilizing turbojet 
aircraft with nine or more passenger seats or a payload 
capacity of more than 7,500 pounds, that originate 
within the U.S. or its territories or possessions to a 
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point outside the U.S. or its territories or possessions, 
or from within the 48 contiguous states to a point 
outside the contiguous 48 states, or originate and 
terminate at points outside the U.S. (FAA, 2011). 
Flap Dist This continuous variable captures the distance from the 
point where the flap lever is selected to any position 
beyond the up position to the point of landing. 
Flap Speed This continuous variable captures the airspeed when 
the flap lever is selected to any position beyond the up 
position. 
Flight Data Monitoring A system that records vast amounts of data during 
flight for later review and analysis, predominately for 
maintenance and safety functions. 
Flight Data Recorder The device onboard the aircraft that records the FDM 
information for both routine analysis and accident 
investigation. 
Gatekeeper The person(s) having the resources to link FDM data to 
crewmembers (FAA, 2004). 
Gear Dist This continuous variable captures the distance from the 
point where the landing gear handle is selected to the 
down position to the point of landing. 
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Gear Speed This continuous variable captures the airspeed when 
the landing gear handle is selected to the down 
position. 
High Speed This categorical variable captures events where the 
aircraft airspeed exceeds 250 KIAS below 10,000 feet. 
This variable is coded with a value of 1.0 above 250 
KIAS. 
International Civil Aviation 
Organization 
A body of the United Nations working with 193 
member States to develop and implement international 
aviation standards. 
Late Start This categorical variable captures events where the 
descent from cruise altitude begins at 95% of the 
distance calculated by the equation 
Distance = Altitude/1000 * 3. 
Moderation The effect when a “second independent variable 
changes the form of the relationship between another 
independent variable and the dependent variable” (Hair 
et al., 2010, p. 180). 
Multicollinearity “Correlation among three or more independent 
variables (Hair et al., 2010, p. 165). 
Pilot Flying The flight crew member responsible for actual control 
of the aircraft during flight. 
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Pilot Monitoring The flight crew member responsible for monitoring 
navigation, communications, and systems, as well as 
the action of the Pilot Flying, in flight. 
Runway Excursion An aircraft unintentionally leaving the runway surface, 
either by running off the side or end, on takeoff or 
landing. 
Speed Brake This categorical variable captures whether the spoilers 
were extended during the descent from cruise altitude 
to landing. This variable is coded 0.0 if the spoilers are 
not used, and 1.0 if they are. 
Spoilers A flight control that significantly decreases lift on a 
section of the wing, while simultaneously increasing 
drag, allowing the pilot to increase descent rate and/or 
decrease airspeed rapidly when activated. Also known 
as Speed Brake. 
Stabilized Approach An approach to landing where, at no later than 1000 
feet above touchdown in Instrument Meteorological 
Conditions (IMC) or 500 feet above touchdown in 
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), the pilot 
flying has the aircraft established on the correct final 
approach course and glidepath, at the appropriate 
airspeed and vertical velocity, and in the correct 
configuration (FAA, 2018c). 
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Supplemental Operations Any U.S. air carrier operations where the carrier and 
the customer, or the customer's representative, 
specifically negotiate departure time and location, and 
arrival location (FAA, 2011). 
Tailstrike When the aft fuselage of an aircraft impacts the ground 
during landing. 
Unstable Approach An approach to landing that has not met stabilized 
approach criteria. For the categorical variable Unstable 
Approach, a UA occurred and is identified by the FDM 
system with a value of 1.0. 
  
 
List of Acronyms 
AC Advisory Circular 
ACS Airman Certification Standards 
AGS Analysis Ground Station 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATP Airline Transport Pilot 
AUC Area Under the Curve 
CATS Crew Activity Tracking System 
CDO Continuous Descent Operations 
CFIT Controlled Flight into Terrain 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
DM Data Mining 
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DV Dependent Variable 
EM Energy Management 
ERAU Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
EUROCAE European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAF Final Approach Fix 
FDAU Flight Data Acquisition Unit 
FDM Flight Data Monitoring 
FDR Flight Data Recorder 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HL Hosmer and Lemeshow 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
IRB Institutional Review Board 
IV Independent Variable 
LOC Localizer Landing System 
LR Logistic Regression 
MPS Minimum Performance Standards 
MV Moderating Variable 
NM Nautical Miles 
PA Participating Airline 
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PAC Percentage Accuracy in Classification 
PF Pilot Flying 
PM Pilot Monitoring 
QAR Quick Access Recorder 
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic 
SA Situational Awareness 
SAW Stabilized Approach Window 
TDZE Touchdown Zone Elevation 
TSO Technical Standards Order 
UA Unstable approach 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VIF Variance Inflation Factor 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 




Chapter II: Review of the Relevant Literature 
The current literature related to the study covered several important topics. This 
chapter explores the relevant literature concerning aircraft EM, UAs, and FDM. The 
following review reveals the research gaps in these principal areas. The variables of 
interest and the research model are presented as well as the justifications for the 
hypotheses.  
Unstable Approaches 
During takeoff, the aircraft is climbing away from the ground at the highest 
allowable thrust setting, rapidly accelerating through the critical slow-speed regime. The 
takeoff phase of flight, representing only 2% of flight time, experiences infrequent 
mishaps. Only 12% of the fatal accidents in worldwide commercial jet operations 
occurred in this flight phase in the decade from 2008 to 2017 (Boeing, 2018). However, 
during approach and landing, the aircraft is descending toward the ground and operating 
in the slow-speed regime.  
The final approach and landing represent just 4% of flight time but account for 
nearly half (49%) of the fatal accidents in worldwide commercial jet operations in the 
decade from 2008-2017 (Boeing, 2018). The disproportionate frequency of fatal 
accidents in the approach and landing flight phases led to a renewed emphasis on 
adhering to stabilized approach criteria (Slatter, 1997). The FAA states in AC 91-79A 
that “a stabilized approach is the safest profile, and it is one of the most critical elements 
to ensure a safe approach to a landing operation”  (FAA, 2018c, p. A1-3). Striving to 
maintain stabilized approach criteria reduces deviations from desired parameters. 
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According to the Flight Safety Foundation, focusing to maintain stabilized 
approach criteria provides other benefits as well. By focusing on flying a stabilized 
approach, the flight crew will also benefit from increased horizontal awareness, vertical 
awareness, airspeed awareness, and energy-condition awareness (Flight Safety 
Foundation [FSF], 2009b). By working diligently to maintain the proper ground track, the 
flight crew will have increased awareness of the aircraft's horizontal position along the 
final approach course and any deviations and trends. Striving to maintain the proper 
glidepath allows the crew better awareness of the aircraft's vertical position and the 
descent rate, deviations, and trends. By concentrating on maintaining the proper airspeed, 
the crew will maintain better awareness of current airspeed, margin to the minimum safe 
speed, deviations from the desired speed, and any trends. Increased energy-condition 
awareness is gained from observing the thrust setting required to maintain the stabilized 
approach criteria and noting deviations from the norm (FSF, 2009b). From this, it is 
evident that there are significant safety benefits from striving to maintain stabilized 
approach criteria. 
Various sources contain guidance on criteria that defines a stabilized approach. 
Advisory Circular 91-79A contains the FAA guidance regarding stabilized approaches. 
This document describes a stabilized approach window (SAW) at 1000’ above the 
runway touchdown zone elevation (TDZE) in IMC, or 500’ above TDZE in VMC (FAA, 
2018c). The aircraft should be configured for landing, in trim, on-course (+/- 1 dot of 
localizer deviation), on-glidepath (+/- 1 dot of glideslope deviation), and at the 
appropriate airspeed (+5/-0 of computed reference speed) with a descent rate appropriate 
for the groundspeed (FAA, 2018c). A maximum descent rate of 1000 feet per minute is a 
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common standard for jet operations (George, 2007). The Flight Safety Foundation’s 
Approach and Landing Accident Reduction task force published stabilized approach 
criteria in their ALAR Briefing Note 4.1, which substantially matches the FAA's criteria 
with additional guidance for unique procedures and abnormal conditions (FSF, 2009a). 
Having met the stabilized approach criteria at the window, the pilot must remain vigilant.  
[I]t's essential to maintain such tight tolerances all the way to touchdown. Strict 
adherence to such stabilized approach [standard operating procedures] minimizes 
the probability of a landing accident. Indeed, when [Business & Commercial 
Aviation magazine] reviewed two decades of NTSB turbine aircraft approach and 
landing accident and incident reports, we found one or more lapses in stabilized 
approach discipline were factors in virtually every mishap, except for a scant few 
events involving mechanical failures. (George, 2007, p. 4) 
The PA for this study has established stabilized approach criteria that do not differentiate 
between instrument or visual conditions. All flights are to use a SAW of 1000 feet above 
field elevation. The PA also specified that the aircraft is to be in the landing configuration 
with the thrust set to maintain airspeed. The pilots are also to have all briefings and 
checklists completed before reaching the SAW (Flight crew operations manual, 2017). 
Moderating Factors 
The flight crew has numerous tasks to accomplish in preparation for the approach 
and landing while maintaining proper EM, making the descent from cruise altitude to 
landing a high workload phase of flight (Schvaneveldt et al., 2001). There are possible 
MVs, factors that may influence the flight crew's ability to maintain proper EM while 
completing the required tasks. Various studies have touched on some of these variables, 
30 
 
including whether the approach is accomplished during day or night, the experience of 
the PF, the duration of the flight (contributing to increased workload), and whether the 
approach is hand-flown or coupled to the autopilot. 
Lighting. As day transitions through twilight into night, the loss of ambient 
lighting restricts visibility. During night approaches, many perceptual cues pilots use to 
determine spatial position with reference to the ground are unavailable. Also, cockpit 
instruments and approach documents can be more challenging to read, leading to EM 
errors. In a study by Kelly and Efthymiou (2019) that analyzed controlled flight into 
terrain (CFIT) mishaps, visibility issues were a factor in 94% of the accidents. In a CFIT 
mishap, the flight crew has failed to maintain altitude awareness, whereas a UA is often 
attributed to a loss of energy awareness. The referenced work did not differentiate among 
different potential visibility restrictions. Instead, night conditions, weather, and other 
restrictions to vision were considered together regarding CFIT accidents. The study did 
note that “[i]t became a critical factor when weather, haze, or darkness restricted the 
vision of the flight crew to a point where normal duties were effected” (Kelly & 
Efthymiou, 2019, p. 162). Generally, the lighting conditions of day, twilight, or night 
impact the flight during a substantial part of the descent through to the approach. While 
the FDM system of the PA captured whether the approach and landing were conducted in 
day or night conditions, weather conditions were not. 
Experience. The experience level of the PF may also influence EM concerning 
UAs. A more experienced pilot is expected to have better judgment and a better ability to 
assess the aircraft's energy state than a less experienced pilot (Zhang et al., 2019). 
Contrarily, a study by Todd and Thomas (2012) investigated the impact of pilot 
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experience on the execution of stabilized approaches. Their work found “. . . no 
statistically significant difference between the performance of Captains and First Officers 
against the stabilized approach criteria used . . .” in their analysis (Todd & Thomas, 
2012). The FDM system in the study indicates which pilot (Captain or FO) was flying the 
approach but did not provide specifics regarding that pilot’s experience. 
Duration. Duration impacts all pilots' performance regardless of their experience, 
interfering with mental acuity and decision making. For shorter duration flights, the 
required tasks for flight (start, taxi, takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach, and landing) 
occur quickly with limited breaks in the activity. Additionally, these shorter flights allow 
limited time for planning the descent and approach phase. The lack of breaks in activity 
results in increased mental workload, which is “associated with decreased accuracy rate 
of detecting abnormal information and longer reaction time” (Wanyan et al., 2018, p. 5). 
The portion of the flight from beginning the descent from cruise through parking at the 
gate at the end of the flight is a noted high-workload environment (Bennett, 2019). Short-
duration flights, therefore, with the inherently limited time under higher workloads to 
plan the descent phase, may impact pilot decision making, resulting in poor EM 
decisions, potentially leading to a UA. 
Automation. Jet transport aircraft are equipped with sophisticated auto-flight 
systems capable of much greater precision than the human pilot. These systems follow 
the programmed route of flight and are also capable of following a vertical profile. The 
vertical profile is the desired climb and descent schedule. Some are capable of flying the 
aircraft throughout the approach, landing, and even the after-landing rollout. In many 
aircraft, the auto-flight system includes auto-throttles which can maintain the selected 
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airspeed (and thus, energy level), which may even be supplied by the system. Adequately 
monitored, the auto-flight system can relieve the flight crew of a significant amount of 
workload. 
Regardless of whether the system includes auto-throttles, the flight crew is 
responsible for ensuring that the aircraft is at the appropriate energy level at all times. 
When flight crews become over-reliant on the auto-flight systems, they may lose 
awareness of the energy state. While their paper was specific to CFIT, Kelly and 
Efthymiou (2019) note the risk of over-reliance on automation: 
[Situational awareness (SA)] is essentially a pilot's ability to retain an accurate 
mental model, in three-dimensional space of the aircraft's position, altitude, speed, 
and prediction of the aircraft's future path, etc. Loss of SA can occur due to poor 
workload management, conflicting information, weather conditions, lack of 
aircraft systems knowledge, and inadequate planning. An increased reliance on 
automation is also viewed as a major contributing factor. Aircraft automation 
exists to aid flight crew in conducting a safer flight. Complacency and a lack of 
vigilance, when system monitoring is required, can result in a loss of SA with 
devastating consequences. This complacency can be attributed to the human 
operators over dependence on an aircraft's automated systems. (p. 156) 
The loss of situational awareness discussed above includes losing energy awareness. 
Proper EM depends upon proper energy awareness. Moreover, pilots heavily reliant on 
the auto-flight system to maintain the energy state may have difficulty with EM when 
hand-flying during the descent and approach. 
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With the emphasis placed on stabilized approaches by regulators and operators, 
there are few UAs. A 2006 Boeing study of 5,609 approaches found that only 245 were 
UAs, or just 4.4% (Graeber, 2006). While approximately 4% of approaches are unstable, 
this 4% accounts for 40% of approach and landing accidents (Veillette, 2016). The errors 
are often EM problems and occur on both the high and low sides of the desired 
parameters. According to an analysis by Airbus: 
Approximately 70% of rushed approaches and UAs involve incorrect 
management of the aircraft energy level, resulting in an excess or deficit of 
energy, as follows:  
• Being slow and/or low on approach: 40% of events  
• Being fast and/or high on approach: 30% of events. (Airbus, 2005, p. 2)  
These statistics point to the likelihood that flight crews are having difficulties evaluating 
the aircraft energy state, controlling the energy state, or both. Such problems are often 
cited as a causal factor regarding UAs (Airbus, 2005). In 1997, Continental Airlines 
added EM as part of their recurrent training program. In their 2000 Line Oriented Safety 
Audit, Continental observed a reduction in UAs of 70% over the previous four years 
(Wagener & Ison, 2014). Such training, however, is not universal, nor is it mandatory. 
Flight Data Monitoring 
Advances in flight data recorder (FDR) technology made FDM possible. Flight 
data recorders are as old as aviation itself. Two of aviation’s most historic flights 
included the use of such recorders. 
Wilbur and Orville Wright’s historic first flight was documented by the first flight 
data recorder. This rudimentary device recorded propeller rotation, distance 
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traveled through the air, and flight duration. Charles Lindbergh’s airplane the 
Spirit of St. Louis was also fitted with a flight-recording device. Lindbergh’s 
recorder was [more] sophisticated, employing a barograph that marked changes in 
barometric pressure or altitude on a rotating paper cylinder. (Grossi, 1999, p. 7) 
The earliest FDRs used in airliners utilized a metal foil tape. As this tape moved at a 
constant rate, styli marked the foil to indicate basic aircraft parameters of heading, 
airspeed, altitude, and vertical acceleration with the time recorded by the advancement of 
the foil. Such recorders were mandated in the U.S. by the Civil Aeronautics Authority in 
1957 (Grossi, 1999). They were required to be crash protected to facilitate accident 
investigation efforts. Requirements for FDRs remained unchanged until 1972 when 
digital technology enabled the recording of many more parameters, and magnetic tape 
replaced foil. This allowed the requirements to increase to include recording “pitch and 
roll attitude, thrust for each engine, flap position, flight control input or control surface 
position, lateral acceleration, pitch trim, and thrust reverser position for each engine, but 
only for aircraft certificated after 1969” (Grossi, 1999, p. 2). These requirements 
remained until the late 1980s with the introduction of solid-state FDRs.” 
The next significant technological advancement in FDR technology, solid-state 
memory, increased reliability and crash and fire survivability. It also allowed for 
increased storage capacity, as much as four times that of tape-based FDRs (Grossi, 1999). 
These advances also allowed for changes in FDR requirements in 1987 and 1988, 
including increasing the number of recorded parameters in older aircraft. The parameters 
for those aircraft certificated before 1969 were increased to include “pitch and roll 
attitude, longitudinal acceleration, the thrust of each engine, and control column or pitch 
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control surface position” (Grossi, 1999, p. 3). Requirements were updated once again in 
1997 that mandated: 
• transport airplanes type certificated before October 1, 1969, and manufactured 
before October 11, 1991, to record as a minimum the first 18 to 22 parameters 
listed in the rule by August 18, 2001; 
• transport airplanes manufactured after October 11, 1991, and before August 
18, 2001, to record as a minimum the first 34 parameters listed in the rule by 
August 18, 2001; 
• transport airplanes manufactured after August 18, 2000, must record as a 
minimum the first 57 FDR parameter listed in the rule; 
• transport airplanes manufactured after August 18, 2002, must record as a 
minimum all 88 FDR parameters listed in the rule. Transport airplanes 
manufactured after August 18, 2002, must record as a minimum all 88 FDR 
parameters listed in the rule. (Grossi, 1999, p. 3) 
The complete list of digital FDR systems parameters is found in Appendix E to 14 CFR 
Part 125, included in Table B2. To convert the various analog inputs from sensors 
throughout the aircraft into digital values that the FDR can record, the system often 
employs a flight data acquisition unit (FDAU) (FAA, 2004).  
Modern aircraft now include numerous digital systems. Digital control units now 
manage the engines, the pilot's instrument panels are predominately digital displays, and 
radio systems are now digital as well. Digital buses interconnect all these systems, which 
allows the FDAU to collect vast amounts of information by monitoring the data bus. Now 
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it is possible to record the information on the pilot's displays and the raw input from the 
sensors (Grossi, 1999). 
Another benefit coming from the advent of digital recording systems was the 
Quick Access Recorder (QAR). These devices record information provided by the FDAU 
but, unlike the FDRs, are not required to be crash survivable. QARs can record thousands 
of parameters; many more than required for the FDR to record. QARs enable the airline 
to access the recorded information accessing the FDR (Grossi, 1999). Airlines can then 
conduct a detailed analysis of the recorded data for various maintenance and operations 
purposes using the appropriate software (SAFRAN, 2012). This activity is known as 
FDM.  
Airlines use FDM information to monitor the aircraft's condition, identify any 
exceedances beyond aircraft limitations, and various safety issues. The analysis software 
rapidly sorts through the voluminous data and can identify data that indicates a need to 
perform maintenance on the aircraft. Some parameters, while still within normal 
operating limits, may indicate a trend that requires further investigation. Oil pressure 
fluctuations or a trend of slightly decreasing oil pressure may indicate a need to inspect or 
change an engine. Another issue might be an increase in the average fuel burn for a 
particular aircraft. Exceedances that previously required the aircrew to notice and write 
up for maintenance are now automatically identified. An indication of a flap overspeed 
may necessitate an inspection of the flaps. Alternatively, perhaps a hard landing is 
recorded, indicating a need to inspect the landing gear and airframe. The analysis 
software can identify singular events and identify trends for a single aircraft or across the 
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entire fleet. The information that FDM can provide to maintenance is vital to a proactive 
maintenance department. 
The analysis software can also identify operational issues to help enhance safety. 
The FDM can provide information on compliance with regulations and SOPs. One 
example could be the required use of heavy automatic braking at a particular airfield due 
to a short runway. The FDM system in modern transport category aircraft can record the 
autobraking system's settings and whether or not it was armed. If the airline finds that too 
many pilots are not following the procedure, the airline can publish a safety memo 
reminding the pilots of the necessity to comply with SOPs. The ability of FDM to 
identify and track safety issues is invaluable. 
The review of the literature found numerous studies investigating various uses of 
FDM information. Studies varied from papers on how various data mining (DM) 
techniques can be applied to FDM information to analyzing fuel flow data within FDM 
information to predict fuel consumption, to methods of enhancing current FDM analysis 
by tracking pilot actions. A selection of these studies are discussed below. However, 
these studies did not investigate the use of FDM information for the identification of 
relationships between poor EM practices and UA events. 
A study by Zhao, Li, and Wang (2017) examined the application of DM 
techniques to FDM information. Their work looked at how to apply various analysis 
techniques and described some of the problems that arise when applied to FDM 
information. One such problem is the dynamic nature of FDM information. They 
highlight the need to consider “…the spatial and temporal nature of flight data prior to 
assigning DM techniques” (Zhao et al., 2017, p. 397). The data within FDM is not the 
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same as a spreadsheet of responses to a survey, but rather slices of time and space 
concerning an aircraft in flight. 
Stolzer and Halford (2007) conducted an investigation of the use of FDM 
information evaluated methods of predicting fuel consumption by applying DM 
techniques to engine fuel flow data, calibrated airspeed, gross weight, and altitude. By 
applying several techniques, the researchers found that two methods of analysis provided 
excellent results over analysis by multiple regression methods (Stolzer & Halford, 2007). 
One goal of the research by Stolzer and Halford was to develop a tool that would enable 
airlines to identify aircraft experiencing fuel burn rates well outside the expected. 
A study by Callantine (2001) examined the possibility of expanding the 
capabilities of FDM to infer aircrew intent. The Crew Activity Tracking System (CATS) 
envisioned within the paper compared aircrew actions against a model of activity that is 
considered correct, to include acceptable alternative actions. The analysis showed that 
CATS would identify both commission and omission errors and identify errors that do 
not create a detectable deviation from standard procedures (Callantine, 2001).  
Aircraft Energy Management 
The topic of aircraft EM has been around since the earliest years of aviation. The 
military fighter pilot community has long taught about EM with respect to air-to-air 
combat (Shaw, 1985). Indeed, in its most rudimentary forms of airspeed and altitude, EM 
is mentioned in a book on World War I aviation published in 1918 (Molter, 1918). 
Having an energy edge over the adversary is one of the critical elements in maintaining 
the tactical advantage necessary to win, or at least survive, the fight. In U.S. civilian 
39 
 
aviation, teaching or evaluating EM was not an area required during the certification 
process until the most recent updates to the Airman Certification Standards (ACS).  
As of June 2019, the ACS specifically identify EM as an area of emphasis. The 
new ACS establishes a requirement that the “applicant demonstrates understanding of [a] 
stabilized approach, to include energy management concepts” (FAA, 2018a, p. 21; 
2018b, pp. 15-16; 2018d, p. 21; 2019, p. 21). These new standards apply to all new pilot 
certificate applicants, as well as new instrument rating applicants. The ACS for Private 
and Commercial pilot ratings offer little additional information explaining stabilized 
approaches. The ACS for the instrument rating, however, explains that “[a] stabilized 
approach is characterized by a constant angle, constant rate of descent approach profile 
ending near the touchdown point, where the landing maneuver begins”  (FAA, 2018b, p. 
A-16). The ACS for the Airline Transport Pilot certification goes further, stating: 
A stabilized approach is one in which the pilot establishes and maintains a 
constant angle glide path towards a predetermined point on the landing surface. It 
is based on the pilot’s judgment of certain visual clues and depends on the 
maintenance of a constant final descent airspeed and configuration. (FAA, 2019, 
p. A-24) 
While these explanations provide some additional information describing a stabilized 
approach, they lack the specificity found in AC 91-79A. Most notably, the ACS 
descriptions lack any emphasis on EM. 
While EM has not been an area of emphasis in civil aviation as a whole, EM is 
extensively taught in two subsets: gliders and aerobatics. In gliders, EM is exceptionally 
critical. Once launched from the winch, auto, or tow plane, the only source of added 
40 
 
energy is “. . . solely from natural forces, such as thermals and ridge waves” (FAA, 2013, 
pp. 1-4). The glider pilot must manage the aircraft's energy to remain aloft for the desired 
time and arrive at a landing point with sufficient energy to complete the necessary 
maneuvers for landing. For the aerobatic pilot, the “. . . conscious exchange of airspeed 
for altitude and back again is energy management and is a fundamental concept of 
performing aerobatic sequences” (Szurovy & Goulian, 1997, p. 20). In the airline 
industry, EM has primarily focused on the quest for fuel efficiency (Merkt, 2013). 
According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, in 2015, U.S. air carriers spent 
nearly 15% of all operating expenses for fuel (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2016). 
This is an increase from 10% reported in 2000, making it a critical metric within the 
airline industry (Stolzer, 2002). While fuel efficiency is essential, EM has a critical safety 
element as well. In all cases, operating the aircraft in a manner such that there is 
sufficient energy for the pilot to maintain control is critical. The top three causes of 
fatalities in commercial aviation, loss of control – in flight, runway excursions, and 
controlled flight into terrain, all have poor EM as a common element (Merkt, 2013). 
The total energy of an aircraft consists of three elements: chemical, potential, and 
kinetic (Merkt, 2013). The chemical energy is the fuel that the engine(s) convert into 
thrust. The energy attributable to the aircraft's height above the ground, or altitude, is 
potential energy. Kinetic energy is the energy of its motion through the air or airspeed. 
The equations for these two forms of energy are expressed by Equations 1 and 2 (Merkt, 
2013). 
𝐸𝐸! = 𝑚𝑚 ∙ 𝑔𝑔 ∙ ℎ  (1) 




EP = Potential energy 
EK = Kinetic Energy 
G = Acceleration of gravity 
H = Height 
M = Mass 
V = Velocity 
Total energy at any given moment is the sum of the instantaneous potential and 
kinetic energies per unit of weight. Adding the two equations together gives the total 
energy equation expressed in Equation 3 (Merkt, 2013). 
𝐸𝐸$ = 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔ℎ +𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉# 2𝑔𝑔⁄    (3) 
where: 
ET = Total energy per unit of weight 
G = Acceleration of gravity 
H = Height (or Altitude) 
M = Mass 
V = Velocity 
Converting chemical energy in the fuel into thrust works to overcomes drag. Energy is 
lost due to drag. Many sources of drag affect an aircraft in flight.  
The total drag of an airplane is composed of the drags of individual components 
and forces caused by interference between these components. The drag of an 
airplane configuration must include the various drags due to lift, form, friction, 
interference, leakage, etc. (Hurt, 1965, pp. 1-17) 
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Drag produced by the creation of lift is known as induced drag and is greatest at high 
airfoil angles of attack associated with slow speeds and aggressive maneuvering (Hurt, 
1965). As airspeed increases, induced drag decreases with the inverse of the square of the 
airspeed. Skin friction and unbalanced pressure distribution resulting from the aircraft 
moving through the air creates parasitic drag (Hurt, 1965). Parasitic drag increases with 
the square of the airspeed and includes all drag components not associated with the 
creation of lift. Total drag is the sum of the induced and parasitic drag. 
Extended landing gear and flaps can increase drag dramatically, and configuration 
changes that increase drag require an increase in thrust to maintain airspeed and altitude 
(Hurt, 1965). Management of drag through configuration is just one part of overall EM. 
“Controlling the aircraft energy level consists in continuously controlling each parameter: 
airspeed, thrust, configuration and flight path, and in transiently trading one parameter for 
another” (Airbus, 2005, p. 2). These four parameters are interrelated such that a change to 
one will produce a change in one or more of the other three. 
Flightpath, specifically the vertical flightpath, is one of the parameters involved in 
EM. To maintain altitude and airspeed requires enough thrust to counterbalance the total 
drag. To accelerate in level flight or climbing, or to climb at a constant airspeed requires 
additional thrust. A steep climb may result in a loss of airspeed even in a clean, low drag 
configuration with maximum thrust selected. A constant speed descent requires less 
thrust than level flight. A steep descent may result in acceleration even in a high drag 
configuration with idle thrust. This characteristic is especially prevalent in the latest 
aircraft designs that have had significant attention given to reducing drag to increase fuel 
efficiency and speed.  
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As aircraft manufacturers have continuously strived to make their aircraft more 
efficient through drag reduction, EM requires more significant attention. Manufacturers 
advise flight crews to monitor the aircraft’s energy state continuously. Airbus advises that 
“throughout the entire flight a next target should be defined, in order to stay ahead of the 
aircraft at all times” (Airbus, 2006, p. 4). Targets include such parameters as altitudes, 
airspeeds, configurations, thrust settings, as well as combinations of these and others. 
Preparing for the descent phase of the flight in advance allows the flight crew to identify 
appropriate targets and fly the aircraft to meet the identified targets. The risk is that, 
should appropriate targets be missed for any reason, it often makes it more difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve subsequent targets. “The key to avoiding such cascading problems 
is timely planning and preparation for the descent during the low workload cruise phase 
of flight” (Veillette, 2016, p. 2). This EM planning is key to a smoothly executed descent. 
Energy management is also an essential element in stabilized approaches. As the 
aircraft approaches the airport for landing, the crew will have slowed and descended. The 
crew will intercept a normal glidepath, usually a three-degree descent, as they configure 
the aircraft for landing. According to the Flight Safety Foundation, typical deceleration 
rates are: 
For level flight 
• 10 to 15 knots per nautical mile with gear up and approach flaps 
• 20 to 30 knots per nautical mile during gear and landing flap extension 
For descent on a three-degree glidepath 
• 10 to 20 knots per nautical mile with landing gear and approach flaps during 
extension of landing flaps 
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• deceleration not possible in a clean configuration (FSF, 2009c) 
An aircraft intercepting the glideslope with only slats extended typically requires 1000 
feet of altitude and three miles to establish the landing configuration (FSF, 2009c). 
Arrival at the stabilized approach target altitude, appropriately configured, on-speed and 
on glidepath requires the careful management of the energy state of the aircraft.  
The current literature in EM had a focus on three primary areas: continuous 
descent operations (CDO), prevention of loss of control incidents, and energy awareness 
aids for pilots. Each of these study areas can be applied to the approach and landing 
phase but are also applicable to other phases as well. While these studies may involve the 
approach and landing phase of flight, they have not provided significant attention to the 
prevention of UAs.  
Continuous descent operations involve minimizing or eliminating level-flight 
segments during the descent phase of flight. The intent of CDO is to minimize fuel 
consumption, emissions, and noise (Prats et al., 2014). The concept involves determining 
the point along the route of flight when the descent for landing can be commenced and 
then proceed without the need for an increase in thrust. “Ideally, a CDO consists in a full 
engine-idle descent, from the cruise altitude to the interception of the instrument landing 
system (ILS) glide slope” (Prats et al., 2014, p. 2). While CDOs are not necessarily 
incompatible with stabilized approaches, the EM focus is on keeping the power as low as 
possible throughout the descent. 
Another EM topic receiving attention in the literature is the prevention of loss of 
control. These studies focused on maintaining sufficient energy to safely maneuver the 
aircraft at all times (Merkt, 2013). This is a critical element in ensuring the safety of 
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flight. Loss of control accidents accounted for over 49% of onboard commercial aviation 
fatalities worldwide for the decade 2008 to 2017 (Boeing, 2018). These studies do apply 
to the concept of stabilized approaches in that it is impossible to execute a stabilized 
approach with loss of control. Having the necessary energy to remain in control, 
however, does not guarantee a stabilized approach.  
To assist pilots in the task of EM, studies have been conducted over the years to 
examine ways to use the technology available at the time to provide pilots with some 
form of indicator in the cockpit to provide a visual representation of the energy state of 
the aircraft (Baker, 2017; Noyes, 2007; Zagalsky, 1973). Advances in processing and 
display technology have allowed for the development of highly intuitive displays of 
aircraft energy state. Zagalsky (1973) presents an electro-mechanical cockpit display with 
pointers that indicate the calculated current energy state and the current energy rate of 
change. It is an attempt to distill tabular and graphic information into a display that 
provides in-flight cues to help the pilot manage the energy state (Zagalsky, 1973, p. 2). 
With the advent of the digital cockpit, energy management displays became able to 
provide not only current state information, but also predictive energy state information 
for the near future and computer determined ideal energy state. The display evaluated in 
Noyes’ (2007) study used a vertical tape-style display to present this information, 
allowing a pilot to determine the current and desired energy states, and the trend of the 
change of these values. A decade later, the OZ display studied by Baker (2017) presents 
the pilot with even more EM information. As stated by Baker: 
The OZ concept display provides intuitive energy management information and 
may mitigate LOC-I by displaying an airplane's current power setting in relation 
46 
 
to its minimum allowable speed (stall), its maximum lift (lift/drag), and its 
maximum allowable speed (structural limits). (2017, p. 35) 
These studies examined ways of helping pilots understand their current energy 
state by providing a visual indication in the cockpit. They lacked, however, other aspects 
inherent in maintaining a stabilized approach, such as vertical and lateral path control. 
Thus, the current literature in the field of aircraft EM focused on efficiency, safety, and 
energy awareness, but lacked a focus on the specifics of possible relationships between 
poor EM practices and UA events.  
Gaps in the Literature 
The review of the current literature identified gaps in the current body of 
knowledge. In the area of EM and UAs, current literature focused on the reduction of fuel 
consumption, emissions, and noise, as well as the prevention of loss of control, but lacks 
research on EM and the occurrence of UAs. The literature also appeared to lack studies 
that examine how the various potential MVs might affect EM. While there are some 
studies that addressed the direct impact these MVs exert on UAs, there was an apparent 
lack of studies examining the influence of these variables on EM. A summary table of the 
review of the current literature can be found in Table B1 of Appendix B. 
Theoretical Framework 
The literature review informed the theoretical model to be used in this research. 
The model, shown in Figure 3, was used to predict the probability of whether a UA event 
will occur based on the EM and MV inputs related to a particular flight. The model 
shows the various EM variables hypothesized to predict UA probability. The MVs are 
shown moderating each of the EM variables’ impact. As each of the MVs shifts from 
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favorable conditions toward unfavorable conditions, it was expected that their influence 
on the relationship between the EM variables and UA probability would result in an 
increase in UA probability. It should be noted that this model is theoretical. The study 
sought to confirm each of the hypothesized relationships. However, after the conclusion 
of the analysis, it became apparent there are different relationships among the variables in 
the model. It may also be found that there are other variables not included in this model 
that predict the probability of a UA event. 
Research Model 
The model in Figure 3 shows the seven IVs influencing the probability of a UA 
event. Each of the MVs is shown moderating the IVs, possibly increasing or decreasing 
an IV’s influence on UA probability. Note that the model is not showing influences that 
the MVs might exert on UA probability directly. The model only includes variables that 






Proposed Model of the System 
 
Note. Horizontal lines from EM variables to UA Event indicate direct effects. Line from 
MVs to direct effects lines indicate moderation effects. 
 
Hypotheses and Support 
Due to the large number of variables in the model, there are many hypotheses in 
the study. Each of the variables exerts its own influence on the probability of a UA event. 
The literature review informed the development of the theories regarding the 
relationships between the IV and the probability of UAs, as well as the moderating 
influence of the MVs on the IVs. The section that follows discusses each of the variables 
and the hypotheses related to their influence in the model. 
Hypotheses for Direct EM Variable Influence. The model in Figure 3 shows 
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UA event. The EM variables have direct relationships with this probability, as indicated. 
The hypotheses for each of these EM variables follows. 
H1a1: A longer delay in the start of descent is associated with an increase in the 
probability of having a UA. Delaying the start of the descent in a jet airliner very far past 
the point computed by three times the altitude above the destination can provide EM 
problems for the flight crew as described in various technical articles (Airbus, 2006; FSF, 
2009b). This distance provides roughly a three-degree descent angle. Above this angle, it 
is difficult to keep the airspeed within aircraft or legal limits. Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that delaying the start of the descent from cruise altitude will be a predictor 
or an increased probability of a UA event. 
H1b1: High-speed below 10,000 feet is associated with an increase in the 
probability of having a UA. Passing 10,000 feet on the descent usually requires an 
airspeed of 250 KIAS or less. Exceeding 250 KIAS can represent an EM problem, as 
simultaneously continuing the descent and decelerating may not be possible (Airbus, 
2006). Stopping the descent to slow increases the angle required to meet descent profile 
requirements, exacerbating the problem. Thus, it was hypothesized that high speed 
(above 250 KIAS) below 10,000 feet will be a predictor or an increased probability of a 
UA event. 
H1c1: Higher airspeed at gear extension is associated with an increase in the 
probability of having a UA. If the PF decides that the landing gear needs to be extended 
at a high airspeed, it may be indicative of an EM problem. Extending the landing gear 
increases drag substantially, which can help decelerate the aircraft. The landing gear is 
normally extended as the aircraft approaches the final descent for landing, with airspeed 
50 
 
close to the stabilized approach requirement. Extension at higher airspeeds may be an 
indicator that airspeed is too high for a stabilized approach. Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that higher airspeeds at gear extension are a predictor of an increased 
probability of a UA event. 
H1d1: A shorter distance to destination at gear extension is associated with an 
increase in the probability of having a UA. If the PF decides that the landing gear 
extension needs to be delayed until closer to the destination, it may be indicative of an 
EM problem. The landing gear should only be extended below the associated limiting 
speed. If speed is excessive approaching the stabilized approach point, the PF may need 
to delay landing gear extension. Delayed extension until closer to the destination may be 
an indicator that airspeed is too high for gear extension and, subsequently, for a stabilized 
approach. Therefore, it was hypothesized that higher airspeeds at gear extension are a 
predictor of an increased probability of a UA event. 
H1e1: Higher airspeed at flap extension is associated with an increase in the 
probability of having a UA. If the PF decides that the flaps need to be extended at a high 
airspeed, it may be indicative of an EM problem. Extending the flaps increases drag but 
to a much lesser degree than the landing gear. Nevertheless, extending the flaps may help 
decelerate the aircraft. The flaps are normally extended as the aircraft approaches the 
final decent for landing, with airspeed somewhat below flap limit speeds. Extension at 
higher airspeeds may be an indicator that airspeed is too high for a stabilized approach. 
Therefore, it was hypothesized that higher airspeeds at flap extension are a predictor of 
an increased probability of a UA event. 
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H1f1: A shorter distance to destination at flap extension is associated with an 
increase in the probability of having a UA. If the PF decides that flap extension needs to 
be delayed until closer to the destination, it may be indicative of an EM problem. Like the 
landing gear, the flaps should only be extended below the associated limiting speed. If 
speed is excessive approaching the stabilized approach point, the PF may need to delay 
flap extension. Delayed extension until closer to the destination may be an indicator that 
airspeed is too high for flap extension and, subsequently, for a stabilized approach. 
Therefore, it was hypothesized that higher airspeeds at flap extension are a predictor of 
an increased probability of a UA event. 
H1g1: Using spoilers on descent is associated with an increase in the probability 
of having a UA. Spoilers are used to increase the descent rate while preventing or limiting 
an increase in airspeed. If the PF decides that spoilers are needed during the descent, it 
may be indicative of an EM problem. If the EM problem is of sufficient magnitude, the 
use of spoilers may be insufficient to correct the problem and prevent a UA event. 
Because the use of spoilers on the descent indicates a desire to correct an excessive 
energy situation, it was hypothesized that such use is a predictor of an increased 
probability of a UA event. 
Hypotheses for MV Moderating Influence. The hypotheses regarding the MVs 
involve how they influence the IVs as predictors of a UA event. In each case of an MV, 
the moderation was measured as the MV transitions from a favorable condition to an 
unfavorable one. To avoid excessive repetition, each of the MVs will be discussed in 




Lighting. The MV Lighting captures the ambient lighting conditions of day, 
twilight, and night. As ambient lighting transitions from day (0.0) to twilight (1.0) into 
night (2.0), visual cues are reduced, which may present an increased workload for the 
flight crew (Zhang et al., 2019). This increase in workload may allow the more subtle 
cues of deteriorating EM to be missed, contributing to further EM complications. Further, 
reductions in visibility were identified as a factor in 94% of CFIT accidents, highlighting 
the impact of decreasing visibility (Kelly & Efthymiou, 2019). Overall, it was 
hypothesized that reductions in ambient lighting, indicated by increasing values of the 
MV Lighting, moderate the IVs in a way that increases the probability of a UA event. The 
associated hypotheses for the MV Lighting were: 
H2aa1: A longer delay in the start of descent, when moderated by reduced 
lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA.  
H2ba1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by reduced lighting, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2ca1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by reduced lighting, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2da1: A shorter distance to destination at gear extension, when moderated by 
reduced lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2ea1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by reduced lighting, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H 2fa1: A shorter distance to destination at flap extension, when moderated by 
reduced lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
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H2ga1: Using spoilers on descent, when moderated by reduced lighting, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
Experience. The MV Experience captures which crew member is the PF, the 
Captain or the FO. Experience is coded 0.0 when the Captain is the PF, and 1.0 when the 
FO is the PF. In general, the Captain is the more experienced member of the flight crew 
and is considered the expert in the cockpit. Thus, the FO should, in similar situations and 
conditions, have a higher overall workload (Zhang et al., 2019). This higher workload is 
expected to translate into greater difficulty in maintaining proper EM. Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that, when the FO is the PF, indicated by increased values of the MV 
Experience, IVs are moderated such that there is an increase in the probability of a UA 
event. Associated hypotheses for the MV Experience were: 
H2ab1: A longer delay in the start of descent, when moderated by pilot 
inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2bb1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by pilot inexperience, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2cb1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by pilot inexperience, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2db1: A shorter distance to destination at gear extension, when moderated by 
pilot inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2eb1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by pilot inexperience, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2fb1: A shorter distance to destination at flap extension, when moderated by 
pilot inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
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H2gb1: Using spoilers on descent, when moderated by pilot inexperience, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
Duration. The MV Duration captures the duration of the flight. As previously 
shown, flights of shorter durations tend to compress all of the processes involved in 
conducting a flight. This results in a continuous high-workload environment, which 
increases the chances of pilot errors (Wanyan et al., 2018). Further, compression of the 
cruise phase allows limited time to plan the descent phase. For this reason, the study 
coded the MV Duration with the values of 1.0 for flight durations in the bottom quartile 
and 0.0 for those above the bottom quartile. It is hypothesized that the IVs are moderated 
such that as the value of the MV Duration increases, the probability of a UA event 
increases. The hypotheses associated with the MV Duration were: 
H2ac1: A longer delay in the start of descent, when moderated by decreased 
duration, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2bc1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by decreased duration, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2cc1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by decreased duration, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2dc1: A shorter distance to destination at gear extension, when moderated by 
decreased duration, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2ec1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by decreased duration, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
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H2fc1: A shorter distance to destination at flap extension, when moderated by 
decreased duration, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2gc1: Using spoilers on descent, when moderated by decreased duration, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
Automation. The MV Automation captures the use of the autopilot in the 
approach phase. Automation is coded as 0.0 when the autopilot is used for the approach 
and 1.0 when the approach is manually flown. The autopilot, when properly used, 
relieves the PF of a significant amount of task execution, allowing the PF to allocate 
more mental resources to EM efforts. However, reliance on automation in the cockpit has 
been identified as a source of degraded ability to efficiently execute the cognitive skills 
necessary to safely fly the aircraft and perform EM (Casner et al., 2014). Modern 
airliners are highly automated, and it is expected that pilots will use it when it is 
available. Therefore, it is hypothesized that, as Automation moves from an autopilot 
approach to a manually flown approach, the IVs are moderated such that the probability 
of a UA event increases. The hypotheses associated with the MV Automation were: 
H2ad1: A longer delay in the start of descent, when moderated by non-automated 
flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2bd1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by non-automated flight, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2cd1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by non-automated 
flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
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H2dd1: A shorter distance to destination at gear extension, when moderated by 
non-automated flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2ed1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by non-automated 
flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
H2fd1: A shorter distance to destination at flap extension, when moderated by 
non-automated flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. 
H2gd1: Using spoilers on descent, when moderated by non-automated flight, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
Summary 
The current literature showed that the approach and landing is statistically the 
most dangerous phase of flight (Boeing, 2018). While compromising a small percentage 
of the overall flight time, it accounts for nearly half of all commercial jet accidents. The 
literature also identified the stabilized approach as an effective way to mitigate the 
dangers (FAA, 2018c). By meeting the stabilized approach criteria, pilots minimize 
deviations from the desired flight path and other critical parameters. Failure to maintain 
strict adherence to stabilized approach criteria results in a UA event. The FDM system 
not only identifies UA events but also captures the EM variables involved. 
The current literature included numerous studies related to the use of FDM 
information. These studies included ways to apply DM techniques to the tremendous 
volumes of information that FDM produces, ways to identify operational outliers such as 
anomalous fuel burns, and methods of tracking aircrew actions for comparison against 
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standards. The literature, however, seemed to lack studies that investigate the use of FDM 
information to identify any specific relationships between EM variables and UA events.  
To consistently meet the stabilized approach criteria and thereby avoid a UA 
event, pilots must practice effective EM in the descent and approach phases of flight. 
Current literature also showed that, while it is certainly not a new concept in aviation, 
EM has not been considered a high priority topic, with the notable exceptions of gliders, 
aerobatics, and fighter combat maneuvering. Some studies focused on efficiency and 
noise reduction by analyzing the physics of the descent and seeking to optimize such by 
using the force of gravity to power CDOs (Prats et al., 2014). Other studies focused on 
the need to ensure there is always sufficient energy available to maneuver the aircraft 
safely, thus avoiding a loss of control mishap (Merkt, 2013). Another area within the 
literature over the years has been some focus on how to assist the flight crew with EM by 
attempting to design a cockpit instrument to display the current and future energy states, 
as well as the rate of change of the energy status (Baker, 2017; Noyes, 2007; Zagalsky, 
1973). While there are numerous texts regarding the physics of EM, and some on the 
application of those physics to aircraft in flight, there appeared to be a lack of studies on 
how specific EM practices during descent and approach predict the probability of a UA 
event.  
The study examined how the seven IVs may be able to predict an increased 
probability of a UA. In addition, the study examined the influence of several MVs on the 
IVs. As there appear to be limited studies in this area, the current effort begins to fill an 
important gap in the literature. Significant relationships were found that may be practical 
in improving training and safety protocols in the area of EM and UAs. Identifying these 
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relationships should produce valuable insight into reducing the probability of the 




Chapter III: Methodology 
The literature review revealed that FDM information contains a wealth of data 
collected at a high rate and high fidelity. This information enables analysis of aircraft 
performance and maintenance related trends and identifies and verifies possible safety-
related events that occur during flight. One area that was lacking was using FDM 
information to identify EM errors, specifically those related to UA events. The FDM 
information provided such insights and helped identify several other variables' impacts on 
these relationships. 
This chapter discusses the selected research method, the population and how the 
sample was chosen, sources of the data and the collection system, the variables in the 
study, and the statistical techniques used in the analysis. Additionally, the software used 
to extract and compute the desired variables and statistical analysis of the variables is 
discussed. This research strived to identify EM variables related to UA events and 
identify the impacts that a selection of MVs may have on those EM variables. Predictive 
statistical techniques, specifically logistic regression (LR), were used to conduct this 
analysis. 
Research Method Selection 
The research method is quantitative analysis using the PA’s FDM information to 
investigate the relationships various EM errors may have on the occurrence of UA events. 
Since the dependent variable (DV), the occurrence or not of a UA event, is dichotomous, 
the statistical analysis selected was an LR. The FDM system provided quantitative data, 
with continuous or categorical data for the IVs and dichotomous categorical data for the 
DV. “When you have a categorical DV and one or more IVs” it is suggested that the 
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quantitative technique of LR is appropriate (Vogt et al., 2014, p. 307). The LR technique 
“. . . attempts to predict the probability that an observation falls into one of two categories 
of a dichotomous [DV] based on one or more independent variables [IVs] that can be 
either continuous or categorical” (Laerd Statistics, 2019, p. 1). Additionally, the LR 
assessed the impacts of a selection of MVs on the EM/UA relationships. 
Population/Sample 
The study population was all commercial jet airline approaches flown by the 
major air carriers in the PA's geographic region in which the aircraft type was a single-
aisle, twin-engine turbojet transport aircraft seating between approximately 100 and 200 
passengers and maximum takeoff weights between 120,000 and 210,000 pounds. 
Worldwide, the commercial jet fleet completed 30.1 million flights in 2017 (Boeing, 
2018). For major air carrier commercial jet operations in the region, roughly 830,000 
total approaches were flown (2017 Aviation sector data analysis, 2018). These flights 
were accomplished in a diverse fleet of aircraft, day and night, in a wide range of weather 
conditions. EM played a crucial role in whether these flights ended with a stabilized 
approach and landing. For perspective, this requires an average of over 2270 approaches 
per day, 94 approaches per hour, or about 1.5 approaches every minute. The study 
population was those approaches flown in aircraft similar to those operated by the PA. 
Sampling Frame and Strategy 
The sample consisted of commercial flights performed by the PA from December 
1st, 2016, through November 30th, 2017. The sample timeframe was selected as it 
included one full year of flights with no overlap. Limiting the sample to a one-year 
timeframe prevented having certain months overrepresented in any seasonal or otherwise 
61 
 
cyclical patterns that may influence UAs that the FDM information cannot identify. 
During the sample period, the PA flew approximately 250,000 commercial flights. Other 
flights flown for training, maintenance, repositioning, or other non-commercial reasons 
were excluded. As a percentage, the PA accomplished just over 30% of the commercial 
flights in the region. The 312,087 flights operated by the PA are a convenience sample, as 
only the PA agreed to allow access to actual FDM information from flight operations. 
Non-commercial flights contained in this convenience sample were removed before 
accomplishing the analysis. 
The approaches in the population are all from carriers subject to operations 
standards and training program requirements that were compliant with ICAO standards 
and recommendations. Further, the majority (67%) of the aircraft operated by the air 
carriers in the region are similar to those operated by the PA (2017 Aviation sector data 
analysis, 2018). As such, the sample should be representative of the overall population. 
Data Collection Process 
The data for the study are archival. The EM data were contained within or 
computed from the archived FDM information provided by the PA. The raw data were 
recorded continuously during flight and downloaded for analysis. The aircraft captured 
and recorded hundreds to thousands of pieces of information during the aircraft's 
operation at rates ranging from once every four seconds to 32 times per second. Sensors 
fed raw readings of the various parameters to the Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU). 
The FDAU converted the raw information into digital data and passed the digital 
information to the various recorders installed in the aircraft. The FDAU records data to 
include the information required by regulation for a crash survivable Flight Data 
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Recorder (FDR), as well as operation and maintenance data retrieved and archived for 
use in safety and performance analysis (Grossi, 1999). Figure 4 provides a basic 
depiction of a notional system. 
 
Figure 4 
Notional Flight Data Acquisition System 
 
Note. Adapted from “Analysis Ground Station User Manual,” by SAFRAN, 2012. 
 
The Analysis Ground Station (AGS) software developed by SAFRAN identified 
and processed data related to UAs. Calculation of critical EM data points related to the 
descent from altitude to the stabilized approach target altitude helped identify 
relationships between EM errors and UAs. 
Design and Procedures 
This archival study was an analysis of FDM information provided by the PA. The 
PA continuously collects FDM information on all flights. These data include non-
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commercial flights conducted for training, maintenance, and logistical reasons. Data 
recorded were regularly retrieved from the onboard Quick Access Recorder and 
transferred to the PA’s AGS database. For this effort, the FDM information for flights 
conducted from April 1st, 2016, to November 30th, 2017, was encrypted and copied to an 
external hard drive for transfer. 
Apparatus and Materials 
In order to be usable for the study, the password-protected FDM information 
received from the PA was decrypted and transferred to an AGS database installed on an 
Apple iMac with an Intel Core i5 processor running at 3.8 gigahertz and 64 gigabytes of 
random access memory. Installed on the iMac was the necessary software to process and 
analyze the FDM dataset. The FDM data were directly accessed using the AGS software, 
and statistical analysis was accomplished using SPSS® version 26. All the data remained 
password-protected to ensure confidentiality. 
Sources of the Data 
Data for the study came from or were calculated from the FDM data provided by 
the PA. The dataset included all flights during which the airborne systems captured valid 
FDM information between April 1st, 2016, to November 30th, 2017. The sample was 
limited to the period from December 1st, 2016, to November 30th, 2017, to limit any 
effects from seasonal weather patterns. Also, flights not involving commercial operations 
were removed from the dataset. Additional parameters, such as the distance from the 
destination when the descent from cruise altitude begins, were computed from data 





A critical aspect of FDM information is that the confidentiality of the flight crew 
is critical. Confidentiality helps ensure that flight crew members can share information 
about mistakes without fear of retribution and is vital in facilitating the sharing of this 
vital safety information with national authorities and the industry (FAA, 2004). While the 
FDM information from the PA was de-identified of any specific flight crew member 
identification, the flight and date information remains. The actual flight number and date 
are not both present in any data included in this paper to maintain flight crew 
confidentiality. Further, to maintain the PA's confidentiality, flight numbers, departure 
locations, and destination locations will not be presented together in any data. 
Any research at ERAU that involves human subjects is required to undergo 
review by the university Institutional Review Board (IRB). In the case of this effort, 
human subjects were not directly involved. However, archival data generated by the 
flight crews' actions and requiring confidentiality were analyzed. To ensure that ethical 
principles regarding such research, and applicable to the study, are identified and 
followed, application for research approval was submitted to the ERAU IRB. The IRB 
review determined that the study was exempt from further IRB review. Documentation of 
the IRB Exempt Determination can be found in Appendix A. 
Measurement Instrument 
The FDM system records volumes of data on every flight. The individual 
parameters are in many forms. Discrete parameters have precise values, such as up or 
down on the landing gear selector handle (SAFRAN, 2012). Other parameters are derived 
from sensor inputs with conversion calculations made within the FDAU. These 
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calculations can be as simple as a multiplying factor or a linear equation or a complex 
polynomial (SAFRAN, 2012). The FDM system also records alphanumeric information 
such as the date, the identifier of the airports of departure and arrival, and the designator 
of the runways used (SAFRAN, 2012). The data were analyzed using the AGS software 
to identify UAs and examine their relationship to EM errors. 
Variables and Scales 
The PA programmed AGS such that exceeding specific parameters at or below 
the stabilized approach safety altitude of 1,000 feet above the landing altitude flags 
events. The closer to the ground that these events occur, the higher Severity Class the 
event is categorized. Events categorized as Severity Class 1 occur between 1,000 feet and 
more than 750 feet. Events categorized as Severity Class 2 occur between 750 feet and 
above 500. Events categorized as Severity Class 3 occur at 500 feet or less. These events 
identify violations of the stabilized approach criteria established by the PA and thus are 
indicative of UA events. A UA is flagged based on the number and severity of these 
events: 
• A single Severity Class 3 event alone flags a UA Severity Class 1 
• A single Severity Class 3 and any Severity Class 2 events flag a UA 
Severity Class 2 
• Two or more Severity Class 3 events flags a UA Severity Class 3 








Exceeding the reference approach speed by 25 knots for 5 seconds 
or more 
Hi Descent Rate 
on Approach 
Exceeding 1,200 feet per minute descent rate for 5 seconds or more 
N1 Low on 
Approach 
Engine power below 35% N1 for 5 seconds or more 
Late Landing 
Configuration 
Flaps not established at 40 degrees and still in motion signifying 
that the landing configuration was not established 
 
Note. Adapted from “Analysis Ground Station User Manual,” by SAFRAN, 2012, p. 16. 
 
The PA uses the level of severity in evaluating the UA event under its Safety 
Management System. For this study, however, the UA flag is considered a binary 
variable; either a UA occurred, or it did not. While the PA uses thresholds for differing 
Severity Classes, the occurrence of a UA itself is binary. The DV in the analysis was 
whether a UA occurred during the flight. 
Variables of Interest. The variables of interest are indicators of possible EM 
errors during the descent from cruise altitude to touchdown, including the distance to the 
destination at the start of the descent, airspeed below 10,000 feet, airspeed at landing gear 
extension, distance to the destination at landing gear extension, airspeed at flap extension, 
distance to the destination at flap extension, and use of spoilers during the descent. Each 
of these variables represents an EM element that may indicate a poor understanding of 
EM by the flight crew. These variables are the IVs for the study. 
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The first IV, Late Start, is the distance to the destination of initiating the descent 
from cruise flight. This categorical variable was computed within AGS. Groundspeed is 
reported every second in nautical miles per hour. The reported groundspeed divided by 
3,600 gives the distance traveled in that second. Computation began when AGS reported 
a change from cruise to descent, terminating at touchdown. The sum of these individual 
distances provided the distance traveled from beginning the descent until touchdown. 
A conventional computation of when to initiate the descent is an easily 
remembered formula of three times the cruise altitude above the destination elevation in 
thousands of feet. This technique can be expressed by Equation 4 (Ison, 2006). 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = %&'
()))
∙ 3 (4) 
where: 
Dist = Distance from touchdown to begin decent in nautical miles 
Alt = Altitude to lose 
To compute the values of Late Start, the actual descent distance was divided by the 
expected descent distance from Equation 4 to arrive at a percentage of the expected 





Late Start Value Assignment  
Percentage of Estimated Distance (ED) Value of Late Start 
Actual Distance > 95% ED 0.0 
95% ED > Actual Distance > 85% ED 1.0 
85% ED > Actual Distance > 75% ED 2.0 
75% ED > Actual Distance 3.0 
 
Note. Estimated Distance is computed using Equation 4. 
 
It is also common to add ten miles to this calculation to slow the aircraft (Ison, 
2006). The distance to the destination at which the descent begins impacts EM. If the 
descent begins too soon and uses standard descent techniques (pitch and power settings 
producing a predictable descent rate), the aircraft will end up low on energy by being 
below the desired descent profile. This early descent would require either adjusting the 
descent rate if recognized early or a level-flight segment at a lower altitude. Conversely, 
if the descent begins late, standard descent techniques result in the aircraft having too 
much altitude or an increased descent rate, which reduces the pilots' ability to slow the 
aircraft in preparation for the approach and landing. The Flight Safety Foundation 
recommends additional checkpoints in the descent of 9,000 feet above the landing 
elevation at 30 nautical miles from the destination and 3,000 feet above the landing 
elevation at 15 nautical miles from the destination (2009a). Delaying the descent long 
enough may result in the pilots unable to reach the approach altitude and slow the aircraft 
in time to conduct a safe approach, leading to a UA. 
Delaying the descent from cruise is one possible cause for the second IV: high 
speed below 10,000 feet. This categorical variable, High Speed, was captured in-flight by 
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the FDM system, reporting the maximum airspeed above 250 Knots, as well as setting the 
event flags programmed by the PA, if appropriate. Other causes can be unintentional, 
such as forgetting to slow during the descent, or intentional, such as attempting to arrive 
at the destination prior to the arrival of a storm. Failing to use spoilers, if necessary, while 
attempting to increase the descent rate can also lead to high speeds. While regulations are 
part of the reason for slowing the aircraft, usually to a maximum of 250 knots below 
10,000 feet, another reason is EM. Keeping the speed down to 250 knots or less 
simplifies the transition to the approach and landing phase as there is less energy to 
dissipate in order to configure the aircraft for the approach. A standard limitation for 
airline aircraft is the landing gear extension, and flight with the landing gear down is 
limited to a maximum of 250 knots. By limiting speed to 250 knots or less, the landing 
gear extension can occur at any time as required to assist EM during this transition. 
Extending the landing gear adds a significant amount of drag to the aircraft. While 
spoilers can assist with additional drag, many aircraft have restrictions on deploying 
spoilers in conjunction with the flaps, making the spoilers of limited use in slowing for 
landing (FSF, 2009c). The third IV, airspeed at landing gear extension, was a significant 
variable in that it helped indicate whether the pilot flying was aware of the speed, should 
a UA occur due to high speed. The continuous variable Gear Speed was captured by 
recording the airspeed at the moment the landing gear handle was selected to the down 
position. A delay of landing gear extension below the maximum extension speed, 
followed by an approach resulting in a UA due to high speed, may indicate that the pilot 
failed to understand the landing gear's ability to help slow the aircraft. 
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The continuous variable Gear Dist was the fourth IV and was calculated in the 
same manner as noted for Late Start beginning at the point when the landing gear handle 
was selected to the down position. Most jet transport aircraft exhibit a consistent 
deceleration with the landing gear extended and descending on a three-degree glidepath 
(FSF, 2009c). If the landing gear extension is delayed to a point closer to the destination, 
followed by an approach resulting in a UA due to high speed, it may indicate that the 
pilot failed to understand the landing gear's ability to help with EM. 
Flaps also provide additional drag that can be used by the pilots to aid in EM. 
Both the airspeed at flap extension and the distance from the destination at flap extension 
are of interest because these data points can provide insight into the pilots' energy 
awareness. The continuous variable Flap Speed, the fifth IV, was captured by recording 
the airspeed at the moment the flap lever was moved to any position beyond the up 
position. The continuous variable Flap Dist, the sixth IV, was calculated in the same 
manner as noted for Late Start but beginning at the moment the flap lever was moved to 
any position beyond the up position. The use of flaps, however, can be much more 
complicated. The flaps on jet transport aircraft typically have numerous different settings 
with differing maximum extension speeds associated with each position. If utilized early 
enough, speed permitting, the additional drag from the flaps may be enough to prevent a 
UA from high airspeed. Conversely, poor EM during the descent may result in the speed 
exceeding flap extension limitations, which may cause a UA based on not being correctly 
configured at the stabilized approach altitude. 
The spoilers can also indicate poor EM during the descent. If the aircraft is above 
the descent profile or at a higher speed than desired, spoilers may help manage the 
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aircraft's energy state. Extending the spoilers reduces lift and increases drag, allowing the 
pilot to increase the descent rate while holding airspeed steady or decreasing airspeed 
with a constant descent rate or level. The seventh IV, Speed Brake, was a categorical 
variable that was 0.0 if spoilers were not used during the descent through landing phases 
of flight, and 1.0 if spoilers were used. If the aircraft experienced a UA because the 
approach and landing phase was entered with too much energy, and spoilers were not 
used during the descent, it may be an indicator that the pilots did not understand the 
spoilers' use as an EM tool. Table 4 provides a listing of the variables of interest.  
 
Table 4 
Energy Management Variables in the FDM Dataset  
Variable  Description Scale 
Unstable 
Approach 
The Dependent Variable. Indicates a UA event has 
occurred.  
Dichotomous 
Late Start Indicates the distance to destination at the start of 
the descent from cruise altitude. 
Categorical 
High Speed Indicates whether the criteria for High Speed Below 
10,000 feet MSL event has been met and the 
relative severity of the event if it occurred. 
Categorical 
Gear Speed Captures the Calibrated Airspeed at landing gear 
extension. 
Continuous 
Gear Dist Captures the distance to the point of landing at 
landing gear extension. 
Continuous 
Flap Speed Captures the Calibrated Airspeed at initial flaps 
extension. 
Continuous 
Flap Dist Captures the distance to the point of landing at 
initial flaps extension. 
Continuous 
Speed Brake Indicates spoiler deployment during the descent 








Moderating Variables. As described in the literature review, other variables, 
while not EM in nature, may interact with the EM variables resulting in an influence on 
UAs. Lighting may impact the aircrew’s visual acuity both inside and outside the cockpit. 
The more light, the better the aircrew can see to execute the approach. The pilot with 
more experience should be more proficient and skilled at executing the descent and 
approach. If the duration is shorter, it may decrease the precision with which the aircrew 
executes the descent and approach. The autopilot is much more precise at controlling the 
aircraft; therefore, it is expected that automation will reduce UAs. These MVs may 
influence the occurrence of UAs. Therefore, the study assessed the impact their inclusion 
had on the model. Table 5 summarizes these possible MVs.  
 
Table 5 
Moderating Variables  
Variable  Description Scale 
Lighting Indicates whether the approach was accomplished 
during daylight, twilight (dusk/dawn), or night 
conditions. 
Categorical 
Experience Indicates whether the Captain (Experienced) or FO 
(Inexperienced) accomplished the approach.  
Categorical/ 
Dichotomous 
Duration Indicates the duration of the flight with the premise 
that a short flight increases task loading, increasing 
pilot EM errors. 
Categorical/ 
Dichotomous 
Automation Indicates approach accomplishment via the 








Confounding Variables. There may have been confounding variables. Some 
situations may force the pilots into a situation that would appear to be a poor EM practice 
but was not of their choosing. One such situation would be Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
directions that prevent the aircrew from beginning the descent from cruise until later than 
desired. Another such situation would be ATC abnormally stopping the descent in 
progress, such as might be caused by interfering traffic. Another potentially confounding 
variable is aircrew deviations to avoid weather during the descent to landing phase. Such 
deviations might significantly delay the normal descent, resulting in a much steeper than 
normal descent. A steeper descent reduces the options the aircrew must slow the aircraft 
in preparation for the approach and landing. None of these potentially confounding 
variables are, unfortunately, captured by the FDM system. The FDM system does not 
store weather radar displays nor radio communications. Moreover, while the system does 
record the aircraft ground track, the reason for any deviation from the typical flight path 
is not. The researcher evaluated the cases to see if there was a pattern for a particular 
flight, aircraft, or airfield that might indicate something external to the aircrews' EM 
practices was influencing a UA's occurrence.  
While there may have been variables external to the flight crew’s EM practices 
that seek to confound the study, these are not highly common occurrences. As such, these 
events will help increase the flight crew’s awareness of the abnormality of the situation. 
This awareness should assist the flight crew in making timely corrections to the EM 
problems that are being forced upon them. Therefore, the impact of these confounding 
variables, unless identified as a particular pattern (which can then be controlled), was 
expected to be non-significant. 
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While various potentially confounding variables may influence UA events' 
occurrence, the EM portion of the analysis focused on the possible relationships between 
EM errors and UA events. As mentioned in the delimitations, the inclusion of various 
other possible predictors of UAs could potentially distort the effects of the EM variables. 
The analysis excluded the examination of UA predictors that are not related to EM 
practices to avoid such potential distortion. 
The research model captures the seven postulated EM variables and the 
interactions of the four identified interaction variables. This created a somewhat 
complicated model, and thus a large number of hypothesis in the study. A graphic 
representation of this model is provided in Figure 3. 
Data Analysis Approach 
The study sought to predict UAs by evaluating the relationships of selected EM 
variables with the probability of a UA event and the influence of selected MVs on those 
relationships. The study extracted or computed the required variables from the FDM 
information provided by the PA. Since the DV was dichotomous, using LR as the data 
analysis approach was suggested (Laerd Statistics, 2019). “Logistic Regression is a 
specialized form of regression that is formulated to predict and explain a binary (two-
group) categorical variable . . .” providing “. . . coefficients indicating the relative impact 
of each predictor variable” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 317). The LR analysis approach followed 
the process as outlined in Laerd Statistics Binomial Logistic Regression (2019). 
Participant Demographics 
The PA operates internationally in a geographic region it shares with other 
comparably sized airlines. The demographic information for the air carriers serving the 
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PA’s region was evaluated to assess how the size, fleet, and operations of the regions 
other air carriers compare to those of the PA. In addition, ICAO membership among 
nations from which these air carriers operate was identified. Member nations of ICAO are 
expected to establish compliant rules and standards for aviation within their jurisdiction. 
Thus, this demographic was critical to verify whether these air carriers were likely to 
have similar operating standards and procedures. The results should be generalizable to 
the air carriers operating in the same geographic region, drawing pilots from the same 
ethno-geographic and cultural area, and operating with similar standards. 
Reliability Assessment Method 
Reliability assessment of the FDM data consists of both the reliability of the data 
collection process and the analysis's reliability. As explained below, the collection of 
FDM data is exceptionally reliable and accurate. The dataset was split by random 
selection into two subsets, a training set and an assessment set, to test the reliability of the 
LR model. If the prediction error rate for the assessment set is similar to the prediction 
error rate of the training set, then the model is presumed to be reliable (Rana et al., 2010).  
FDM System Reliability. FDM systems can precisely record thousands of 
parameters for analysis at high sampling rates. The FAA reminds air carriers to examine 
FDM data to ensure that it is reasonable and consistent (FAA, 2004). Since air carriers 
use FDM data to evaluate aircraft and operations efficiency, it is incumbent on the carrier 
to ensure that the FDM data is as accurate as possible. Marketing materials report 
mechanical/electrical reliability of FDR/FDAU devices as high as 50,000 hours Mean 
Time Between Failure (L3, 2018). The design of FDR/FDAU devices must meet 
stringent standards to achieve certification. The FAA’s minimum performance standards 
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(MPS) for flight data recorders, found in Technical Standards Order (TSO)-124A, state 
that FDRs must meet the MPS found in the European Organization for Civil Aviation 
Equipment standard ED-112A. The MPSs specify the required external dimensions, the 
physical testing requirements for crash survivability, and the required performance 
(European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment, 2013). The performance 
specifications require the bit error rate to be no more than one error in 105 bits, and, when 
using data compression, the word error may not exceed one error in 105 words. Since the 
systems that acquire and record the data must meet stringent certification standards, the 
FDM data is, therefore, considered reliable.  
Assessment of the LR analysis reliability was accomplished through examination 
of the prediction error rates across datasets. When the results can be interpreted 
consistently in differing situations, the model is reliable (Field, 2018). Therefore, the 
reliability testing for the LR analysis was assessed by comparing different datasets for 
consistent results in the prediction error rate. 
Validity Assessment Method 
Validity assessment of the FDM data consists of an examination of the data 
collected as well as the validity of the analysis. The validity of the data collected, that it is 
an accurate measure of the desired parameters, is subject to strict regulations. To assess 
the validity of the LR data analysis, it is suggested that a comparison of the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (HL) goodness of fit test and the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
curve assessment be conducted using a dataset different from that used to define the 




FDM System Validity. The FDM system records a multitude of parameters at a 
rate of at least one hertz. The system is designed to accurately record the data for safety 
and efficiency analysis and meet the regulatory requirements to capture the necessary 
data. These requirements are specified for digital flight data recording systems in 
Appendix E of 14 CFR Part 125 (FAA, 2017). This appendix provides a list of the 
minimum parameters that the system must capture, the minimum range of values, the 
sensors' accuracy providing the input, and the sample interval required. Values provided 
can be discrete, such as indicating the status of a control, system, or switch (FAA, 2017). 
These values could be simply on/off or up/down, or there may be several discrete 
indicators, such as which navigation source, such as VOR/GPS/ILS/LOC, is in use at the 
given moment. The minimum required by regulation is shown in Table B2 of Appendix 
B. Since an approved flight recorder system must meet these stringent requirements, and 
such an approved system generates the FDM data utilized by this study, the FDM data is, 
therefore, considered valid.  
Data Analysis Process/Hypothesis Testing 
The data analysis process began with an examination of the FDM information in 
AGS. This analysis determined what information was already available in the dataset, and 
what information needed computation. Once identified, these additional variables 
required appropriate procedures to be written within AGS to perform the necessary 
computations. With the procedures written, the raw data files were processed to generate 
new variables. After processing, specific selected parameters and variables were 
extracted in a snapshot of each flight and exported in a comma-separated value (.csv) 
format for importation into Microsoft® Excel® and SPSS®, one file per month. The 
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exported files were imported into Excel® to examine the information for missing data 
and apparent erroneous data and extreme outliers. These cases were scrutinized and, if 
appropriate, removed from the dataset. Then the monthly files were consolidated into a 
single file containing the entire year of FDM information. This single file was exported in 
the .csv format and imported into SPSS® to conduct the statistical analysis. 
As previously mentioned, the statistical analysis process, based on a dichotomous 
DV, was an LR. Hair et al. (2010) explain, “[l]ogistic regression is the preferred method 
for two-group (binary) dependent variables due to its robustness, ease of interpretation, 
and diagnostics” (p. 333). This technique seeks to determine the probability of an 
observation belonging to one of the two categories of the DV. In the case of this study, 
the observations were the flights within the FDM dataset, and the two categories of the 
DV were whether a UA event occurred or it did not. In order to accomplish the LR, seven 
assumptions must be met. These assumptions are: 
• one DV, which must be dichotomous, 
• one or more IVs that are either nominal or continuous, 
• independence of observations, and categories of DV and all nominal IVs 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, 
• a minimum of 15 cases per IV, 
• a linear relationship between continuous IVs and the logit transformation 
of the DV, 
• no multicollinearity, and  
• no “significant outliers, high leverage or highly influential points.” (Laerd 
Statistics, 2019, pp. 3-5) 
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Each of these assumptions is addressed below. 
One DV, which must be dichotomous. The only DV for the study, UA Event, 
indicated whether or not a UA event occurred. If a UA event occurred, then the value of 
UA Event was 1; otherwise, it was 0. Thus, the single DV is dichotomous, and this 
assumption was met.  
One or more IVs that are either nominal or continuous. The study had seven IVs. 
Four of the IVs were continuous, and one was nominal. The remaining two IVs were 
ordinal. It is noted, however, that an ordinal IV may be used in an LR if treated as either 
nominal or continuous. Therefore, the ordinal IVs Late Start and High Speed were treated 
as nominal. With these adjustments, the assumption of one or more IVs that are either 
nominal or continuous was met. 
Independence of observations and categories of DV and all nominal IVs mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Each observation was from a different flight, 
conducted under the specific conditions of a particular date and time. Thus, even if the 
flight had the same crew operating the same flight number in the same aircraft, the 
totality of that observation's conditions is unique to that specific approach event, ensuring 
the independence of observations. Further, for the DV and all nominal IVs, the categories 
encompass all the possibilities for the respective variables. In each case, the observation 
can only exist in a single category of the respective variable. As such, the conditions of 
the assumption of independence of observations were met. 
Minimum of 15 cases per IV. There were seven IVs in the study, with an 
additional four MVs, for a total of 11. A minimum of 165 cases is required to meet this 
assumption. With the size of the FDM data, this assumption is easily met. However, 
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selecting too large a sample for analysis could result in statistical significance of a 
variable that is irrelevant in practice (Hair et al., 2010). Further, it is suggested that each 
category of the DV should have at least 10 observations. UAs historically occur at a rate 
of 4% (Veillette, 2016). Therefore, the minimum sample for the LR would be 250 cases 
for 10 UA observations in the DV. When the PA’s actual UA rate was calculated, this 
minimum sample was adjusted to achieve 10 UA observations, as suggested. 
An examination of the data assessed these first four assumptions. More advanced 
analysis was required to assess the remaining three assumptions. The paragraphs that 
follow describe the process using SPSS® to assess linearity, multicollinearity, and 
outliers.  
Linear relationship between continuous IVs and the logit transformation of the 
DV. The Box-Tidwell test is suggested to test for a linear relationship between the 
continuous IVs and the logit transformation of the DV (Laerd Statistics, 2019). In 
SPSS®, this was done by conducting the LR including the interaction of each continuous 
IV with its log (Field, 2018). Reviewing the Variables in the Equation table produced by 
SPSS® revealed the significance levels determined for the interaction variables. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2014) recommend applying a Bonferroni correction using the 
total number of terms in this model, including the interaction terms and the constant, to 
adjust the level at which significance is accepted (As cited in Laerd Statistics, 2019). Any 
significant interaction has violated the assumption of linearity. 
Any identified issues of non-linearity can potentially be remedied. A 
transformation of the IV will be attempted to see if linearity can be established. Should 
the transformation of a continuous variable fail to establish linearity, there are two 
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alternatives. One alternative is to transform the continuous variable into ordinal 
categories and treat it as nominal (Laerd Statistics, 2019). The other alternative is to 
eliminate the offending variable from the model. Thus, the assumption of a linear 
relationship between the continuous IVs and the DV's logit transformation can be met. 
No multicollinearity. Once linearity has been established, it must be determined if 
any multicollinearity exists in the model. Multicollinearity is when two or more IVs have 
a strong correlation. While SPSS® lacks a dedicated function to detect multicollinearity 
in logistic regression, it is recommended to use the linear regression process using the 
DV and IVs from the regression model (Field, 2018). The linear regression process in 
SPSS® will provide tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics to assess if 
multicollinearity exists among the IVs. Any VIF greater than 10 (Myers, 1990, as cited in 
Field, 2018) and tolerance values less than 0.1 (Menard, 1995, as cited in Field, 2018) 
indicate a multicollinearity problem. 
Field (2018) recommends two possible solutions in the event multicollinearity 
exists. One suggestion is to conduct a principal component analysis, using the component 
scores to represent the offending IVs. Another suggestion, which Field considers the 
“safest (although unsatisfactory) remedy is to acknowledge the unreliability of the 
model” (2018, p. 669). 
No significant outliers, high leverage, or highly influential points. Points such as 
these have a significant adverse effect on the regression analysis, reducing the 
prediction's accuracy and statistical significance (Laerd Statistics, 2019). The SPSS® 
software package provides a diagnostic that helps identify cases that poorly fit the model 
by flagging cases where the standardized residual exceeds ±2. Scrutinization of these 
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cases will determine why the standardized residual was so large and if elimination from 
the analysis is warranted. Alternatively, a transformation of the offending variable may 
resolve the issue. With this analysis accomplished, the assumption of no significant 
outliers is met. 
Binomial Logistic Regression. With the data thoroughly examined, outliers dealt 
with, and assumptions met, initiation of the LR can commence. The LR attempts to 
predict the logit of the DV with the model in Equation 5 (Laerd Statistics, 2019). 
logit(Y)=b0+b1X1+b2X2+b3X3+. . .+bnXn+e (5) 
where: 
Y = the dependent variable 
b0 = the sample intercept 
b1 = the sample slope for X1 
bn = the sample slope for Xn 
e = the sample residuals 
During the analysis process, SPSS® will first compute the value of the constant b0 by 
estimating the model with no IVs included, otherwise known as the null model. The steps 
that follow depend on what type of approach to the regression is selected: hierarchical or 
empirical. 
In a hierarchical regression, the researcher determines which IVs to add to the 
model and what sequence — thus allowing the researcher to let the theory of the study 
drive the design of the model. In a forward stepwise regression, IVs are added to the 
model, one at a time, starting with the IV that is the best predictor of the available IVs. 
Additional IVs are added to the model until the improvement of fit of the model becomes 
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statistically insignificant (p > 0.05). Conversely, in a backward stepwise regression, the 
first model includes all of the IVs, removing the IV that contributes the least to the fit of 
the model until only those IVs that are statistically significant remain in the model. 
Due to the model's complexity, with seven IVs and four MVs, the study 
conducted both forward and backward stepwise regressions. This approach may help to 
overcome the limitations of the forward and backward stepwise regressions on their own. 
In forward stepwise regression, the algorithm may fail to include a variable that becomes 
significant only after becoming part of the model. In backward stepwise regression, 
removal of a significant variable may occur due to its significance being suppressed by 
another variable in the model. A comparison of the results of the forward and backward 
approaches informed any necessary modifications to the model in an attempt to achieve a 
model that is the best fit. The HL goodness of fit test, where statistical significance shows 
a poorly fitting model, provides an assessment of the model's goodness of fit. 
With a well fit model, the next assessment to be made was how well the model 
explains the variance in the DV. The Model Summary table produced by SPSS® 
provided several choices in making this assessment. The Cox and Snell R2 and the 
Nagelkerke R2 values provide a pseudo-R2 that attempts to approximate R2 for the logistic 
regression. A problem with the Cox and Snell R2 is that it has an upper bound of less than 
1. The Nagelkerke R2 value is a modification of the Cox and Snell R2 that corrects this 
issue. 
Several measures can be used to examine how well the model predicts the DV 
based on the IVs. These measures compare the model's predictions to the actual outcome 
from the data, as shown in the Classification Tables produced by SPSS®. These 
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measurements are the percentage accuracy in classification (PAC), sensitivity, selectivity, 
positive predictive value, and negative predictive value (Laerd Statistics, 2019). The PAC 
is the overall percentage of cases that were correctly predicted, matching the actual 
occurrence. Sensitivity is the percentage of cases where a UA occurred that the model 
correctly predicted a UA would occur. On the other hand, selectivity is the percentage of 
cases where a UA did not occur, and the model correctly predicted that a UA would not 
occur. The positive predictive value is the percentage of cases correctly predicted to have 
UAs relative to the number of cases where a UA was predicted. Finally, the study's 
negative predictive value is the percentage of cases correctly predicted that a UA would 
not occur relative to the number of cases where a UA was not predicted. These five 
measures provided an assessment of how well the model predicted the outcome of the 
occurrence of a UA given the EM variables. 
The ROC curve provided a further assessment of how well the model 
discriminates. While the model was initially generated by using a cutoff of 50% or higher 
probability of occurrence to predict that a UA would occur, the ROC curve evaluates all 
possible cutoff points. Increasing the cutoff point results in a lower likelihood of 
classification of a case as having a UA occur, thus a higher likelihood of classification of 
a case as not having a UA (Laerd Statistics, 2019). The ROC plot shows sensitivity 
versus 1 minus specificity (Hilbe, 2009). In SPSS®, the ROC plot consists of a line from 
the origin to (1,1) that represents a model that has no discrimination, and a line that 
represents the discrimination of the model throughout the range of cutoffs from 0.0 to 
1.0. As described by Pepe: 
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For any chosen threshold value [of the cutoff point] c, one can define a 
dichotomous test by the positivity criterion X ≥ c, and calculate the associated 
error rates. A plot of 1 minus the false-negative rate (or true positive rate) versus 
the false-positive rate for all possible choices [of the cutoff threshold] is the ROC 
curve for X. (2000, p. 308) 
The farther the model line is above the reference line, the more discriminating the model. 
The difference between the two lines can be evaluated by computing the area under the 
curve (AUC) for the model line. The AUC of the reference line is 0.5; therefore, the more 
that the AUC for the model exceeds 0.5 represents increasing levels of discrimination of 
the model. Hosmer Jr. et al. (2013) provide a useful guide for evaluating the level of 
discrimination concerning the AUC, summarized in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Guidance for Evaluating AUC in ROC Analysis 
Area Under the Curve (AUC) Discrimination Ability 
0.5 No Discrimination 
0.5 < AUC < 0.7 Poor Discrimination 
0.7 < AUC < 0.8 Acceptable Discrimination 
0.8 < AUC < 0.9 Excellent Discrimination 
0.9 < AUC Outstanding Discrimination 
 
Note. Adapted from Hosmer Jr. et al. (2013). 
 
A final assessment of the basic model was made by examining the Variables in 
the Equation table produced by SPSS®. This table lists all of the variables in the model 
and provides several informative statistics for each. The b coefficients from Equation 5 
indicate how much the log-odds change per unit change in the variable when all the other 
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variables are fixed. The Exp(B) values show the odds ratio (how much the odds change 
for each unit increase) for each IV. The significance of each IV in the model indicates 
whether the IV added to the model significantly. Finally, the table provides the 95% CI 
for each Exp(B). If the value of 1.0 falls within the CI of an IV, it is an indication that an 
increase in the specific IV could produce either an increase or decrease in the odds ratio. 
Each of these measures helps in assessing the basic model. 
Once the basic model was assessed, the impact of each MV was evaluated. This 
evaluation involved adding each interaction to the model, one at a time, assessing how it 
changed the b coefficient of the associated IV, as well as the overall fit and prediction 
power of the model.  
Hypothesis Testing. To test the various hypotheses, the SPSS® output of the 
appropriate LR was evaluated. First, it was determined if the variable in question makes a 
significant contribution to the model. Significance can be determined by checking the 
Sig. column in the Variables in the Equation table. Since the hypotheses are directional, 
the value can be halved to determine significance. A value in this column of p < 0.05 
indicates that the variable made a statistically significant contribution to the model. Once 
significance has been confirmed, the value in the B column is examined. B is the change 
in the log-odds for each unit change in the IV when all of the other variables are constant 
(Laerd Statistics, 2019). B is also the slope of the variable in Equation 5. If this value is a 
positive number, it indicates that the log-odds increase for increases in the IV. A negative 
value indicates that the log-odds decrease for increases in the IV. Next, the Exp(B) value 
should be examined. Exp(B) indicates the odds ratio for the variable. The odds ratio 
shows how much the odds for the DV change for each unit change of the IV. If Exp(B) is 
87 
 
greater than 1.0, it indicates that the log-odds increase for increases in the IV. Exp(B) less 
than 1.0 indicates that the log-odds decrease for increases in the IV (Laerd Statistics, 
2019). Finally, the 95% CI for the IV should be examined. If the CI spans 1.0, the odds 
ratio could either decrease or increase per unit increment of the IV, making the 
contribution of the IV indeterminate. 
The process outlined above was applied to each hypothesis within each RQ. If the 
variable makes a significant contribution to the model, the B and Exp(B) will indicate the 
contribution that the variable makes. If the variable does not make a significant 
contribution to the model, then the null hypothesis with respect to that variable cannot be 
rejected. 
To test hypotheses for the MVs, the basic model is modified by adding the MV of 
interest and calculating the LR to provide new B and Exp(B) values for the IVs with the 
added MV. Next, the interacting variable between the MV and each of the IVs in the 
basic model is added in turn. The LR is recomputed, and the significance of the 
interaction variable is evaluated. If the interaction variable is significant (p < 0.05), the 
Exp(B) value for the interaction variable are assessed. Here, Exp(B) indicates the odds 
ratio for the interaction variable. The odds ratio shows how much the odds for the DV 
change for each unit change of the interaction variable. If Exp(B) is greater than 1.0, it 
indicates that the log-odds increase for increases in the interaction variable. Exp(B) less 
than 1.0 indicates that the log-odds decrease for increases in the interaction variable 
(Laerd Statistics, 2019). Comparing the Exp(B) value for the interaction variable with the 
Exp(B) value for the IV alone reveals how the MV moderates the effect of the IV. The 




This was a study of archival FDM data. The PA's FDM system collected these 
data during more than 300,000 flights. The raw data were processed using AGS software 
to limit the data to only commercial flights. Training or maintenance flights may include 
intentional violations of the stabilized approach criteria based on the particular objectives 
of the flight. Since the objectives of these flights are unknown, it is impossible to separate 
EM driven UAs from those occurring due to other factors. Thus, removing these non-
commercial flights from the sample eliminates the potentially confounding data. In 
addition, some additional variables not customarily captured by the FDM system will be 
calculated within the AGS program. The dataset will be randomly split into two sets, one 
to build the model and another to test for validity and reliability. Next, a statistical 
analysis of the FDM information using SPSS® will perform an LR. The result of this 
process will be a model of how the IVs affect the probability of a UA event. The 
sensitivity and selectivity of the model should be better than 50%, and the ROC AUC 
should be much better than 0.5. The model will be used to test the hypotheses for each of 
the EM variables, as well as the effects of the potential MVs using the test dataset to 




Chapter IV: Results 
This chapter provides details of the analysis of the data. The demographics of the 
population are presented along with how they contribute to the generalizability of the 
research. Descriptive statistics are provided for each of the variables, both EM and MV. 
The reliability and validity testing results are presented, and their impacts on the analysis 
are explained. Next, the results of the testing for each of the hypotheses are presented. 
Finally, a summary of the analysis is provided. 
Demographics Results 
The study population is all commercial jet airline approaches flown by the air 
carriers in the geographic region of the PA. Air carriers in the region flew approximately 
830,000 approaches in 2017 (2017 Aviation sector data analysis, 2018). These flights 
were accomplished in a diverse fleet of aircraft, day and night, in a wide range of weather 
conditions. While the aircraft and conditions, and the air carrier operating the flight, may 
differ, there are several aspects common across this population. 
Numerous commonalities aid in the generalizability of the study. The population 
comes from a region where all the national aviation authorities are members of ICAO. 
Thus, the aviation rules across the region are fairly universal. There are no unique 
operating regulations that impact the analysis. Additionally, all the commercial jet 
carriers in the region operate in accordance with ICAO-compliant standards, providing 
uniformity of training and operations standards, further aiding generalizability. 
Another aid to generalizability is that the flight crew members are most likely 
drawn from the people within the region, providing uniformity of the flight crews’ ethno-
geographic culture. Cultural differences could influence attitudes and norms that might 
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have influenced the sample. The sample consists of commercial flights performed by the 
PA from December 1st, 2016, through November 30th, 2017. The demographic data for 
the air carriers in the region are provided in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
Corporate Demographics of Major Air Carriers Operating in the Market  
 Participating 
Airline 
Airline A Airline B Airline C 
Pilots (PIC and SIC) 1,000+ 1,500+ 1,900+ 600+ 
Fleet Size 100+ 100+ 140+ 50+ 
Percentage of Fleet 
Type Similar to PA 100 10 80 95 
Passengers Carried 
(millions) 30+ 20+ 30+ 10+ 
Cargo Carried (tons) 100+ 50+ 230+ 70+ 
Total Flights 251,000 256,000 226,000 87,000 
Percentage of 
Region’s Flights 30 31 27 10 
ICAO Membership of 
Airline’s Nation Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note. Pilot count, fleet size, and fleet type data current as of December 31st, 2017. Other 
information reflects operations for the year 2017. Identification of airlines masked to 
maintain the confidentiality of the PA. Adapted from (2017 Aviation sector data analysis, 
2018) and (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2020). 
 
As Table 7 shows, of the four major air carriers in the region, three are similar in 
fleet size, the number of pilots, and operations conducted. All four operate similar aircraft 
types within their fleet, constituting differing percentages of their total fleet from 10% to 
100%. The similarity of these carriers from which the population of approaches is derived 




The analysis included categorical and continuous variables in the EM variables, 
while the MVs were all categorical. The original dataset was cleaned of cases with 
obviously erroneous values, such as airspeeds reported below the minimum flight speed 
or zero values for altitude or airspeed for the aircraft in flight. Cases with missing data for 
the EM variables were also removed from the dataset. Destination airports with high 
percentages of UAs were analyzed. In all cases, the airport had a meager number of 
arrivals, resulting in a single or very few approaches with a UA driving a very high UA 
rate. None of these cases were deemed problematic and remained in the dataset. The 
descriptive statistics below are derived from the resultant cleaned dataset. 
Energy Management Variables 
The EM variables consisted of four categorical variables (including the DV) and 
four continuous variables. Of the categorical variables, three are binary, and one consists 
of four categories. The binary variables are Unstable Approach (the DV), High Speed, 
and Speed Brake. Late Start consisted of four categories, as described in Table 3 above. 





Categorical Energy Management Variable Descriptive Statistics  





0 (Stabilized) 207,969 98.6 98.6 
1 (Unstable) 3,026 1.4 100.0 
Total 210,995 100.0  
     
Late Start 0 (AD≥95%ED) 210,367 99.7 99.7 
1 (95%>AD≥85%) 583 0.3 100.0 
2 (85%>AD≥75%) 44 0.0 100.0 
3 (75%ED>AD) 1 0.0 100.0 
Total 210,995 100.0  
     
High Speed 0 (KIAS ≤ 250) 158,604 75.2 75.2 
1 (KIAS > 250) 52,391 24.8 100.0 
Total 210,995 100.0  
     
Speed Brake 0 (Not Used) 56,565 26.8 26.8 
1 (Used) 154,430 73.2 100.0 
Total 210,995 100.0  
 
Note. AD = Actual Distance of start of descent; ED = Estimated Distance of start of 
descent as calculated in Equation 3; KIAS = Knots Indicated Airspeed. 
 
As previously stated, a 2006 Boeing study found 4.4% of approaches resulting in 
UAs (Graeber, 2006). Table 8 clearly shows that UAs are very rare events for the PA, 
with an occurrence rate in the dataset of only 1.4%. Beginning the descent phase late (at 
less than 95% of the distance computed using Equation 3) is even rarer, with only 0.3% 
of the cases in the dataset identified as such. Conversely, high speed on the descent was 
much more common, occurring on nearly 25% of the cases. However, the use of spoilers 
was widespread in the dataset, with over 73% of cases indicating such an occurrence. 
93 
 
Along with the categorical variables above, there were four continuous EM 
variables. These variables captured the airspeed and distance to the destination at the 
extension of the landing gear and flaps. The descriptive statistics for the continuous EM 
variables are presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 
Continuous Energy Management Variable Descriptive Statistics  
 Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Gear Speed 106.50 365.50 179.06 23.54 1.40 2.90 
Gear Dist 0.25 49.57 8.59 3.17 2.42 9.61 
Flap Speed 117.00 327.50 222.75 17.43 0.48 -0.19 
Flap Dist 2.57 79.62 16.80 4.60 1.97 8.41 
 
Note. Dist. to Dest. = Distance to Destination; For all variables, N = 210995. 
 
The landing gear and flaps must be extended such that the aircraft is appropriately 
configured at the SAW to meet the stabilized approach criteria. The FAA’s Instrument 
Flying Handbook (2016) states that the Outer Marker (OM) for an instrument approach 
will be located four to seven miles from the airport and indicates the location of the final 
approach fix. The PA’s SOPs direct that, in general, the landing gear and flaps are 
extended not later than three miles before the OM or seven miles from the runway 
threshold, whichever occurs first (Flight crew operations manual, 2017). The SAW of 
1000 feet AGL, along a 30 glidepath, corresponds to roughly 3 miles from the runway 




Assuming the OM is 5 miles from the threshold, the PA targets an airspeed of 150 
KIAS at the FAF with the landing gear extended allowing the aircraft to decelerate while 
descending on the glideslope to a nominal 130 KIAS VRef. Values of Gear Speed had a 
mean of 179.06 KIAS (SD = 23.54), which closely corresponded to the recommended 
airspeed when extending the landing gear at 3 miles before the OM. Additionally, a 
kurtosis of 2.90 indicates that Gear Speed values were more concentrated near the mean 
than the extremes. A skewness value of 1.40 showed that the tail above the mean was 
more extensive than the tail below. There were values of Gear Speed that were above the 
270 KIAS limiting airspeed for gear extension on the PA’s aircraft. A review of the data 
did not reveal an error in the data collection system, nor did the number and interval for 
these extreme values indicate that these cases would be considered outliers. The 
descriptive statistics for Gear Speed indicate that, overall, flight crew did very well 
following the SOP guidance. 
Gear extension, per the PA’s SOP, should occur at 3 NM prior to the OM, which 
corresponds to a value of 8 for Gear Dist. Again, flight crew did well in following SOP 
guidance. The mean for Gear Dist was 8.59 NM (SD = 3.17). A kurtosis of 9.61 indicates 
that values of Gear Dist are highly concentrated near the mean with relatively few values 
in the extreme. A skewness value of 2.42 indicates many more values in the curve tail 
above the mean than the curve tail below. There is no specification limiting the distance 
at which the landing gear may be lowered. The SOPs do, however, require the aircraft to 
be fully configured by the SAW. There are values of Gear Dist that indicate that the 
landing gear handle was selected to Down even after passing the SAW. The SAW 
distance is 1.76 SDs below the mean, indicating that these occurrences are rare. As with 
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airspeed, a review of the distance data for landing gear extension did not reveal an error 
in the data collection system, and the number and interval for these extreme values do not 
indicate that these would be considered outliers. The graph on the left in Figure 5 depicts 
the distribution of Gear Speed, while the graph on the right depicts that of Gear Dist. 
 
Figure 5 
Landing Gear Extension Histograms 
 
Note. Histograms produced by SPSS®. 
 
The flaps on the PA’s aircraft have various limiting speeds, with a decreasing 
maximum speed as the amount of flaps employed increases. As such, the flaps require an 
additional measure of awareness during employment to ensure the flaps are not extended 
at an airspeed above the limit for the amount selected. The maximum speed for any flap 
employment is 250 KIAS for the PA’s aircraft. The values of Flap Speed (M = 222.75, 
SD = 17.43) showed that most flap employments fell within the restriction. The limiting 
speed of 250 KIAS was 1.56 SD above the mean. The kurtosis of -0.19 indicated that 
Flap Speed exhibited a distribution slightly flatter than a normal distribution. The 
skewness value of 0.48 indicated more values in the curve tail above the mean than in the 
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curve tail below. Like Gear Speed, there were values of Flap Speed that were above the 
250 KIAS limiting airspeed for flap extension on the PA’s aircraft. Again, a review of the 
data did not reveal an error in the data collection system, and the number and interval for 
these extreme values of Flap Speed did not indicate consideration of these cases as 
outliers. 
The other variable recorded at flap extension is the distance to landing. Flap Dist 
captured the distance flown to landing from the moment of flaps selection to any position 
beyond the full up position. The mean for Flap Dist was 16.80 NM (SD = 4.80). Much 
like for landing gear extension, the kurtosis for flap extension was 8.41, indicating the 
values are highly concentrated close to the mean. While there is no published maximum 
distance from landing at which flaps may be extended, There is an admonition in the 
PA’s SOPs to “monitor distance to the OM in order not to establish FLAP 05 
configuration too early” (Flight crew operations manual, 2017). Again, the PA’s SOPs 
require the aircraft to be fully configured by the SAW. There are values of Flap Dist that 
indicate flap deployment at points beyond the SAW. The SAW distance is 3.1 SDs below 
the mean, indicating that these occurrences are very rare. However, there were many 
more cases where flaps were selected down much earlier, some as many as 13 SD above 
the mean. As with the other continuous EM variables, a review of the distance data for 
flap extension did not reveal an error in the data collection system, and the number and 
interval for these extreme values did not indicate that these would be considered outliers. 
A possible explanation for the extreme values for Flap Dist may be the extension of flaps 
in a holding pattern during the approach phase. Such an event would cause the 
computation of distance to the destination to begin while the aircraft was in holding. Such 
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an occurrence would have added significantly to the distance reported for Flap Dist for 
the associated case. The graph on the left in Figure 6 depicts the distribution of Flap 
Speed, while the graph on the right depicts that of Flap Dist. 
 
Figure 6 
Flap Extension Histograms 
 
Note. Histograms produced by SPSS®. 
 
Moderating Variables 
The four MVs capture factors that may moderate the EM variables influence on 
the probability of a UA event. While Lighting, Experience, and Automation were 
extracted from the FDM information, Duration was computed by examining the reported 
flight durations and flagging the bottom quartile to designate short (less than 52 minutes 
duration) and long (52 minutes or longer duration). The descriptive statistics for the MVs 





Moderating Variable Descriptive Statistics  
Value Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Lighting 1 (Day) 123,464 58.5 58.5 
2 (Twilight) 18,682 8.9 67.4 
3 (Night) 68,849 32.6 100.0 
Total 210,995 100.0  
     
Experience 1 (Captain) 89,491 42.4 42.4 
2 (First Officer) 121,504 57.6 100.0 
Total 210,995 100.0  
     
Duration 0 (Longer Flight) 158,819 75.3 75.3 
1 (Short Flight) 52,176 24.7 100.0 
Total 210,995 100.0  
     
Automation 0 (Autopilot) 205,934 97.6 97.6 
1 (Manual) 5,061 2.4 100.0 
Total 210,995 100.0  
 
Note. Short Flight = Bottom Quartile. 
 
The FDM system determined the value of the MV Lighting by comparing the time 
of landing with the sunrise/sunset tables for the destination airfield. Dusk and dawn were 
combined into the single value of twilight. Twilight is the period before sunrise and after 
sunset, during which “there is natural light provided by the upper atmosphere, which does 
receive direct sunlight and reflects part of it toward the Earth’s surface” (FAA, 2020, p. 




Civil twilight is defined to begin in the morning, and to end in the evening when 
the center of the Sun is geometrically 6 degrees below the horizon. This is the 
limit at which twilight illumination is sufficient, under good weather conditions, 
for terrestrial objects to be clearly distinguished. (FAA, 2020, p. 10-2-8) 
In the middle latitudes, civil twilight periods in the morning and evening are 
approximately 30 minutes. This limited period is roughly 4.2% of the day. Thus, the 
limited number of landings identified as occurring in twilight lighting conditions, 8.9%, 
is understandable. Additionally, most airlines operate fewer flights during the overnight 
hours. Thus, the value of 32.6% of approach and landings occurring in night lighting 
conditions is also understandable.  
The MV Experience was determined by which pilot was controlling the 
autopilot/flight director system. The FDM system records which cockpit side is 
controlling the autopilot/flight director system during the approach. The PA’s SOPs 
direct control selection to the side of the PF. It is usual for air carrier flight crews to 
alternate the PF/PM duties on each leg, allowing less experienced pilots (usually the FO) 
to gain experience while also allowing more experienced pilots (usually the Captain) to 
maintain proficiency. To help FOs gain experience, the Captain may permit the FO to 
operate as the PF on additional legs. This may explain why Captains were recorded as 
making 42.4% of landings, while FOs were recorded as making 57.6%. Along with pilot 
experience, the duration of the flight impacts pilot performance. 
The MV Duration was computed within SPSS® using the recorded time from 
liftoff to touchdown in hours, minutes, and seconds (hh:mm:ss). This value was first 
converted into decimal hours (H.h), then SPSS® was used to establish the quartiles. The 
100 
 
bottom quartile was designated as short flights (flagged with a value of 1), with all other 
flights designated as long flights (flagged with a value of 0). Those flights with durations 
exactly at the breaking point between the quartiles were designated as longer flights. 
Thus, the short flights accounted for 24.7 % of the flights. The increased overall task 
loading during shorter duration flights decreases pilot performance (Wanyan et al., 2018). 
The autopilot helps in reducing pilot task loading. The MV Automation captured 
autopilot use for the approach. The FDM system does not just record which cockpit side 
controls the autopilot/flight director system; it also records whether the autopilot was 
engaged and flying the aircraft during the approach. The FDM system indicates a 
disengaged autopilot with a value of 0 and an engaged autopilot with a value of 1. These 
values were recoded 0 for an engaged autopilot and 1 for manually flown with the 
autopilot disengaged for the study. The MV Automation indicates that 97.6% of the 
approaches executed by the PA had the autopilot engaged. Before a model employing the 
EM variables and MVs described above could be developed, LR's assumptions had to be 
validated. 
Testing of Assumptions 
Before any analysis of the data could be accomplished, the assumptions for the 
LR needed testing. These assumptions were extensively described in the Data analysis 
process/hypothesis testing section in Chapter III. For LR, the seven assumptions are: 
• one DV, which must be dichotomous, 
• one or more IVs that are either nominal or continuous, 
• independence of observations, and categories of DV and all nominal IVs 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, 
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• a minimum of 15 cases per IV, 
• a linear relationship between continuous IVs and the logit transformation 
of the DV, 
• no multicollinearity, and  
• no “significant outliers, high leverage or highly influential points.” (Laerd 
Statistics, 2019, pp. 3-5) 
Each of the seven assumptions was validated, as discussed below. 
There must be a single DV, which is dichotomous. The single DV for the study, 
UA Event, consists of values of 0 for cases where a UA did not occur, and 1 for cases 
where a UA did occur. The assumption of a single, dichotomous DV was met. 
There must be one or more IVs that are either nominal or continuous. There are 
seven IVs and four MVs. Three of the IVs and all four MVs were nominal, and the 
remaining four IVs were continuous. The assumption that there must be one or more IVs 
that are either nominal or continuous was met. 
Observations must be independent, and categories of DV and all nominal IVs 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The dataset was cleaned of duplicate 
cases. These cases were identified by comparing flight dates, destinations, landing times, 
durations, and aircraft identification, ensuring each case was a separate, independent 
observation of a specific approach event. The values for each variable can only exist in 
one category for that variable in each case. There are no possible values for any variable 
other than those found in the set for each case present in the set. Thus, the assumption of 
independence of observations and exclusivity of variables was met. 
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There must be a minimum of 15 cases per IV. The previous discussion indicated 
that, with an industry average of 4% UAs, there needed to be a minimum of 250 cases to 
satisfy the suggested minimum of 10 instances of each category of the DV. Equation 6 





)   (6) 
where: 
Sm = Minimum sample size 
Em = Minimum number of events 
X = Number of cases in which a UA occurred, and the variable is flagged 
N = Total number of cases 
Using Equation 6, the minimum sample size associated with each of the 
categorical variables, both EM and MV, was calculated. For the MV Lighting, only the 
category with the fewest occurrences was calculated. The results of the calculations are 















Late Start 24 0.79% 0.01% 87,915 
High Speed 845 27.92% 0.40% 2,497 
Speed Brake 2,058 68.01% 0.98% 1,025 
Lighting (Twilight) 201 6.64% 0.10% 10,497 
Experience 2,311 76.37% 1.10% 913 
Duration 2,355 77.83% 1.12% 896 
Automation 204 6.74% 0.10% 10,343 
 
Note. N = 210995; Minimum sample size calculated using Equation 6. 
 
The variables with very low occurrence rates require a very large sample size. 
Late Start, the variable that occurs the fewest times in UA events, demands a minimum 
sample size of nearly 88,000. The next two variables least frequently occurring in a UA 
event, Lighting (Twilight) and Automation, each drive minimum sample sizes of just 
under 10,500. Hair et al. (2010) caution that very large sample sizes result in giving 
statistical significance to any difference regardless of relevance. Therefore, the seldom 
occurring variable Late Start was subjected to additional review to reduce the possibility 
of inflated statistical significance. 
The LR indicated that Late Start alone was non-significant (p = 0.094). When all 
the EM variables were included in the model, Late Start was still non-significant 
(p = 0.172). Since Late Start occurred at such a low rate, the Firth LR was used to verify 
this variable’s significance. The Firth LR is a method of computing the LR that seeks to 
minimize the bias introduced by small group size. In the study’s case, the small sample 
was the 24 cases of UA when Late Start was non-zero. Even with the bias correction, 
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Late Start failed to be significant. The results of the Firth LR confirmed that Late Start 
was a non-significant variable both alone (p = 0.189) and when part of the basic model 
(p = 0.205). Due to the very low occurrence rate, and the lack of significance in the LR 
models, it was decided to exclude Late Start from minimum sample size considerations. 
Multiple random subsets were extracted from the training dataset with crosstab analysis 
accomplished to select training and assessment sets that came closest to fulfilling the 10-
instance suggestion on the remaining variables. With a sample size of 10,500, the 
assumption of 15 cases per IV was met. 
There must be a linear relationship between continuous IVs and the logit 
transformation of the DV. The linear relationship between the continuous variables and 
the logit of the dependent variable was assessed via the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. 
The LR was accomplished, including the interaction between each continuous IV and its 
log and assessing the significance of the interaction. A Bonferroni correction was applied 
using all twelve terms in the model resulting in statistical significance acceptance when 
p < .00417 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). Based on this assessment, all continuous 
independent variables were linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable. The 





Assessment of Linearity. 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a 
 
Late Start(1) -17.132 7,163.691 .000 1 .998 .000 
High Speed(1) .058 .194 .088 1 .766 1.059 
Gear Speed .104 .218 .227 1 .633 1.109 
Gear Dist -.756 .290 6.771 1 .009 .470 
Flap Speed -.494 .607 .662 1 .416 .610 
Flap Dist -.017 .297 .003 1 .954 .983 
Speed Brake(1) -.090 .189 .228 1 .633 .914 
Gear Speed by 
Ln_GearSpeed 
-.014 .035 .162 1 .687 .986 
Gear Dist by 
Ln_GearDist 
.186 .081 5.254 1 .022 1.205 
Flap Speed by 
Ln_FlapSpeed 
.079 .094 .706 1 .401 1.082 
Flap Dist by 
Ln_FlapDist 
.000 .074 .000 1 1.000 1.000 
Constant 7.826 21.645 .131 1 .718 2,504.986 
 
Note. a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, 
Flap Speed, Flap Dist, Speed Brake, Gear Speed * ln_Gear Speed, Gear Dist * ln_Gear 
Dist, Flap Speed * ln_Flap Speed, Flap Dist * ln_Flap Dist. 
 
There must be no multicollinearity. To assess for multicollinearity, the linear 
regression process was conducted using the DV and IVs from the model as recommended 
by Field (2018). The linear regression process provides statistics for tolerance and VIF. 
In assessing tolerance, values less than 0.1 indicate potential multicollinearity problems 
(Menard, 1995, as cited in Field, 2018). The model’s tolerance values were all well above 
0.1, indicating that there are no multicollinearity issues. The other statistic provided is the 
VIF, which indicate problems when values exceed 10 (Meyrs, 1990, as cited in Field, 
2018). The study model’s VIF values were all much less than 10, further indicating that 
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there are no multicollinearity issues. The tolerance and VIF values for the model are 
provided in Table 13.  
 
Table 13 




1 Late Start .996 1.004 
High Speed .972 1.028 
Gear Speed .430 2.325 
Gear Dist .493 2.028 
Flap Speed .796 1.256 
Flap Dist .793 1.261 
Speed Brake .943 1.060 
 
Note. Dependent Variable: Unstable Approach. 
 
The linear regression process in SPSS® also produces a table of collinearity 
diagnostics. Variables sharing high proportions of variance on the same small eigenvalue 
indicates problems (Field, 2018). The review of the collinearity diagnostics table 
indicated that there were no significant problems within the model. While this process 
reveals which variables may be problematic, it does not provide a simple resolution. 
Elimination of any variable removes potentially valuable information from the model. An 
examination of the collinearity diagnostics table shows that none of the variables in the 
model have high levels of variance proportion on the same small eigenvalue. It was 
determined that there was no multicollinearity since no variables shared high variability 
on the same eigenvalue. This determination was bolstered by the tolerance values all well 
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above 0.1, and all VIF values well below 10. The assumption of no multicollinearity in 























1 5.893 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 
2 .999 2.429 .00 .98 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
3 .719 2.862 .00 .01 .94 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
4 .229 5.077 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .95 
5 .097 7.775 .00 .00 .00 .00 .45 .00 .12 .00 
6 .055 10.391 .01 .00 .04 .02 .09 .01 .60 .00 
7 .005 34.080 .20 .00 .00 .96 .45 .10 .27 .00 
8 .003 44.636 .79 .00 .00 .02 .00 .89 .00 .03 
 
Note. Dependent Variable: Unstable Approach; Dim. = Dimension; Eigen. = Eigenvalue; 
Cond. = Condition; Const. = Constant. 
 
There must be no significant outliers, high leverage, or highly influential points. 
The dataset was thoroughly examined for suspect data. Cases, where there appeared to be 
any type of error in the FDM system’s recording of the data, were eliminated. These 
cases included those with missing values for the variables of interest. Cases with extreme 
values were analyzed, eliminating those with outlier data. In the continuous IVs, extreme 
values followed a trend that did not indicate these values were outliers. The number and 
interval of these extreme values indicated that no single case was of high leverage of 
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highly influential on its own. Therefore, the assumption of no significant outliers, high 
leverage, or highly influential points was met. 
Model Development 
With the assumptions associated with LR met, the model was created in SPSS®. 
Forced entry, forward stepwise, and backward stepwise models were compared to 
determine the best overall model. The Forced Entry and Backward Stepwise procedures 
both resulted in a model with three significant variables, while the Forward Stepwise 
procedure produced a model with only two significant variables. A discussion of each of 
the models is below, and complete SPSS® results for each model are provided in 
Appendix B. A summary of the critical results of the Omnibus Tests of Model 
Coefficients, Model Summary, and HL Test is provided in Table 15. 
 
Table 15 
Summary of Critical Test Results 
  Stepwise 
 Forced Entry Forward Backward 
Omnibus Test Sig. <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Model Summary -2LL 1453.75 1463.647 1455.378 
Nagelkerke R2 0.024 0.017 0.023 
Hosmer and Lemeshow χ2 13.033 2.593 15.265 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Sig 0.111 0.957 0.054 
 
Note. Sig. = Significance, -2LL = -2 Log-Likelihood; See Appendix B, Tables B3 and B4 
for full details. 
 
The Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for the three models were all p < 0.001, 
indicating that all the models were statistically significant at p < 0.05. Likewise, all three 
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models had a -2 Log-Likelihood very close to 1460. The Nagelkerke R2 values for all 
three models indicate that they all explain very little of the variability in the DV. The 
Forced Entry and Backward Stepwise models explain just 2.3% of the variance, and the 
Forward Stepwise model only 1.7%. While the R2 values are small, the models only 
include EM variables, which are a small portion of the factors influencing UA 
occurrence. Many other factors are not modeled, including but not limited to  weather, 
winds, aircraft malfunctions, and ATC. Thus, a small R2 was expected. Finally, the HL 
Test for significance exceeds 0.05 for all three models, indicating that none of the models 
would be considered a poor fit. Moreover, with a chi-square value of 2.593 and a 
significance of nearly 1.0, the HL test seemed to indicate that the Forward Stepwise 
model was the best fit to the data. 
Due to the extreme difference in group sizes between UA and non-UA events, the 
default classification cutoff of 0.5 was not appropriate. All three models placed all cases 
into the Stabilized Approach group (Unstable Approach = 0) with the default 
classification cutoff of 0.5, therefore all the UA cases were misclassified as stabilized. 
The cutoff value was adjusted to account for the prior probabilities of UA versus non-UA 







ZCS = calculated cutoff value between groups 
NA = number of observations in group A 
NB = number of observations in group B 
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ZA = centroid for group A 
ZB = centroid for group B 
Group A, UA events, had 140 observations with a mean predicted probability of 0.01713. 
Group B, non-UA events, had 10,360 observations with a mean predicted probability of 
0.1328. Entering these values into Equation 7 yields a ZCS of 0.017. 
With the classification cutoff adjusted to the calculated value of 0.017, the Forced 
Entry, Forward Stepwise, and Backward Stepwise procedures were accomplished. A 
review of the classification tables resulting from the three procedures determined which 
model provided the best results. The resultant classification tables are provided in 
Appendix B. A summary of the classification table results is provided in Table 16. 
 
Table 16 
Summary of Procedure Differences 
Procedure PAC Sensitivity Selectivity Positive PV Negative PV 
Forced 76.2 42.1 76.7 2.39 98.99 
Forward 77.4 35.0 78.0 2.11 98.89 
Backward 76.8 42.1 77.6 2.44 99.00 
 
Note. PAC = Percentage Accuracy in Classification; PV = Predictive Value; See 
Appendix B, Tables B3 and B4 for full details. 
 
The classification results for the three procedures were very similar, with minor 
variations. All three produced moderate PAC around 77%. In addition, all three 
procedures resulted in very high negative predictive values near 99%, showing excellent 
identification of non-UA events. However, they also all resulted in low sensitivity (less 
than 50%) and a very low positive predictive value of about 2.5%, indicating poor 
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identification of actual UA events. With very little difference among the models 
concerning classification performance, and since hypothesis testing required that all the 
EM variables be present in the model, the Forced Entry model was selected for reliability, 
validity, and hypothesis testing. 
Reliability and Validity Testing Results 
Having selected the Forced Entry model for testing the many hypotheses, 
confirmation of reliability and validity was accomplished using the assessment dataset. 
To generate the two datasets, 50% of the sample of 210,995 cases were randomly 
selected in SPSSÒ. First, the selected cases were copied into a new file as the training 
set. Then, the unselected cases were copied into a file as the assessment dataset. This 
process ensured that they were two separate sets, rather than just two sets randomly 
selected from the same dataset. Otherwise, numerous individual cases would likely 
appear in both datasets, negatively influencing the reliability and validity testing results. 
Reliability Testing 
For reliability testing of the model, the dataset was split by random selection into 
a training set and an assessment set. A random sample of 10,500 cases selected from the 
training set produced the sample to generate the model. A sample of 10,500 cases, the 
same as the sample size used to generate the model, was randomly extracted from the 
assessment set and used to determine the model's reliability. The SPSS® Scoring Wizard 
function generated predicted probabilities for the assessment sample cases using the same 
variable coefficients as in the training model. A crosstabs analysis generated the same 
classification table as would be produced in the LR procedure. If the prediction error rate 
for the assessment set is similar to the training set’s prediction error rate, then the model 
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is presumed to be reliable (Rana et al., 2010). A review of the results revealed that the 
assessment set’s prediction error rate was indeed similar to that of the training set. Thus, 
the model was determined to be reliable. A summary of the comparison between the 
training and assessment sets’ classification tables is provided in Table 17. 
 
Table 17 
Comparison of Training and Assessment Classification Error Rates. 
 PAC Sensitivity Selectivity Positive PV Negative PV 
Training 76.2 36.9 76.9 2.38 98.99 
Assessment 76.9 40.0 77.5 2.59 98.85 
 
Note. PAC = Percentage Accuracy in Classification; PV = Predictive Value. 
 
Validity Testing 
The test of model validity used two measures. The HL goodness of fit test is 
computed by SPSS® during the LR procedure. The ROC was computed after the final 
model was determined. Both measures indicate that the model exhibits poor 
discrimination in predicting UA events. 
The HL goodness of fit test provides a measure that verifies if the model is a good 
fit with the data. If the HL significance value indicates statistical significance (p < 0.05), 
the model is not a good fit. These values are in Table 16 above. For the Forward Stepwise 
model, the HL test of significance had a value of 0.957, or nearly 1.0, which, combined 
with the HL chi-squared value for this model of 2.593, indicated a fairly good fit to the 
data. All three models produced HL significance values above p = 0.05; thus, all were 
presumed to fit the data, thus aiding in validity. 
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Another measure of the validity of the LR model is the AUC value from the ROC. 
The ROC generated by SPSS® provided the AUC for the three models. Based on the 
AUCs, none of the three models provide much discrimination. The best AUC achieved 
was 0.626 for the Force Entry model; with Referencing Table 6 in Chapter III, AUC 
values between 0.5 and 0.7 indicate poor discrimination. The results of the ROC 
computation are provided in Figure 7 and Table 18.  
 
Figure 7 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
 





Area Under the Curve 





Asymptotic 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Forced Entry 0.627 0.025 0.000 0.578 0.676 
Forward Stepwise 0.614 0.024 0.000 0.567 0.661 
Backward Stepwise 0.619 0.026 0.000 0.569 0.669 
 
Note. Std. = Standard; Sig. = Significance; a. Under the nonparametric assumption; b. 
Null hypothesis: true area = 0.5. 
 
Based on the HL goodness of fit test results and the AUC, the three models were 
determined to be marginally valid. The HL significance indicated that the models were a 
marginal fit, while the AUC indicated that the model provided poor discrimination. As 
noted above, there are many factors outside of EM that may influence UAs. Therefore, a 
model with poor discrimination and marginal fit is understandable, but not desirable. 
Hypothesis Testing Results 
With the model defined and the reliability and validity confirmed, each of the 
hypotheses was tested using the model’s variable coefficients. For the EM variables, the 
coefficients were taken directly from the model. The MVs, however, required the 
addition of the interaction between the appropriate EM variable and the MV to the model, 
with results providing coefficients for analysis. The basic Forced Entry model was used 
to provide coefficients for all the EM variables. For the full SPSS® analysis results for 
the Forced Entry Model, see Appendix B, Table B3. The table of variables in the Forced 





Forced Entry Model 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a Late Start(1) -16.908 7301.899 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .064 .193 .109 1 .741 1.066 .730 1.557 
Gear Speed .015 .005 8.065 1 .005 1.015 1.005 1.026 
Gear Dist -.108 .043 6.277 1 .012 .898 .826 .977 
Flap Speed .016 .005 9.020 1 .003 1.016 1.006 1.027 
Flap Dist -.013 .022 .342 1 .559 .987 .945 1.031 
Speed Brake(1) -.094 .188 .252 1 .616 .910 .629 1.315 
Constant -9.541 1.167 66.825 1 .000 .000   
 
Note. a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 
Flap Dist, Speed Brake. 
 
Energy Management Variable Hypothesis Testing 
The first step to test the hypotheses related to the EM variables was to review the 
variables’ significance. If the variable was significant (p < 0.05), it was a significant 
contributor to the model, with confirmation by examining the Wald statistic. The Wald 
statistic indicates how much the variable contributed to the model. The second step in 
assessing the variable was to evaluate the Exp(B) value. This Exp(B) value indicates the 
change in the probability of the DV per unit change in the associated IV. The Exp(B) 
value indicates the direction of the change, with values above 1.0 indicating an increase 
in the probability and values below 1.0 indicating a decrease. An Exp(B) value of 1.0 
indicates that there is no effect. The third step is evaluating the 95% confidence interval 
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(CI) for Exp(B). If the 95% CI spans the value 1.0, the variable's effect is ambiguous 
since, within the 95% CI, the effect could be positive, negative, or no effect at all. If the 
variable was insignificant (p > 0.05) or the 95% CI includes the value of 1.0, then the 
associated hypothesis was not supported. The testing of the hypotheses associate with 
each of the EM variables follows. 
H1a1: A longer delay in the start of the descent is associated with an increase in 
the probability of having a UA. Early data analysis revealed that the EM variable Late 
Start had an extremely low occurrence rate, producing a considerable sample size 
requirement that would amplify the significance of other variables. In the sample size of 
10,500, some random samples would have an occurrence of Late Start, while other 
samples would not. Even with large sample sizes, Late Start's coefficient failed to be 
significant, and the 95% Confidence Interval (CI) included the value of 1.0. If the CI 
includes the value 1.0, the direction of the effect of the variable is ambiguous. Thus, the 
hypothesis was not supported. 
H1b1: High-speed below 10,000 feet is associated with an increase in the 
probability of having a UA. The EM variable High Speed was not significant in the 
model (Wald = 0.92, p = 0.762, Exp(B) = 1.060, 95% CI: 0.726-1.026). The significance 
is greater than p = 0.05, and the 95% CI also includes the value 1.0. Hypothesis H1b1 was 
not supported. 
H1c1: Higher airspeed at gear extension is associated with an increase in the 
probability of having a UA. Gear Speed was significant in the model (Wald = 8.061, 
p = 0.005, 95% CI: 1.005-1.549). The Wald statistic of 8.061 indicates that Gear Speed 
contributed significantly to the model. The Exp(B) value of 1.015 reveals a positive 
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relationship in which every unit increase in Gear Speed, the probability of a UA event 
increases by a factor of 1.015. Put another way, a one-knot increase in Gear Speed 
increases the probability of a UA event by 1.50%. Therefore, hypothesis H1c1 was 
supported. 
H1d1: A shorter distance to the destination at gear extension is associated with an 
increase in the probability of having a UA. Like the airspeed at gear extension, Gear Dist 
was significant (Wald = 6.360, p = 0.012, Exp(B) = 0.898, 95% CI: 0.825-0.976). The 
Wald statistic of 6.360 shows that Gear Dist was a significant contributor to the model, 
though not as much as Gear Speed. The Exp(B) value of 0.898 indicates a negative 
relationship such that for each unit increase in Gear Dist, the probability of a UA event 
decreases by a factor of 0.898. Since this hypothesis is related to decreases in Gear Dist, 
dividing 1.0 by 0.898 yields the appropriate factor of 1.114. This factor increases 
probability of a UA per unit decrease in Gear Dist by 11.4%, resulting in support of the 
hypothesis. 
H1e1: Higher airspeed at flap extension is associated with an increase in the 
probability of having a UA. Flap Speed was also significant in the model. Again, the 
Wald statistic of 9.029 indicates that Flap Speed contributed significantly to the model. 
The Exp(B) value of 1.016 indicates a positive relationship with the DV. For each unit 
increase in Flap Speed, a UA event's probability increases by a factor of 1.016. This gives 
an increase in the probability of a UA per unit increase in Flap Speed of 1.6%. 
Hypothesis H1e was supported. 
H1f1: A shorter distance to the destination at flap extension is associated with an 
increase in the probability of having a UA. Flap Dist was not significant in the model 
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(Wald = 0.330, p = 0.566, Exp(B) = 0.987, 95% CI: 0.946-1.031). Unlike the other 
continuous EM variables, Flap Dist contributed little to the model, as indicated by the 
Wald statistic value of 0.330. Further, the 95% CI included the value1.0 making the 
effect of Flap Dist ambiguous. For these reasons, the hypothesis for H1f was not 
supported. 
H1g1: Using spoilers on descent is associated with an increase in the probability 
of having a UA. Another variable not significant in the model was Speed Brake 
(Wald = 0.264, p = 0.607, Exp(B) = 0.908, 95% CI: 0.946-1.313). The Wald statistic 
shows little contribution to the model. Inclusion of 1.0 in the 95% CI makes the effect of 
Speed Brake ambiguous. Thus, the hypothesis was not supported. 
After testing the hypotheses associated with the EM variables, the possible 
influences of the MVs were investigated. Even though an EM variable might not have 
been significant in the basic model, an MV's influence may have altered the EM 
variable's contribution to the model. The testing of MV influence is reported below. 
Moderating Variable Influence Hypothesis Testing 
Testing of the hypotheses related to the influence of the MVs was a more 
involved process. Each MV had to be added to the model in turn to produce a new 
baseline. Then, each interaction was added in turn to evaluate the interaction between the 
EM variables and the MV of interest. If the interaction variable was significant 
(p < 0.05), then the EM variable was checked for significance. If the EM variable is also 
significant, then the interaction odds ratio can be determined by adding the B values for 
the EM variable and the interaction variable, and exponentiating the sum. Due to the 
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large number of SPSS® outputs required in this process, the tables are provided in 





Summary of Interactions 
 Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I. for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Lighting * Late Start .000 2 1.000    
Lighting * High Speed .318 2 .853    
Lighting * Gear Speed 1.116 2 .572    
Lighting * Gear Dist .365 2 .833    
Lighting * Flap Speed .735 2 .692    
Lighting * Flap Dist 7.095 2 .029    
Lighting * Speed Brake 13.359 2 .001    
Experience(1) by Late Start(1) .000 1 1.000 .462 .000  
Experience(1) by High Speed(1) 1.074 1 .300 .642 .277 1.485 
Experience(1) by Gear Speed .388 1 .533 1.007 .986 1.027 
Experience(1) by Gear Dist .097 1 .756 .978 .853 1.123 
Experience(1) by Flap Speed .000 1 .995 1.000 .959 1.043 
Experience(1) by Flap Dist .174 1 .677 1.020 .930 1.119 
Experience(1) by Speed Brake(1) .456 1 .499 .599 .135 2.652 
Duration by Late Start(1) .000 1 1.000 .900 .000 . 
Duration by High Speed(1) 4.408 1 .036 2.519 1.063 5.968 
Duration by Gear Speed .383 1 .536 .995 .980 1.010 
Duration by Gear Dist  .183 1 .669 .970 .841 1.117 
Duration by Flap Speed .236 1 .627 1.006 .983 1.028 
Duration by Flap Dist .125 1 .724 1.017 .925 1.119 
Duration by Speed Brake(1) .578 1 .447 .716 .303 1.694 
Automation(1) by Late Start(1) .000 1 1.000 .243 .000 . 
Automation(1) by High Speed(1) .163 1 .686 .743 .176 3.136 
Automation(1) by Gear Speed .064 1 .800 1.003 .981 1.026 
Automation(1) by Gear Dist 2.076 1 .150 .771 .541 1.098 
Automation(1) by Flap Speed .248 1 .618 .990 .954 1.029 
Automation(1) by Flap Dist 2.923 1 .087 .846 .699 1.025 
Automation(1) by Speed Brake(1) 1.645 1 .200 2.889 .571 14.612 
 
Note. Significant (p < 0.05) interactions highlighted in bold. All hypotheses are 
directional, so the single-tailed significance is determined by taking half the p-value. 




H2aa1: A longer delay in the start of the descent, when moderated by reduced 
lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The 
interaction variable, Lighting * Late Start, was not significant (p = 1.000). Therefore, the 
hypothesis was not supported. 
H2ba1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by reduced lighting, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Lighting * High Speed, was not significant (p = 0.853). Thus, the hypothesis 
H2ba1 was not supported. 
H2ca1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by reduced lighting, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Lighting * Gear Speed, was not significant (p = 0.572), resulting in a failure to 
support the hypothesis. 
H2da1: A shorter distance to the destination at gear extension, when moderated by 
reduced lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
The interaction variable, Gear Dist * Lighting, was not significant (p = 0.833). The 
hypothesis H2da1 was not supported. 
H2ea1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by reduced lighting, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Flap Speed * Lighting, was not significant (p = 0.692), producing a lack of 
support for the hypothesis. 
H2fa1: A shorter distance to the destination at flap extension, when moderated by 
reduced lighting, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
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The interaction variable, Flap Dist * Lighting, was significant (Wald = 7.095, df = 2, 
p = 0.029) in the interaction model. Likewise, Flap Dist was also significant (B = -0.062, 
Wald = 3.997, df = 1, p = 0.046, Exp(B) = 0.940). The twilight values of Flap Dist * 
Lighting(1) were not significant (p = 0.057), but night Flap Dist * Lighting(2) was 
significant (B = 0.012, Wald = 6.282, p = 0.012, Exp(B) = 1.107). While the computation 
of this interaction's effect is possible, note that that the interaction effect is in the opposite 
direction of the EM variable effect. The negative B value and the Exp(B) below 1 for 
Flap Dist indicate a decrease in the probability of a UA event as Flap Dist increases. The 
study was interested in the effect as Flap Dist decreases. Inverting both will still result in 
effects in opposite directions, indicating that decreasing Flap Dist influenced by the 
decreased lighting of night decreases a UA event's probability. This influence is in the 
opposite direction of the hypothesis, which is therefore not supported. Table 21 provides 
additional details from the SPSS® output for the Lighting * Flap Dist interaction. 
 
Table 21 
Lighting * Flap Dist Interaction 
 B df Sig. Exp(B) 
95 % C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Flap Dist * Lighting  2 .029    
Flap Dist by Lighting(1) .089 1 .057 1.093 .997 1.197 
Flap Dist by Lighting(2) .101 1 .012 1.107 1.022 1.198 
Flap Dist -.062 1 .046 .940 .885 .999 
 
Note. Full details for this interaction are found in Appendix B, Table B5. 
 
H2ga1: Using spoilers on the descent, when moderated by reduced lighting, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
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variable, Speed Brake * Lighting, was significant (Wald = 13.359, df = 2, p = 0.001). 
However, Speed Brake was not significant (p = 0.278) in the interaction model. 
Therefore, hypothesis H2ga1 was not supported. Additional details from the SPSS® 
output for the Speed Brake * Lighting interaction are provided in Table 22. 
 
Table 22 
Lighting * Speed Brake Interaction 
 B df Sig. Exp(B) 
95 % C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Speed Brake * Lighting  2 .001    
Speed Brake(1) by Lighting(1) 1.134 1 .294 3.109 .374 25.842 
Speed Brake(1) by Lighting(2) 1.383 1 .001 .251 .111 .567 
Speed Brake .271 1 .278 1.311 .803 2.193 
 
Note. Full details for this interaction are found in Appendix B, Table B5. 
 
H2ab1: A longer delay in the start of the descent, when moderated by pilot 
inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The 
interaction variable, Experience * Late Start, was not significant (p = 1.000). Thus, the 
results did not support the hypothesis. 
H2bb1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by pilot inexperience, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Experience * High Speed, was not significant (p = 0.300). This hypothesis could 
not be supported. 
H2cb1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by pilot inexperience, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
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variable, Experience * Gear Speed, was not significant (p = 0.533). Therefore, hypothesis 
H2cb1 was not supported. 
H2db1: A shorter distance to the destination at gear extension, when moderated by 
pilot inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
The interaction variable, Experience * Gear Dist, was not significant (p = 0.756). As a 
result, the hypothesis was not supported. 
H2eb1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by pilot inexperience, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Experience * Flap Speed, was not significant (p = 0.995). Therefore, hypothesis 
H2eb1 was not supported. 
H2fb1: A shorter distance to the destination at flap extension, when moderated by 
pilot inexperience, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
The interaction variable, Experience * Flap Dist, was not significant (p = 0.677), 
resulting in a failure to support the hypothesis. 
H2gb1: Using spoilers on the descent, when moderated by pilot inexperience, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Experience * Speed Brake, was not significant (p = 0.499). Thus, hypothesis 
H2gb1 was not supported. 
H2ac1: A longer delay in the start of the descent, when moderated by decreased 
duration, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The 
interaction variable, Duration * Late Start, was not significant (p = 1.000). Hypothesis 
H2ac1 was not supported.  
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H2bc1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by decreased duration, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Duration * High Speed, was significant (p = 0.036). However, in the interaction 
model, High Speed was not significant (p = 0.493). Therefore, the hypothesis was not 
supported. Additional details from the SPSS® output for the Duration * High Speed 
interaction are provided in Table 23. 
 
Table 23 
Duration * High Speed Interaction 
 B df Sig. Exp(B) 
95 % C.I. for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Duration by High Speed .924 1 .036 2.519 1.063 5.968 
High Speed -.159 1 .493 .853 .542 1.343 
 
Note. Full details for this interaction are found in Appendix B, Table B5. 
 
H2cc1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by decreased duration, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Duration * Gear Speed, was not significant (p = 0.536). Thus, the hypothesis 
H2cc1 was not supported. 
H2dc1: A shorter distance to the destination at gear extension, when moderated by 
decreased duration, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. The interaction variable, Duration * Gear Dist, was not significant (p = 0.669), 
producing a failure to support the hypothesis. 
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H2ec1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by decreased duration, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Duration * Flap Speed, was not significant (p = 0.627). As a result, the 
hypothesis was not supported. 
H2fc1: A shorter distance to the destination at flap extension, when moderated by 
decreased duration, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. The interaction variable, Flap Dist * Duration, was not significant (p = 0.724). 
Therefore, hypothesis H2fc1 was not supported. 
H2gc1: Using spoilers on the descent, when moderated by decreased duration, is 
associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Duration * Speed Brake, was not significant (p = 0.447), producing a failure to 
support hypothesis H2gc1. 
H2ad1: A longer delay in the start of the descent, when moderated by non-
automated flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. 
The interaction variable, Automation * Late Start, was not significant (p = 1.000). 
Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported. 
H2bd1: High-speed below 10,000 feet, when moderated by non-automated flight, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Automation * High Speed, was not significant (p = 0.686). Hypothesis H2bd1 
was not supported. 
H2cd1: Higher airspeed at gear extension, when moderated by non-automated 
flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The 
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interaction variable, Automation * Gear Speed, was not significant (p = 0.800). Thus, the 
hypothesis was not supported. 
H2dd1: A shorter distance to the destination at gear extension, when moderated by 
non-automated flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. Automation * Gear Dist, was not significant (p = 0.150). The results failed to 
support the hypothesis. 
H2ed1: Higher airspeed at flap extension, when moderated by non-automated 
flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The 
interaction variable, Automation * Flap Speed, was not significant (p = 0.618). Therefore, 
hypothesis H2ed1 was not supported. 
H2fd1: A shorter distance to the destination at flap extension, when moderated by 
non-automated flight, is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a 
UA. The two-tailed significance of the interaction variable, Automation * Flap Dist, was 
p = 0.087. Since the hypothesis is directional, the p-value can be cut in half, resulting in 
p = 0.044, which is significant. However, Flap Dist was not significant in the interaction 
model (p = 0.853). The results failed to support hypothesis H2fd1. 
H2gd1: Using spoilers on the descent, when moderated by non-automated flight, 
is associated with a further increase in the probability of having a UA. The interaction 
variable, Speed Brake * Automation, was not significant (p = 0.200) in the interaction 
model. Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported. 
Four of the interaction-related hypotheses showed significance in the interaction 
models. However, either the EM variable in the interaction was not significant or the 
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interaction resulted in a change in UA probability opposite that hypothesized. Therefore, 
even though the interactions were significant, the MV hypotheses were not supported.  
Summary 
The initial examination of the dataset revealed an EM variable that exhibited a 
minuscule occurrence. Late Start occurred in the entire dataset only 628 times in all 
210,995 cases or just 0.30% of all cases. Among 3,026 UA events, Late Start occurred 
just 24 times or just 0.79%. To meet the recommendation of 10 instances of the DV for 
UA events required a sample size of 87,915, which would have created inappropriate 
significance levels to the model's other variables. Even with the very large sample size 
required, Late Start failed to be significant in any analysis. To avoid influencing the 
analysis of the other variables, Late Start was discounted when determining the sample 
size. A sample size of 10,500 was considered appropriate to meet the assumptions for the 
LR. 
The seven LR assumptions were all tested and considered met. Next, the model's 
reliability and validity were assessed by applying the coefficients defined by the testing 
dataset to the assessment dataset. The classification error rates produced with the 
assessment set were very close to those generated by the training set (Table 18), thus 
verifying reliability. The HL goodness of fit test, in which significance (p < 0.05) 
indicates a poor fit with the data, assessed validity. The HL significance for the Forced 
Entry model of p = 0.126 indicated a reasonable fit. However, the other assessment of 
validity, the ROC AUC (Figure 7 and Table 19), produced a value of 0.626. Values for 
the AUC between 0.5 and 0.7 indicate poor discrimination by the model. Due to an 
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assessment of poor discrimination, the results of the study should be approached 
cautiously. 
The results of the hypothesis testing related to the EM variables yielded three 
hypotheses that were supported: those related to the variables Gear Speed, Gear Dist, and 
Flap Speed. All three were in relation to continuous EM variables. For those hypotheses 
not supported, all were due to a lack of significance of the variable in the model. There 
were no instances among the EM variables where the variable was significant, but the 
effect's direction was the opposite of that in the alternative hypothesis.  
Hypothesis testing for the MV revealed four statistically significant interactions. 
All interactions tested for the MV Experience resulted in a lack of significance and did 
not support the related hypotheses. For the MV Lighting, the interactions with Flap Dist 
(p = 0.029) and Speed Brake (p = 0.001) were significant. Flap Dist was also significant 
(p = 0.46) in the interaction model, but the interaction's influence was in the opposite 
direction of the hypothesis. Speed Brake was not significant (p = 0.278) in the interaction 
model. Similarly, the MV Duration interacting with High Speed was significant 
(p = 0.036), but High Speed was not significant (p = 0.278) in the interaction model. 
Finally, Automation's interaction with Flap Dist was significant (p = 0.087) by taking 
half to obtain the one-tailed significance (p = 0.044). Nevertheless, Flap Dist was not 
significant (p = 0.853) in the interaction model. Therefore, all of the hypotheses related to 
the interactions with the MVs were not supported. A summary of the results of 
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Note. Derived from SPSSÒ output tables in Appendix B, Tables B3, and B5. 
 
The model of the system was revised to reflect the results of the hypothesis 
testing. Removal of the hypothesized direct influences of Late Start, High Speed, Flap 
Dist, and Speed Brake reflect the findings of non-support in the analysis. Additionally, 
the hypothesized moderating influences of Lighting, Experience, Duration, and 
Automation were all removed due to the findings of non-support. With the non-supported 
influences removed, only the direct influences of Gear Speed, Gear Dist, and Flap Speed 





Model of the System after Hypothesis Testing 
 
Note. Hypothesis testing supported three of the hypotheses. 
 
With the hypothesis testing completed and the model revised to reflect the 
findings therein, examining the results remains. Chapter V discusses the hypothesis 
testing results for each of the EM variables. Also addressed are the results of the 
interactions for each of the MVs. Finally, conclusions are drawn, and recommendations 
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Chapter V: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
As stated in Chapter I, the purpose of this research effort was to identify 
relationships between the EM variables found in FDM information and the probability of 
a UA’s occurrence for a particular flight using statistical analysis. The study also sought 
to identify relationships between MVs and the EM variables that influence UAs. As this 
was an archival analysis, variables needed to be extracted or computed from the FDM 
information. The EM variables selected represented a number of the critical points of 
reference used by pilots in planning and executing the descent and approach phases of 
flight. Likewise, MVs selection came from identifiable conditions in the FDM 
information that the literature indicated might impact pilot EM performance sufficiently 
to influence the probability of a UA event. Data analysis was accomplished using the LR 
process within SPSS®. Results for the EM variables indicated that three of the seven 
hypotheses were supported (H1c, H1d, H1e) in the basic model. The analysis did not 
support any of the 28 hypotheses related to the MVs. This chapter discusses the model 
results, offers conclusions, and provides recommendations for additional research. 
Discussion 
The study examined the key reference points used by the flight crew to estimate 
the energy state during the descent and approach phases to identify how EM variables 
may influence the UA event’s probability. These points of reference allow the flight crew 
to plan correct points for various actions, and in some cases to also make corrections 
during the execution. In the following sections, each hypothesis’ results are discussed, 
along with proposed explanations for such results. 
Energy Management Related Hypotheses 
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There were seven hypotheses related to EM variables, three categorical related to 
the descent phase (Late Start, High Speed, and Speed Brake), and four continuous related 
to the approach phase (Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, and Flap Dist). Of these, 
Gear Speed, Gear Dist, and Flap Speed saw their hypotheses supported. 
Hypothesis 1a. The EM variable Late Start was selected because the initiation of 
the descent is the first EM key point in the descent and approach phases. In theory, 
delaying the start of the descent sufficiently would result in a higher than desired EM 
state which the flight crew would find challenging in returning to the desired EM state. 
Out of the 210,995 cases in the overall dataset, there were only 628 occurrences, or 0.3%, 
of Late Start. Of these, only 24 were associated with a UA event or 0.01%. Possible 
causes for this low occurrence rate may be proactive requests to begin the descent by the 
flight crew or ATC direction to initiate the descent. Either scenario is plausible, but the 
dataset lacks any information to confirm either possibility. Sample size requirements 
necessary to include Late Start in the model (nearly 90,000) would adversely bias the 
results for the other variables in the model. Even in exploratory analyses, which inflated 
the occurrence of Late Start by removing 75% of the cases where Late Start = 0, still 
resulted in a lack of significance. For these reasons, Late Start was removed from 
consideration when determining the sample size. In the sample of 10,500 cases, there 
were only 29 instances of Late Start, and only one related to a UA. The meager 
occurrence of Late Start was likely the reason for measures related to Late Start being 
non-significant.  
Late initiation of the descent was selected as an IV since it would seem to create a 
situation with compounding EM problems that would increase a UA event’s probability. 
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In practice, for the PA, it is an event even rarer than UAs. From nominal cruising 
altitudes of around 30,000 feet, the flight crew has nearly 100 miles to make EM 
corrections for this error. A more focused study would be necessary to determine why 
late initiation of the descent is so uncommon. Concerning UAs, however, late initiation of 
the descent was not found to be a significant predictor. 
Hypothesis 1b. High Speed identified the occurrence of an airspeed exceeding 
250 KIAS below and altitude of 10,000 feet. This is a requirement in most IACO-
compliant national aviation regulations and is also a requirement within the PA’s SOPs. 
The EM ramifications of exceeding this limitation are difficulty in slowing the aircraft 
appropriately to configure the aircraft and to execute the approach and landing, leading to 
an increased probability of a UA event. The FDM information only records the 
occurrence, without indication of whether the exceedance was accidental or intentional. 
During the descent, if idle power is selected, descent rate and airspeed have a direct 
relationship. Increasing the descent rate results in a commensurate increase in airspeed. 
Since a late initiation of the descent is a rare event, instances of High Speed are likely due 
to loss of altitude awareness approaching 10,000 feet in the descent and failing to slow to 
250 KIAS, or an intentional attempt to correct an excessively high altitude state by 
increasing the descent rate above that achieved with maximum drag available while 
maintaining 250 KIAS. High Speed was associated with UA events 845 times or 27.92% 
and in 0.40% of all cases. However, High Speed was non-significant (p = 0.762) in the 
model, thus failing to support the hypothesis. 
During a normal descent, the aircraft should pass through 10,000 feet 
approximately 33 miles from the destination (as computed using Equation 4). The flight 
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crew now had less time and distance to correct for any EM errors than at the initiation of 
the descent. As such, the expectation was that the excessive energy involved in this high-
speed state would be more challenging to manage, increasing UA probability. The data 
show, however, that this hypothesis was not supported. One plausible explanation is the 
flight crew intentionally exceeding speed to correct an excessive altitude condition while 
in a high drag configuration, expecting to correct the high-speed condition with drag after 
resolving the altitude problem. Additional study is needed to determine if this is the case. 
Overall, however, exceeding 250 KIAS below 10,000 feet was not a predictor of UA 
probability. 
Hypothesis 1c. Due to its high drag, the landing gear are very effective in helping 
to slow the aircraft once the airspeed is below the maximum extension speed. Thus, the 
landing gear is a valuable and effective EM tool as the aircraft transitions into the 
approach phase of flight. Extending the landing gear at higher airspeeds was theorized as 
an indication of an attempt to control an excessive energy state. Thus, it would create a 
positive relationship between Gear Speed and UAs in which, as the airspeed at gear 
extension increased, so would the probability of a UA event. 
Additionally, a significant number of landing gear extensions occurred well above 
the limiting speed for the PA's aircraft. Gear Speed exhibited a fairly narrow dispersion 
about the mean, but with a fairly extensive positive tail (Mean = 179.06, SD = 23.54, 
Min. = 106.50, Max. = 365.50, Skewness = 1.40, Kurtosis = 2.90). A review of the 
extreme positive tail cases did not reveal any obvious errors in the dataset that would 
indicate a possible anomaly in the collection system. The analysis retained these cases 
due to the reliability and validity of the FDM collection system. Gear Speed was found to 
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be very significant in the model with a significant contribution (p = 0.005, Wald = 8.065, 
Exp(B) = 1.015). For each unit of increase in Gear Speed, the odds of a UA event 
increased by 1.50%, indicating this hypothesis is supported.  
The PA’s SOPs indicate a target of 150 KIAS at the FAF, with a recommendation 
to extend the landing gear and flaps three miles before the FAF. Since the PA’s aircraft 
slow approximately 10 KIAS per mile with the gear extended during the approach, the 
SOPs expect an airspeed at the configuration point of about 180 KIAS, which is very 
close to the mean Gear Speed of 179.06 KIAS. Flight crews extending the landing gear 
above 180 KIAS may be attempting to correct an excessive energy state. Thus, higher 
values for Gear Speed were expected to predict an increased probability of a UA event. 
The analysis supported this expectation. This finding’s significance is that aircrew that 
consistently finds the need to configure at speeds above the recommended 180 KIAS are 
at a higher risk of experiencing a UA event. 
Hypothesis 1d. The distance from the destination of landing gear extension also 
provides energy state information. According to the PA’s SOPs, the landing gear’s 
extension should occur at approximately 8 miles from the destination. Delaying beyond 
the 8-mile point was theorized to likely be due to excessive energy in the form of 
airspeed. This would create a negative relationship in which, as the distance from the 
destination at gear extension decreased, the probability of a UA event would increase. As 
with Gear Speed, Gear Dist displayed a fairly narrow dispersion but with an extensive 
positive tail (Mean = 8.59, SD = 3.17, Min. = 0.25, Max. = 49.57, Skewness = 2.42, 
Kurtosis = 9.61). Again, a review of the cases in the extreme positive tail did not reveal 
any obvious errors in the dataset that would indicate a possible anomaly in the collection 
137 
 
system. The analysis retained these cases due to the reliability and validity of the FDM 
collection system. A potential explanation for the more extreme values of Gear Dist is 
the initiation of configuring the aircraft by extension of the gear but, before extending the 
flaps, aborting the approach. In this case, the AGS programming would not indicate a go-
around; thus, the Gear Dist computation would not reset, and the data snapshot used to 
build the dataset would not identify the anomaly. The values of interest, however, are 
those at the lower end of the scale. Gear Dist was also found to be very significant in the 
model with a significant contribution (p = 0.012, Wald = 6.227, Exp(B) = 0.898). For 
each unit of decrease in Gear Dist, the odds of a UA event increased by 1.11%, 
supporting the hypothesis. 
The mean for Gear Dist was 8.59, just outside the eight miles provided in the 
PA’s SOPs. A flight crew with an excessive energy problem during the approach phase 
would commonly configure earlier to allow the added drag from the landing gear to assist 
in deceleration. Delaying configuration beyond the SOP standard was expected to be due 
to aircraft limitations. Delayed configuration would combine the EM issues of too much 
speed with insufficient drag to assist in slowing, resulting in an increase in UA 
probability. The analysis seemed to agree, as the probability of a UA increased as Gear 
Dist decreased. A flight crew that consistently delays landing gear extension inside of the 
distance specified in the SOPs has a more significant potential for a UA event.  
Hypothesis 1e. Flap extension speed is another possible indication of energy 
state. Like the landing gear, flaps also increase drag, but to a lesser extent. In theory, flap 
extension at higher speeds indicates an excess energy state, increasing the UA event 
probability. The PA’s SOPs call for initiating flap extension during the early portion of 
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the approach. A review of the descriptive statistics for Flap Speed (Mean = 222.75, 
SD = 17.43, Min. = 117, Max. = 327.50, Skewness = 0.48, Kurtosis = -0.19) revealed that 
the limiting speed for flap extension is 1.56 SD above the mean. In the vast majority of 
cases, Flap Speed is within the limitation. Further, the kurtosis statistic for Flap Speed 
indicates that distribution is slightly flatter than normal. Once again, a review of extreme 
cases revealed no anomalies with the FDM system. Flap Speed was significant in the 
model (p = 0.003, Wald = 9.020, Exp(B) = 1.016). For each 1 knot increase in Flap 
Speed, the odds of a UA event increased by 1.6%, supporting the hypothesis. 
Since flap extension increases drag, but less than the landing gear, it is probable 
that the flight crew would begin with flap extension to manage an excessive energy 
situation on approach. The landing gear is an all-at-once drag increase, while the flaps 
can add drag incrementally. In theory, the greater the EM problem, the sooner (faster 
airspeed) that flap extension would be used to correct the excessive energy. The analysis 
appears to agree with this assessment, as increases in Flap Speed increases the probability 
of a UA event. Consistently high flap extension speeds create a higher risk of a UA. 
Hypothesis 1f. Another indication of the energy state is the distance to the 
destination at flap extension. Delayed flap extension may indicate a problem of excess 
airspeed. Values of Flap Dist (Mean = 16.80, SD = 4.60, Min. = 2.57, Max = 79.62, 
Skewness = 1.97, Kurtosis = 8.41) are clustered close the mean, as indicated by the SD of 
4.6 and the kurtosis of 8.41. While there is no maximum flap extension distance, the PA’s 
SOPs caution not to configure too early. An investigation of extreme values within Flap 
Dist, like previous variables, revealed no problems with the FDM system. 
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Regarding these large values of Flap Dist, there is a highly probable cause for 
these values. If the aircraft were to begin flap extension while in, or then subsequently 
assigned, holding the additional flown miles while in holding would continue to increase 
Flap Dist. These high values are likely the result of such a situation. Flap Dist was non-
significant (p = 0.566) in the model, and the hypothesis was not supported. 
The distance from the destination of the initial flap extension has minimal 
restriction. In theory, excess energy in the way of airspeed would delay initial flap 
extension, indicating an increase in UA probability. However, the lack of significance of 
Flap Dist in the model shows this to be incorrect. Final landing flap selection was not 
considered as this occurs very close to the stabilized approach point. Delaying flap 
selection at this point in and of itself would directly cause a UA. Upon reviewing the 
results, the distance when a different flap position selection occurs may be a better 
indicator of UA probability. However, the current study found that decreasing distance 
when flaps are initially extended (Flap Dist) did not predict an increase in UA 
probability. 
Hypothesis 1g. The spoilers, also known as speed brakes, assist in EM by 
reducing lift while increasing drag. In the descent phase, spoilers can slow the aircraft, 
increase the rate of descent without increasing airspeed, or to a limited extent, do both 
simultaneously. In the approach phase, as the aircraft is slowed and configured, spoilers 
become less effective and, in some aircraft, are not allowed to be used after flaps 
extension. Speed Brake captured the use of spoilers during the descent and approach 
phases of flight. Common descent profiles can be flown without the use of spoilers, 
which reserves their use for situations where an EM problem has developed, and 
140 
 
management of excess energy (altitude, speed, or both) is required. In theory, using the 
speed brakes may indicate an EM problem that would lead to an increase in UA 
probability. However, Speed Brake was not significant (p = 0.607) in the model. This 
lack of significance may indicate that the proactive use of the spoilers was a useful EM 
tool for the flights studied. However, with Speed Brake non-significant, the hypothesis 
was not supported. 
Since the speed brakes are specifically an EM tool designed to help reduce the 
energy state, the use of that tool might indicate excessive energy such that a UA would 
result. Indeed, speed brakes use occurred during the descent and approach phases of 
flight in over 68% of flights where a UA occurred. However, the model found this to be 
non-significant. Non-significance might be due to the flight crew making good use of this 
EM tool attempting to correct an excessive energy state. The analysis found that speed 
brake use is not a predictor of UA events. 
Moderating Variable Related Hypotheses 
There were 28 hypotheses associated with the interactions of the EM variables 
with the MVs. In all 28 interaction models, the hypothesis lacked support. In 24 
interaction models, the interaction variable was not significant (p > 0.05). In three 
interaction models, the interaction variable was significant (p < 0.05), but the associated 
EM variable was not. In the remaining interaction model, the influence was in the 
opposite direction of the hypothesis. The influences of the MVs are discussed in general, 
with the four specific interactions discussed in greater detail. 
Hypotheses Related to Lighting (H2aa, H2ba, H2ca, H2da, H2ea, H2fa, 
H2ga). The MV Lighting was extracted from the FDM information. The AGS system 
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compares the reported landing time against the sunrise/sunset tables for the destination 
airport. The system assigned values of 1 for dawn, 2 for day, 3 for dusk, and 4 for night. 
For the analysis, day was assigned a value of 1 as the best case for lighting conditions. 
Dawn and dusk were assigned a value of 2 as the next case in degrading lighting, and 
night was assigned a value of 3 as the worst case in lighting conditions. The study 
theorized that as the lighting conditions went from day to night, best to worst, the 
moderating effects of the lighting condition on the EM variables would increase the 
probability of a UA event. This theory was supported by research identifying visibility as 
a factor in 94% of CFIT accidents, in which altitude awareness was lost rather than 
energy state awareness (Kelly & Efthymiou, 2019). 
For the EM variables Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, and Flap 
Speed, the interaction variables were non-significant (p > 0.05). The interaction variable 
of Lighting * Flap Dist was significant, as was Flap Dist in this interaction model, 
indicating a significant effect. However, the effect of the interaction was in the opposite 
direction of the hypothesis. In night lighting conditions, the moderating effect of Lighting 
on Flap Dist was to reduce, rather than increase, UA event probability. This is a 
surprising result, since the expectation was that restricted visibility due to reduced 
lighting would create an increase in difficulty in EM.  
Another surprising result was the interaction between Lighting and the EM 
variable Speed Brake. The interaction variable Lighting * Speed Brake was significant, 
but the EM variable Speed Brake was not in this interaction model. Like the interaction 
between Lighting and Flap Dist, the direction of this significant interaction was opposite 
of the hypothesis. These interesting interactions may be the result of flight crew being 
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more EM aware and more vigilant in adhering to approach procedures due to decreased 
ability to detect obstacles as well as reduced depth perception. Both of these interactions 
should be examined more closely in future research. 
Exterior environmental lighting was included in the visibility conditions in the 
study by Kelly and Efthymiou (2019). The current effort was unable to extract the 
visibility on approach. However, it was able to determine lighting conditions from the 
capture of dawn, day, dusk, or night in the FDM information. This analysis expected that, 
as the environmental lighting decreased, the loss of external visual cues would increase 
the difficulty in maintaining proper EM. The model, however, refutes this expectation. A 
probable explanation for this result is good flight crew discipline in using internal cues 
for EM. The flight crew was making EM decisions based more on aircraft instrument 
indications rather than on external visual cues. The only statistically significant 
moderation produced as Lighting got worse was to reduce the probability of a UA. 
Overall, Lighting’s only moderating effect was the opposite of that hypothesized. 
Hypotheses Related to Experience (H2ab, H2bb, H2cb, H2db, H2eb, H2fb, 
H2gb). The MV Experience was determined by which side of the cockpit was in control 
of the flight director/autopilot, as reported by the FDM system. If the left side was in 
control, the assumption was the Captain was the PF, and Experience was coded as 0. If 
the right side was in control, Experience was coded 1, indicating the FO was the PF. The 
assumption was that the Captain would be the more experienced crew member, and thus 
more capable of managing energy. Therefore, if the FO was the PF, it was theorized that 
EM would not be as precise, thus increasing the probability of a UA event. However, the 
analysis found Experience non-significance (p > 0.05) in all interaction models. The non-
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significance may be due to the slightly higher percentage of flights where the FO was the 
PF (57.6% versus 42.4% for Captains), providing FOs with slightly higher proficiency 
resulting in offsetting for the lack of experience. This result supports the research of Todd 
and Thomas (2012) that did not find a difference between Captains and FOs regarding 
stabilized approach performance criteria. 
Zhang et al. (2019) suggested that Captains, with more experience, would be 
more proficient in dealing with EM problems that might arise during a flight. However, 
the results failed to support the hypothesis. Flight crew members for airlines are subject 
to high performance standards in both initial and recurrent training. The standards are the 
same for both Captains and FOs, regardless of experience. Thus, both should be capable 
of similar performance in the execution of the descent and approach. The data indicate 
that this is likely, as Experience did not provide any significant moderating effects. 
Hypotheses Related to Duration (H2ac, H2bc, H2cc, H2dc, H2ec, H2fc, 
H2gc). The MV Duration required conversion to a binary categorical value from a 
continuous value reported by the FDM system. The system reported flight duration in an 
hours, minutes, and seconds format with no delimitation between the values (i.e., 
hh:mm:ss). The original hh:mm:ss format was first converted into a decimal hours format 
(i.e., H.h), and then descriptive statistics were computed to find the bottom quartile of 
durations. Cases in the bottom quartile were coded 1 in the MV Duration to indicate the 
shorter flights, reflecting the theory that shorter flights have a higher task loading with 
minimal opportunities for breaks. Without breaks, mental workload increases, resulting in 
a decreased ability to detect errors and increased reaction time (Wanyan et al., 2018). 
Due to the issues associated with shorter duration flights, the expectation was that the 
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MV Duration was expected to influence EM such that UA probability would increase. 
Duration’s influence was non-significant (p > 0.05) in all the interaction models, except 
for the model of interaction with High Speed. The interaction variable Duration * High 
Speed was significant and in the direction of the hypothesis. While High Speed was not 
significant in the interaction model, nevertheless, the significance of the interaction 
variable does indicate that there is an influence in this interaction that suggests future 
research into this relationship.  
For these reasons, all of the hypotheses related to MV Duration were not 
supported. 
A potential cause for this outcome may be the PA’s flight crew scheduling 
process. Scheduling short-duration flights early in a crew member’s workday may 
mitigate the identified issues. However, with de-identified data, confirming this 
possibility is not possible. While previous studies (Wanyan et al., 2018) indicated that 
flight crew performance suffers from the high task loading of shorter duration flights, 
Duration provided no statistically significant moderating effects in the interaction model. 
Hypotheses Related to Automation (H2ad, H2bd, H2cd, H2dd, H2ed, H2fd, 
H2gd). The coding of the MV Automation was the inverse of the FDM systems report of 
whether the autopilot was engaged. Thus, if the autopilot was engaged, Automation was 
coded 0 and coded 1 if the autopilot was not engaged (indicating a hand-flown approach). 
The autopilot was engaged in over 97% of the data's approaches, indicating a potential 
for over-reliance on automation. Kelly and Efthymiou (1986) identified overreliance on 
automation as a major contributor to complacency, lack of vigilance, and loss of SA. 
While the PA’s SOPs assume the use of the autopilot for the approach, manual flying for 
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proficiency is allowed, leaving the final decision to the PF. Based on the very high 
percentage noted for autopilot executed approaches, the expectation was that, for 
approaches flown manually, the moderation effects of Automation would influence the 
EM variables such as to produce an increase in the probability of a UA event. The 
potential for both overreliance on automation and a reduction in basic proficiency could 
contribute to such a result. However, only one of the interaction models yielded a 
significant interaction. The interaction Automation * Flap Dist was significant (single-
tailed p = 0.044), and acted in the direction of the hypothesis. However, Flap Dist was 
not significant (p = 0.835) in the interaction model, resulting in a failure to support the 
hypothesis. This significant interaction bears further exploration in future research. In all 
other associated interaction models, the influence of Automation was non-significant 
(p > 0.05). 
Automation in the cockpit has both benefits and detriments. The automation is 
capable of flying the aircraft with greater precision than human pilots can. With auto-
throttles, the system can even manage the energy state with little assistance from the 
pilots. However, Kelly and Efthymiou (2019) identified excessive reliance on automation 
as leading to decreases in pilot proficiency. The PA’s SOPs specify that the procedures 
assume full use of automation, while not prohibiting manual flight for proficiency (Flight 
crew operations manual, 2017). With most approaches in the dataset flown using the 
autopilot, it was an expectation that the resultant moderating effects of Automation would 
manifest a decrease in proficiency. What the analysis revealed, however, was that 
Automation provided no significant moderating effects in the interaction model.  
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Moderating Variable Interactions of Interest. While none of the MV 
interactions resulted in support of the related hypotheses, the four interactions that were 
statistically significant were interesting. The two interactions related to Lighting indicated 
an influence opposite of the hypotheses, while the interactions related to Duration and 
Automation indicated an influence in the direction of the hypotheses. As noted, each of 
these results should be further investigated to gain better insights into their effects on UA 
probability in future research. 
Conclusions 
The analysis identified the relationships between certain flight variables and UA 
events using FDM information. The results lead to an improved understanding of the EM 
predictors of UA events and the influence of possible MVs. The outcomes of the study 
make valuable contributions, both practical and theoretical. 
Many factors influence UA probability, of which EM is just a subset. In 
examining EM's influence on UAs, remember that EM is a continuously fluid process. 
Multiple methods are available to the flight crew to alter the energy state of the aircraft. 
As the results of this study highlight, EM errors during the descent and approach process 
do not always result in a UA event. The investigation into the influences of the MVs 
indicates that even when there are other factors that, on the surface, would seem to 
increase the probability of a UA occurring, the data indicate that those factors have no 
significant impact on UAs. The results identified three EM factors that were significant 
concerning UA occurrence and thus provide a focus for further investigation. More 
importantly, the current study validated the idea that FDM information can identify 
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descent and approach EM variables that affect UA probability. As noted previously, this 
methodology should apply to other flight phases and target issues.  
The data indicate that, overall, the PA’s flight crews were disciplined in their 
adherence to the SOPs regarding the decent through landing phases of flight. This 
discipline was evident by the low rate of UAs identified in the FDM information. The 
thresholds used in this analysis were more sensitive in identifying UAs than the analysis 
used operationally by the PA. Nonetheless, the results revealed a 1.4% UA rate for the 
PA, far below the 4.4% rate for the industry overall (Graeber, 2006).  
Theoretical Contributions   
The study validated that the LR process can produce a model that effectively 
predicts UA probability based on EM variables in the descent and approach phase of 
flight. As there appeared to be a lack of studies in the area in the literature, this initial 
investigation lays the foundation for filling this gap, providing insights for academia and 
industry. This effort was unique because it utilized actual operational FDM information 
from an airline, thus representing a significant contribution to the body of knowledge.  
Additionally, the current work examined how non-energy related MVs might alter 
the influence EM variables have in predicting UAs, which also expanded knowledge due 
to an apparent lack of such studies in the literature. This investigation is an initial step 
into a more holistic approach in aviation data analysis by including moderating factors. 
While the study revealed no significant moderating influence from the MVs examined, 
expansion of this type of analysis is needed to understand the influence of these 




The primary area of practical contributions of the study is safety. The safety realm 
is both proactive and reactive. Proactive safety activities seek to prevent undesired events 
such as UAs. The results provide safety practitioners with new information to screen 
FDM information. The FDM system can identify trends in these variables so that safety 
personnel can inform flight crews across the system of trends that may lead to increased 
instances of UAs. 
Further, armed with these results, airline training departments can fine-tune 
training programs to specifically address the EM-specific issues identified. By increasing 
awareness of these critical EM issues, pilots can be more vigilant for these errors. While 
the improvements to initial and recurrent training programs will enhance flight crew 
awareness regarding EM’s impact on UA occurrences, it is also possible to provide 
immediate training for pilots exhibiting problems with EM. 
The results enable emergent training by leveraging the FDM analysis system. By 
referencing the key UA predictors, FDM information can identify flights where a UA did 
not occur but was more likely (i.e. UA close calls). If allowed, the FDM system can even 
identify specific flight crew members exhibiting trends of the EM errors that predict UAs, 
even if a UA did not occur. The identified flight crew could be provided with focused 
training addressing the specific errors being made by the crew member immediately on 
identification. Such dedicated training should assist in reducing exhibited EM error 
trends, preventing future UAs. 
When prevention has failed, safety investigations seek to identify what went 
wrong. With the additional information provided by the results of this study, safety 
practitioners investigating UA events will have a better understanding of the relationship 
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between these EM variables and UAs, which may enable quicker resolutions to 
investigations or more focused findings. Additionally, focused findings provide improved 
feedback to the training programs to facilitate improvements. 
Limitations of the Findings 
The study has four limitations. First, the analysis was limited to the data from a 
single airline. The fact that the PA’s policies, procedures, and training were in accordance 
with ICAO standards aids in generalization. Likewise, the nations where the PA operates 
have ICAO-compliant regulations, further aiding in generalization. However, cultural 
differences in the ethno-geographic region do limit the generalizability of the findings. 
Fortunately, the study can be replicated with other carriers and in other ethno-geographic 
areas. The necessary data can be extracted or computed from the carrier's FDM system. 
Following the methodology described in Chapter III, the data analysis should provide 
results specific to that carrier. 
The second limitation pertains to aircraft. The PA operates a fleet of aircraft 
consisting of various single-aisle, twin-engine jet transport aircraft. This fleet has the 
characteristics of seating between approximately 100 and 200 passengers and maximum 
takeoff weights between 120,000 and 210,000 pounds. The findings are thus limited to 
operators of aircraft that closely match those characteristics. However, the similar 
performance and flight characteristics of typical transport category aircraft aid in 
generalizability across other aircraft fleets outside this characteristic set. Again, 
replication of this effort is possible with FDM information from another aircraft type. 
Using the methodology described in Chapter III, applied to the appropriate FDM 
information from another aircraft type, the analysis would provide results specific to 
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other aircraft types. Such an analysis would identify differences arising from significantly 
different aircraft performance, such as deceleration rates and gear or flap extension 
limitations.  
Third, this effort examined data from a specific, one-year timeframe, and thus 
influenced by the regulations, training, and standards extant at that time. Since these 
influences are subject to change, generalization is limited outside of the period covered 
by the study. However, replication of the analysis can easily update the results to 
accommodate any significant changes in these areas. 
Fourth, the findings are limited due to the limitations of the model. While many 
variables influence UAs, this investigation only examined a handful of EM variables 
available in the archival data. Since the scope of the study was limited to how the EM 
variables influence the probability of a UA event, the influence of non-EM factors was 
not relevant. The lack of moderation by the four MVs in this study suggests that the 
potential confounding variables have little impact on how the EM variables influence 
UAs. Due to the focus on the EM variables, the model only accounted for a small portion 
of the variability in the data. 
Additionally, the model’s low sensitivity results in some UA events being missed, 
resulting in Type II error. Given the rarity of UA events and the focus on only the 
selected EM predictors, the model's low discrimination is understandable. While the 
current model provides a baseline from which to approach EM influences on UAs, 





Moving forward, several recommendations arise. There are practical 
recommendations that are focused on how the airline industry can benefit from the 
results. There are also recommendations for further research using the current study as a 
springboard to expand the body of knowledge further. 
Recommendations for the Airlines in the Region 
There are three recommendations for the airline industry. The recommendations 
provided focus on the airlines in the region of operations of the PA. Note, however, that 
all airlines could potentially benefit from taking them under consideration. 
The first recommendation is that the airline industry conducts similar studies 
using their FDM information. Since the data in the sample drives the model, different 
samples will yield somewhat different models. Factors such as culture, training, 
standards, and many others influence FDM information. Thus, each airline should have a 
unique model reflecting its characteristics. Using its unique model, each airline should 
tailor training and safety programs to address the critical EM areas identified. 
The second recommendation is that the airline industry and the pilot groups work 
together to facilitate just-in-time training. Use the FDM system to identify pilots 
exhibiting trends of EM errors that increase the probability of a UA event and provide 
immediate supplemental EM training. While maintaining pilot anonymity, the FDM 
system could match such a pilot to a specific EM training module to immediately address 
the issue rather than waiting for the next training cycle. 
The third recommendation is that the airline industry increases academia's ability 
to access de-identified FDM information. Access to comprehensive operational data was 
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vital to the current study. However, timely access to current data would allow the 
academic community to address today’s problems rather than those of several years ago. 
Cooperation between academia and airlines will significantly benefit both. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
There are four recommendations for future research. Follow-on investigations are 
necessary to validate the results of the current effort. Further exploration of the 
interactions that were statistically significant, while not supporting the hypotheses of this 
study, may produce better insights. Another area for additional research is investigating if 
the methodology would enable prediction of UA severity. Finally, studies are needed to 
expand the methodology to other flight phases and EM problems. 
The data limited the current study. While some computation was available to 
generate additional EM variables, the current analysis was constrained to the archival 
data. A follow-up effort would allow for the capture of data explicitly designed for the 
study. Following the overall methodology in Chapter III with enhanced data collection 
would help validate this effort's results. Additionally, refining the data may help increase 
the discrimination of the model. A specific recommendation would be to refine the 
variable capturing the distance from the destination of flap deployment to a specific 
setting typically selected closer to the FAF. This change would help eliminate the 
possibility of capturing holding distances in the data. Better data will yield a better 
model, and refining the model for EM influences on UAs should enhance safety. 
For the interactions that produced statistical significance, focused research may 
bring clarity. Those related to Lighting were surprising in that they were contrary to the 
related hypotheses. A closer look is needed to understand the dynamics that yield a 
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decrease in UA probability with an increase in the level of difficulty. The interaction 
between Lighting and Flap Dist should be of particular interest, as both the interaction 
and EM variables were significant in the interaction model. The only reason it did not 
support the hypothesis was the direction of influence. 
Another recommendation for future research is an examination into whether the 
methodology of this study could predict the severity of a UA event. As noted in Chapter 
III, the PA uses a system that classifies violations of stabilized approach criteria into 
three separate severity categories, and then determines UA severity through a matrix that 
accounts for cumulative criteria violation severities. It may be possible to incorporate the 
criteria violation severity levels and UA severity matrix into methodology to produce a 
model that produces a prediction of the UA severity based on the EM and MV inputs. 
The literature review revealed limited studies regarding EM in aviation safety. 
While the current analysis examined predicting UA events, similar methodologies can 
address other EM driven flight events. With the vast amount of data collected by the 
FDM system and the possibility of capturing precise data points, there are many possible 
avenues of EM research related to aviation safety include landing overruns and loss of 
control incidents. Each of these areas includes EM issues, and the necessary data should 
be available or computable from the FDM information. Creating a theoretical model 
representing the influences on the outcome, identifying potential moderators, extracting 
the necessary data from FDM information and other sources, and analyzing via the LR 
similar to the current study's methodology, should reveal the influences EM variables 
have on the studied event. Such additional studies would help increase safety, expand this 









2017 Aviation sector data analysis. (2018). Association of Airline Companies.  
 
Airbus. (2005). Approach techniques: Aircraft energy management during approach. 
Flight Operations Briefing Notes. https://skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/166.pdf  
 
Airbus. (2006). Descent management: Descent and approach profile management. Flight 
Operations Briefing Notes. https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/169.pdf  
 
Albright, J. (2014, May 1). New approach to stabilized approaches: A practical way to 
ensure you're at the right place, configuration and speed. Business and 
commercial aviation, 110(5), 54. https://aviationweek.com/business-aviation/new-
approach-stabilized-approaches  
 
Baker, E. R. (2017). Comparative analysis of conventional electronic and OZ concept 
displays for aircraft energy management (Publication Number 352) [Doctoral 
Dissertation, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University]. Scholarly Commons. 
https://commons.erau.edu/edt/352 
 
Bennett, S. A. (2019, August 3). Pilot workload and fatigue on four intra-European 
routes: a 12-month mixed-methods evaluation. Journal of Risk Research, 22(8), 
983-1003. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1430704  
 
Bewick, V., Cheek, L., & Ball, J. (2005, January 13). Statistics review 14: Logistic 
regression. Critical Care (London, England), 9(1), 112-118. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/cc3045  
 
Boeing. (2018). Statistical summary of commercial jet airplane accidents 2017. Boeing 
Commercial Airplanes. http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf 
 
Box, G. E., & Tidwell, P. W. (1962, December 1). Transformation of the independent 
variables. Technometrics, 4(4), 531-550. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00401706.1962.10490038  
 
Bruce, K., Kelly, J. R., & Person, J. L. (1986, August 18-20). NASA B737 flight test 
results of the Total Energy Control System [Paper Presentation]. Astrodynamics 
Conference, Williamsburg, VA, United States. https://doi.org/10.2514/6.1986-
2143 
 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics. (2016). Air carrier financial reports - 2015 (Form 41 





Callantine, T. J. (2001). Analysis of flight operational quality assurance data using 
model-based activity tracking [Paper Presentation]. Advances in Aviation Safety 
Conference & Exposition,  https://doi.org/10.4271/2001-01-2640 
 
Carbaugh, D., Cashman, J., Carriker, M., Forsythe, D., Melody, T., Rockliff, L., & 
Wainwright, W. (1998). Aerodynamic principles of large-airplane upsets. 
Aero(Qtr 03). https://bit.ly/3b5C888  
 
Casner, S. M., Geven, R. W., Recker, M. P., & Schooler, J. W. (2014, December 1). The 
retention of manual flying skills in the automated cockpit. Human Factors, 56(8), 
1506-1516. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018720814535628  
 




European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment. (2013). ED-112: Minimum 
operational performance standard for crash protected airborne recorder systems.  
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2004). Flight operational quality assurance (AC120-




Federal Aviation Administration; Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators, 
76 Fed. Reg. 52235 (Aug. 22, 2011) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 119). 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2013). Glider flying handbook (FAA-H-8083-13A) 




Federal Aviation Administration. (2016). Instrument flying handbook (FAA-H-8083-




Federal Aviation Administration; Certification and Operations: Airplanes Having A 
Seating Capacity of 20 or More Passengers or A Maximum Payload Capacity Of 
6,000 Pounds or More; And Rules Governing Persons On Board Such Aircraft, 82 
Fed. Reg. 34399 (July 25, 2017) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 125). 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2018a). Commercial pilot - airplane airman 






Federal Aviation Administration. (2018b). Instrument rating - airplane airman 




Federal Aviation Administration. (2018c). Mitigating the risks of a runway overrun upon 




Federal Aviation Administration. (2018d). Private pilot - airplane airman certification 




Federal Aviation Administration. (2019). Airline transport pilot type rating for airplane 









Field, A. (2018). Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics: North American 
edition (5th ed.). SAGE. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/77862  
 
Flight crew operations manual. (2017). Participating Airline.  
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2009a). Flight Safety Foundation ALAR briefing note 4.1. 
https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/856.pdf 
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2009b). Flight Safety Foundation ALAR briefing note 7.1. 
https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/864.pdf 
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2009c). Flight Safety Foundation ALAR briefingnote 4.2. 
https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/857.pdf 
 
George, F. (2007). Back to basics: The stabilized approach. Business & Commercial 
Aviation, 101(1), 36. https://aviationweek.com/back-basics-stabilized-approach  
 
Graeber, R. C. (2006). The safety benefits of LOSA: A manufacturer’s view [PowerPoint]. 





Grossi, D. R. (1999, May 3-5). Aviation recorder overview [Paper Presentation]. 
International Symposium On Transportation Recorders, Arlington, VA, United 
States. http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Publications/pdf_library/grossi.pdf  
 
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E. (2010). Multivariate data 
analysis (7th ed.). Prentice Hall. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04898-2_395  
 
Hilbe, J. M. (2009). Logistic regression models. Chapman and Hall/CRC. 
https://doi.org/10.1201/9781420075779  
 
Hosmer Jr., D. W., Lemeshow, S., & Sturdivant, R. X. (2013). Applied logistic 
regression (Vol. 398). John Wiley & Sons. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118548387  
 
Hurt, H. H. (1965). Aerodynamics for naval aviators (NAVWEPS 00-80T-80). Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, Aviation Training Division.  
 




International Civil Aviation Organization. (2015). Procedures for air navigation services: 
Training (Doc 9868). https://bit.ly/2G4DVz9 
 
International Civil Aviation Organization. (2020). ICAO member states. 
https://www.icao.int/about-icao/Pages/member-states.aspx 
 




Keller, J., MENDONCA, F. C., & Cutter, J. E. (2019). Collegiate aviation pilots: 
Analyses of fatigue related decision-making scenarios. International Journal of 
Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, 6(4), 9. 
https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2019.1360  
 
Kelly, D., & Efthymiou, M. (2019, June). An analysis of human factors in fifty controlled 
flight into terrain aviation accidents from 2007 to 2017. Journal of Safety 
Research, 69, 155-165. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2019.03.009  
 










Lee, S., & Kim, J. K. (2018, March). Factors contributing to the risk of airline pilot 
fatigue. Journal of air transport management, 67, 197-207. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2017.12.009  
 
Merkt, J. R. (2013, October). Flight energy management training: Promoting safety and 
efficiency. Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering, 3(1). 
https://doi.org/10.7771/2159-6670.1072  
 
Molter, B. A. (1918). Knights of the air. D. Appleton.  
 
Mouloua, M., Ferraro, J. C., Parasuraman, R., Molloy, R., & Hilburn, B. (2019). Human 
monitoring of automated systems. In Human Performance in Automated and 
Autonomous Systems: Emerging Issues and Practical Perspectives (pp. 1-26). 
CRC Press. https://doi.org/10.1201/9780429458323-1  
 
Noyes, J. (2007, July). Energy management displays: A new concept for the civil flight 
deck. Applied Ergonomics, 38(4), 481-489. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apergo.2007.01.008  
 
Pepe, M. S. (2000, March). Receiver operating characteristic methodology. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 95(449), 308-311. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.2000.10473930  
 
Prats, X., Barrado, C., Perez-Batlle, M., Vilardaga, S., Bas, I., Birling, F., Verhoeven, R., 
& Marsman, A. (2014, 16-20 June). Enhancement of a time and energy 
management algorithm for continuous descent operations [Paper Presentation]. 
14th AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference, 
Atlanta, GA, United States. https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2014-3151 
 
Rana, S., Midi, H., & Sarkar, S. (2010). Validation and performance analysis of binary 
logistic regression model. Proceedings of the WSEAS International Conference 
on Environmental, Medicine and Health Sciences, http://www.wseas.us/e-
library/conferences/2010/Penang/EMEH/EMEH-09.pdf  
 
SAFRAN. (2012). Analysis ground station V14 user manual. SAFRAN.  
 
Schvaneveldt, R. W., Beringer, D. B., & Lamonica, J. A. (2001). Priority and 
organization of information accessed by pilots in various phases of flight. The 









Slatter, R. T. (1997, March). Technique and criteria for a stabilized approach need to be 
spelled out in the operations manual. ICAO Journal, 52(2), 15, 28. 
https://www.icao.int/publications/journalsreports/1997/5202.djvu  
 
Stolzer, A. J. (2002). Fuel consumption modeling of a transport category aircraft using 
flight operations quality assurance data: a literature review. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20020041933.pdf 
 
Stolzer, A. J., & Halford, C. (2007). Data mining methods applied to flight operations 
quality assurance data: A comparison to standard statistical methods. Journal of 
Air Transportation, 12(1), 6. https://commons.erau.edu/publication/116  
 
Szurovy, G., & Goulian, M. (1997). Advanced aerobatics. McGraw-Hill Professional.  
 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2014). Using multivariate statistics (6th ed.). Pearson.  
 
Todd, M. A., & Thomas, M. J. W. (2012, August). Flight hours and flight crew 
performance in commercial aviation. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine, 83(8), 776-782. https://doi.org/10.3357/ASEM.3271.2012  
 
Veillette, P. (2016, January 28). Preparing for descent during low workload phases of 




Vogt, W. P., Gardner, D. C., Haeffele, L. M., & Vogt, E. R. (2014). Selecting the right 
analyses for your data: Quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods. Guilford 
Publications. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjet.12260_5  
 
Wagener, F., & Ison, D. C. (2014, April). Crew resource management application in 
commercial aviation. Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering, 3(2), 2. 
https://doi.org/10.7771/2159-6670.1077  
 
Wanyan, X., Zhuang, D., Lin, Y., Xiao, X., & Song, J.-W. (2018, March). Influence of 
mental workload on detecting information varieties revealed by mismatch 
negativity during flight simulation. International Journal of Industrial 
Ergonomics, 64, 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ergon.2017.08.004  
 
Zagalsky, N. (1973, January 10-12). Aircraft energy management [Paper Presentation]. 





Zhang, X., Qu, X., Xue, H., Zhao, H., Li, T., & Tao, D. (2019, June). Modeling pilot 
mental workload using information theory. The Aeronautical Journal, 123(1264), 
828-839. https://doi.org/10.1017/aer.2019.13  
 
Zhao, X.-b., Li, B., & Wang, C.-g. (2017). There is a gold mine in flight data: A 
framework of data mining in civil aviation. DEStech Transactions on Social 





















B1 Summary of the Review of the Current Literature 
B2 Appendix E to 14 CFR Part 125  
B3 Logistic Regression Tables for Basic Model 
B4 Logistic Regression Tables for Forward and Backward Stepwise 
 




Table B1  
 
Summary of Literature Reviewed 
 
Subject Area: Unstable Approaches 
Author(s) and 
(Date) 














Does not discuss specific 
















Does not discuss specific 
EM relationships to UA 
events. 
Does discuss how some 
of the MV may impact 
CFIT, but not EM/UA 
events. 










Found that fatigue 
impacts mental 
acuity and decision 
making. May be 
significant on 
repeated short flights 
with little break 
before the high-
workload descent and 
approach phase. 
Does not discuss specific 
EM relationships to UA 
events. 
Does discuss how pilot 
fatigue may impact UAs 
directly. 




Reports that of 95 
UA incidents studied, 
12.6% cited fatigue 
as a factor. 
Does not discuss specific 
EM relationships to UA 
events. 
Does discuss how pilot 




Subject Area: Unstable Approaches 
Author(s) and 
(Date) 









inflight and pilot 
workload. 
Defines descent from 
cruise to landing as a 
high-workload phase 





Does not discuss specific 












Found that pilot 
experience levels 
were not statistically 
significant in directly 
influencing the 
occurrence of UA 
events. 
Does not discuss specific 
EM relationships to UA 
events. 
Does discuss how pilot 
experience may impact 
UAs directly but not as 




Discusses how a 
focused training 
program allowed a 




EM training, resulted 
in a 70% reduction in 
UA events. 
Does not discuss specific 






Subject Area: Flight Data Monitoring 
Author(s) and 
(Date) 









By comparing pilot 
actions against a 
model of correct and 
acceptable alternative 
actions, the system 
attempts to infer pilot 
intent. 
Does not examine the 





Subject Area: Flight Data Monitoring 
Author(s) and 
(Date) 
Summary Findings Limitations  
FAA (2004) FAA regulatory 
document detailing 
current flight data 
recorder mandatory 
capabilities. 
Extensive list of 
requirements. The 
required information, 
however, is miniscule 
compared to the 
capabilities of current 
recorder technology. 
Does not examine the 
use of FDM to identify 
EM variables 
influencing UAs. 
Grossi (1999) NTSB Paper: The 
history of flight data 
recorders. Describes 
the origins and 
evolution of flight 
data recording 
instruments and the 
requirements 
mandated of them. 
Even the Wright 
brothers’ aircraft has 
a rudimentary flight 
data recorder, as did 
Lindbergh’s. Includes 
extensive detailing of 
the progress of FDR 
technology. 
Does not examine the 








FDM data to identify 
anomalous fuel burn 
rates. 
Used data mining 
techniques to 
determine abnormal 






Does not examine the 
use of FDM to identify 
EM variables 
influencing UAs. 




possible ways to 
utilize FDM 
information and 
provides examples of 
DM possibilities. 
Provides an overview 
of the potential for 
DM of FDM. 
Does not delve into any 
specific area in depth. 
Just shows how various 
DM techniques might 
be applied to FDM. 
Does not examine the 






Subject Area: Aircraft Energy Management 
Author(s) and 
(Date) 
Summary Findings Limitations  
Baker (2017) Dissertation: A 
study evaluating a 
new concept for an 
EM situational 
awareness display. 
Found that response 
times and accuracy 
for interpretation of 




Study focused on 
energy awareness, 
which would assist in 
EM, but not on EM 
directly. 
Does not discuss any 
aspects of EM with 









regarding pilot skill 





time, ends up 
atrophying cognitive 
skills necessary to 
conduct EM. 
Does not discuss 
influence on UAs 
specifically. 
Hurt (1960) Book: 
Aerodynamics text 
utilized by the U.S. 
Navy. 
Provides detailed and 
extensive discussions 
of various forms of 
drag on an aircraft in 
flight. 
Does not discuss any 
aspects of EM with 
respect to prevention 
of UAs. 
Merkt (2013) Journal Article: 
Discusses two 
aspects of EM: 
safety and 
efficiency. 
Highlights the need 
for improved EM 
training for pilots to 
increase both safety 
and efficiency and 
the trade-offs 
between the two. 
Air carrier EM has 
focused on fuel 
efficiency, but the 
top three causes of 
commercial aviation 
fatalities include EM 
as a common 
element. 
Does not discuss 
stabilized approaches 




Subject Area: Aircraft Energy Management 
Author(s) and 
(Date) 
Summary Findings Limitations  
Molter (1918) Book: Written in the 
World War I era, the 
book describes some 
of the tactics used by 
the earliest air-to-air 
pilots. 
Demonstrates an 
understanding of the 




With the limited 
understanding of 
aerodynamics at the 
time of its writing, 
altitude and airspeed 
were the only 
discussed elements of 
EM. 
Does not discuss any 
aspects of EM with 
respect to prevention 
of UAs. 
Noyes (2007) Journal Article: 
Discusses 3 types of 
total energy display 
designed to provide 
the pilot with a 
single point of 
reference for the 
energy state of the 
aircraft. 
The most simplified 
display produced the 
quickest reaction 
times, but also the 
most erroneous 
reactions. 
Small number of 
participants. 
Discusses how the 
display can assist the 
pilot in EM but does 
not discuss any aspects 
of EM with respect to 
prevention of UAs. 







and new, more 
accurate model. 
New model provides 
increased accuracy in 
planning CDOs. 
Inclusion of wind 
into the model is 
identified as most 
significant 
improvement. 
Focused on CDO 
which emphasizes 
minimizing level flight 
segments during 
descent to minimize 
fuel consumption, 
noise, and emissions. 
Does not examine 
impact on UAs. 
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Subject Area: Aircraft Energy Management 
Author(s) and 
(Date) 
Summary Findings Limitations  
Shaw (1985) Book: Instructional 
manual on how to 
employ fighter 
aircraft and execute 
aerial combat 
maneuvers. Includes 
a 32-page appendix 
specific to fighter 
performance which 
includes a lengthy 
section on energy 
management and 
maneuverability. 
EM is not a new 
subject in aviation. It 
is and has been a 
significant part of 
fighter aviation. 
This manual is specific 
to fighter aviation. It 
does not include 
general or commercial 
aviation. While 
portions are technically 
applicable to these 
areas, the focus is air-
to-air combat. 
Does not discuss any 
aspects of EM with 






U.S. air carrier 
efficiency. 
For U.S. air carriers, 




Does not discuss any 
aspects of EM with 






manual for precision 
aerobatic 
maneuvers. 
Discusses EM from 
the perspective of 
precision aerobatics. 
EM is necessary to 
ensure that there is 
sufficient energy at 
the completion of 
one maneuver to 
begin execution of 
the next maneuver. 
Does not discuss any 
aspects of EM with 








of workload on 
pilots’ ability to 
detect errors. 
High-workload 
situations result in 
decreased accuracy 
and increased 
reaction times in 
addressing errors. 
Does not discuss any 
specifics regarding 




Subject Area: Aircraft Energy Management 
Author(s) and 
(Date) 










management was a 
causal factor. 
When EM was 
included a part of an 
air carriers recurrent 
training program, the 
incidents of UAs 
declined 70%. 
Not all of the NTSB 
reports examined for 
the study contained the 





details were not always 
available. 
Does not discuss any 
aspects of EM with 







and kinetic energy 
and provides 
formulae for their 
computation, 
including the total 
energy equation. 
Does not discuss any 
aspects of EM with 




Li, & Tao 
(2019) 
Journal Article: 
Discusses a method 











Does not discuss 
influence on UAs 
specifically. 




Table B2  
 
Appendix E to 14 CFR Part 125—Airplane Flight Recorder Specifications 








1. Time or Relative 
Times Counts.1 




4 1 sec UTC time 
preferred when 
available. Count 
increments each 4 
seconds of system 
operation. 












1 5′ to 35′ Data should be 
obtained from the 
air data computer 
when practicable. 











1 1 kt Data should be 
obtained from the 
air data computer 
when practicable. 







±2° 1 0.5° When true or 
magnetic heading 


















6. Pitch Attitude ±75° ±2° 1 or 0.25 
for 
airplanes 
















0.5° A sampling rate of 
0.5 is 
recommended.  












crew member but 
one discrete 










9. Thrust/Power on 
each engine—




±2% 1 (per 
engine) 




EPR, N1 or 
Torque, NP) as 
appropriate to the 
particular engine 
being recorded to 

























12a. Pitch control(s) 
position (nonfly-by-
wire systems)18 












0.5% of full 
range 
For airplanes that 
have a flight 
control breakaway 
capability that 
allows either pilot 
to operate the 
controls 
independently, 
record both control 
inputs. The control 
inputs may be 
sampled alternately 
once per second to 
produce the 
sampling interval 
of 0.5 or 0.25, as 
applicable. 
12b. Pitch control(s) 
position (fly-by-wire 
systems)3 18 












0.2% of full 
range 
 
13a. Lateral control 
position(s) (nonfly-
by-wire)18 












0.2% of full 
range 
For airplanes that 
have a flight 
control break away 
capability that 
allows either pilot 
to operate the 
controls 
independently, 
record both control 
inputs. The control 
inputs may be 
sampled alternately 
once per second to 
produce the 
sampling interval 




13b. Lateral control 
position(s) (fly-by-
wire)4 18 























0.5 0.3% of full 
range 
For airplanes that 
have a flight 
control breakaway 
capability that 
allows either pilot 
to operate the 
controls 
independently, 
record both control 
inputs. The control 
inputs may be 
sampled alternately 




14b. Yaw control 
position(s) (fly-by-
wire)18 





0.5 0.2% of full 
range 
 
15. Pitch control 
surface(s) position6 
18 












0.3% of full 
range 
For airplanes fitted 
with multiple or 
split surfaces, a 
suitable 
combination of 
inputs is acceptable 












16. Lateral control 
surface(s) position7 
18 


















acceptable in lieu 
of recording each 
surface separately. 
The control 
surfaces may be 
sampled alternately 
to produce the 
sampling interval 
of 0.5 or 0.25, as 
applicable. 
17. Yaw control 
surface(s) position8 
18 





0.5 0.2% of full 
range 
For airplanes fitted 
with multiple or 





acceptable in lieu 
of recording each 
surface separately. 
The control 
surfaces may be 
sampled alternately 












19. Pitch Trim 
Surface Position 





1 0.6% of full 
range 
 
20. Trailing Edge 






±3° or as 
Pilot's 
indicator 
2 0.5% of full 
range 
Flap position and 
cockpit control 
may each be 
sampled at 4 
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second intervals, to 
give a data point 
every 2 seconds.  
21. Leading Edge 
















2 0.5% of full 
range 
Left and right 
sides, or flap 
position and 
cockpit control 
may each be 
sampled at 4 
second intervals, 
so as to give a data 
point every 2 
seconds. 
22. Each Thrust 













discretes enable the 




23. Ground Spoiler 


















0.2% of full 
range 
 
24. Outside Air 
Temperature or Total 
Air Temperature.13 
−50 °C to 
+ 90 °C 



















flight path and 
speed of the 
aircraft. 
26. Radio Altitude14 −20 ft to 
2,500 ft 



















arranged so that at 

























system should be 
recorded but 
arranged so that at 
least one is 
recorded each 
second. It is not 
necessary to record 
ILS and MLS at 
the same time; 
only the approach 

























system should be 
recorded but 
arranged so that at 
least one is 
recorded each 
second. It is not 
necessary to record 
ILS and MLS at 
the same time; 
only the approach 
aid in use need be 
recorded. 








A single discrete is 
acceptable for all 
markers. 




Record the master 
warning and record 
each ‘red’ warning 




other parameters or 





























0.3% of full 
range 
If left and right 
sensors are 
available, each 
may be recorded at 
4 or 1 second 
intervals, as 
appropriate, so as 
to give a data point 












±5% 2 0.5% of full 
range. 
 






1 0.2% of full 
range. 
 












recorder capacity is 
limited in which 
case a single 
discrete for all 
modes is 
acceptable. 
36. Landing Gear 
Position or Landing 
























4 1 knot, and 
1.0°. 
 






4 0.002°, or 
as installed 































Full Range ±2% 1 for each 
lever 
2% of full 
range 
For airplanes with 
non-mechanically 
linked cockpit 















preferred priority is 
indicated vibration 
level, N2, EGT, 
Fuel Flow, Fuel 
Cut-off lever 






























45. DME 1 and 2 
Distance 
0-200 NM As 
installed 
4 1 NM 1 mile. 
46. Nav 1 and 2 
Selected Frequency 









Full range ±5% (1 per 64 
sec.) 
0.2% of full 
range. 
 
48. Selected Altitude Full range ±5% 1 100 ft. 
 
49. Selected speed Full range ±5% 1 1 knot. 
 
50. Selected Mach Full range ±5% 1 .01. 
 
51. Selected vertical 
speed 
Full range ±5% 1 100 ft/min. 
 
52. Selected heading Full range ±5% 1 1°. 
 
53. Selected flight 
path 
Full range ±5% 1 1°. 
 
54. Selected decision 
height 
Full range ±5% 64 1 ft. 
 







show the display 
system status (e.g., 
off, normal, fail, 
composite, sector, 












show the display 
system status (e.g., 
off, normal, fail, 
and the identity of 
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display pages for 
emergency 
procedures, need 
not be recorded). 
57. Thrust 
command.17 
Full Range ±2% 2 2% of full 
range 
 
58. Thrust target Full range ±2% 4 2% of full 
range. 
 
59. Fuel quantity in 
CG trim tank 
Full range ±5% (1 per 64 
sec.) 



































63. Engine warning 






64. Engine warning 






65. Engine warning 






66. Yaw Trim 
Surface Position 






2 0.3% of full 
range. 
 
67. Roll Trim 
Surface Position 
Full Range ±3% 
Unless 









68. Brake Pressure 







applied by pilots or 
by autobrakes. 
69. Brake Pedal 











braking applied by 
pilots. 
70. Yaw or sideslip 
angle 
Full Range ±5% 1 0,5°. 
 

















73. Computed center 
of gravity 
Full Range ±5% (1 per 64 
sec.) 
1% of full 
range. 
 





























Full range ±5% 2 100 psi. 
 








79. Computer failure 











80. Heads-up display 
(when an 









display (when an 








82. Cockpit trim 
control input 
position—pitch 
Full Range ±5% 1 0.2% of full 
range 
Where mechanical 
means for control 
inputs are not 
available, cockpit 
display trim 
positions should be 
recorded. 
83. Cockpit trim 
control input 
position—roll 
Full Range ±5% 1 0.7% of full 
range 
Where mechanical 
means for control 
inputs are not 
available, cockpit 
display trim 
position should be 
recorded.  
84. Cockpit trim 
control input 
position—yaw 
Full Range ±5% 1 0.3% of full 
range 
Where mechanical 
means for control 
input are not 
available, cockpit 
display trim 
positions should be 
recorded. 
85. Trailing edge 
flap and cockpit flap 
control position 
Full Range ±5% 2 0.5% of full 
range 
Trailing edge flaps 
and cockpit flap 
control position 
may each be 
sampled alternately 
at 4 second 
intervals to provide 




86. Leading edge 




±5% 1 0.5% of full 
range. 
 
87. Ground spoiler 




±5% 0.5 0.3% of full 
range 
 
88. All cockpit flight 




















surface position is 
a function of the 
displacement of the 
control input 
device only, it is 
not necessary to 
record this 
parameter. For 
airplanes that have 
a flight control 
break away 
capability that 
allows either pilot 
to operate the 
control 
independently, 
record both control 
force inputs. The 
control force inputs 
may be sampled 
alternately once 









   
90. Yaw damper 
command 
Full range As 
installed 
0.5 1% of full 
range 
 
91. Standby rudder 
valve status 
Discrete 0.5 
   
Note. The recorded values must meet the designated range, resolution and accuracy requirements during 
static and dynamic conditions. Dynamic condition means the parameter is experiencing change at the 
maximum rate attainable, including the maximum rate of reversal. All data recorded must be correlated in 
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time to within one second. Adapted from “14 CFR Part 125, Appendix E”, 2017 by FAA. 1For A300 B2/B4 
airplanes, resolution = 6 seconds. 2For A330/A340 series airplanes, resolution = 0.703°. 3For 
A318/A319/A320/A321 series airplanes, resolution = 0.275% (0.088°>0.064°), for A330/A340 series 
airplanes, resolution = 2.20% (0.703°>0.064°). 4For A318/A319/A320/A321 series airplanes, resolution = 
0.22% (0.088°>0.080°), for A330/A340 series airplanes, resolution = 1.76% (0.703°>0.080°). 5For 
A330/A340 series airplanes, resolution = 1.18% (0.703° >0.120°), for A330/A340 series airplanes, seconds 
per sampling interval = 1. 6For A330/A340 series airplanes, resolution = 0.783% (0.352°>0.090°). 7For 
A330/A340 series airplanes, aileron resolution = 0.704% (0.352°>0.100°). For A330/A340 series airplanes, 
spoiler resolution = 1.406% (0.703°>0.100°). 8For A330/A340 series airplanes, resolution = 0.30% 
(0.176°>0.12°), for A330/A340 series airplanes, seconds per sampling interval = 1. 9For B-717 series 
airplanes, resolution = .005g. For Dassault F900C/F900EX airplanes, resolution = .007g. 10For A330/A340 
series airplanes, resolution = 1.05% (0.250°>0.120°). 11For A330/A340 series airplanes, resolution = 1.05% 
(0.250°>0.120°). For A330 B2/B4 series airplanes, resolution = 0.92% (0.230°>0.125°). 12For A330/A340 
series airplanes, spoiler resolution = 1.406% (0.703°>0.100°). 13For A330/A340 series airplanes, resolution 
= 0.5°C. 14For Dassault F900C/F900EX airplanes, Radio Altitude resolution = 1.25 ft. 15For A330/A340 
series airplanes, resolution = 0.352 degrees. 16For A318/A319/A320/A321 series airplanes, resolution = 
4.32%. For A330/A340 series airplanes, resolution is 3.27% of full range for throttle lever angle (TLA); for 
reverse thrust, reverse throttle lever angle (RLA) resolution is nonlinear over the active reverse thrust 
range, which is 51.54 degrees to 96.14 degrees. The resolved element is 2.8 degrees uniformly over the 
entire active reverse thrust range, or 2.9% of the full range value of 96.14 degrees. 17For 
A318/A319/A320/A321 series airplanes, with IAE engines, resolution = 2.58%. 18For all aircraft 
manufactured on or after December 6, 2010, the seconds per sampling interval is 0.125. Each input must be 
recorded at this rate. Alternately sampling inputs (interleaving) to meet this sampling interval is prohibited. 
19For all 737 model airplanes manufactured between August 19, 2000, and April 6, 2010: The seconds per 
sampling interval is 0.5 per control input; the remarks regarding the sampling rate do not apply; a single 
control wheel force transducer installed on the left cable control is acceptable provided the left and right 




Table B3  
Logistic Regression Tables for Basic Model 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 10500 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 10500 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 10500 100.0 
Note. a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases. 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
Stabilized 0 
Unstable Approach 1 
 





Speed Brake 0 (Not Used) 2,856 .000 
1 (Deployed) 7,644 1.000 
High Speed 0 (Normal) 7,837 .000 
1 (Fast) 2,663 1.000 
Late Start 0 (Timely) 10,471 .000 
1 (Late) 29 1.000 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
Classification Tablea,b 
 Observed Predicted 
 Unstable Approach 
Percentage 
Correct 
 Stabilized Unstable 
Approach 
Step 0 Unstable Approach Stabilized 10360 0 100.0 
Unstable Approach 140 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   98.7 




Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -4.304 .085 2,558.917 1 .000 .014 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables Late Start(1) 393 1 .531 
High Speed(1) .467 1 .495 
Gear Speed 10.681 1 .001 
Gear Dist .282 1 .596 
Flap Speed 19.266 1 .000 
Flap Dist 2.003 1 .157 
Speed Brake(1) 1.281 1 .258 
Overall Statistics 32.834 7 .000 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 33.267 7 .000 
Block 33.267 7 .000 




Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 1,453.754a .003 .024 




Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 















Step 1 Unstable Approach Stabilized 7,947 2,413 76.7 
Unstable Approach 81 59 42.1 
Overall Percentage   76.2 
Note. a. The cut value is .017. 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a Late Start(1) -16.908 7,301.899 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .064 .193 .109 1 .741 1.066 .730 1.557 
Gear Speed .015 .005 8.065 1 .005 1.015 1.005 1.026 
Gear Dist -.108 .043 6.277 1 .012 .898 .826 .977 
Flap Speed .016 .005 9.020 1 .003 1.016 1.006 1.027 
Flap Dist -.013 .022 .342 1 .559 .987 .945 1.031 
Speed Brake(1) -.094 .188 .252 1 .616 .910 .629 1.315 
Constant -9.541 1.167 66.825 1 .000 .000   
Note. a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, Flap 





Table B4  
Logistic Regression Tables for Forward and Backward Stepwise 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 18.406 1 .000 
Block 18.406 1 .000 
Model 18.406 1 .000 
Step 2 Step 4.969 1 .026 
Block 23.375 2 .000 










1 1,468.616a .002 .013 
2 1,463.647a .002 .017 
Note. a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 8 
because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 6.303 8 .613 




Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
Unstable Approach = 
Stabilized 
Unstable Approach = 
Unstable Approach 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 1,062 1,061.901 8 8.099 1,070 
2 1,022 1,025.014 12 8.986 1,034 
3 1,061 1,060.693 10 10.307 1,071 
4 1,004 1,001.365 8 10.635 1,012 
5 1,040 1,035.041 7 11.959 1,047 
6 1,034 1,037.831 17 13.169 1,051 
7 1,010 1,009.603 14 14.397 1,024 
8 1,053 1,056.740 21 17.260 1,074 
9 1,019 1,015.838 16 19.162 1,035 
10 1,055 1,055.973 27 26.027 1,082 
Step 2 1 1,045 1,043.629 5 6.371 1,050 
2 1,040 1,041.497 10 8.503 1,050 
3 1,041 1,040.271 9 9.729 1,050 
4 1,040 1,039.093 10 10.907 1,050 
5 1,034 1,037.892 16 12.108 1,050 
6 1,037 1,036.525 13 13.475 1,050 
7 1,035 1,034.827 15 15.173 1,050 
8 1,033 1,032.783 17 17.217 1,050 
9 1,033 1,029.835 17 20.165 1,050 
10 1,022 1,023.647 28 26.353 1,050 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 Unstable Approach Percentage 
Correct  Stabilized Unstable 
Approach 
Step 1 Unstable Approach Stabilized 8,211 2,149 79.3 
Unstable Approach 95 45 32.1 
Overall Percentage   78.6 
Step 2 Unstable Approach Stabilized 8,082 2,278 78.0 
Unstable Approach 91 49 35.0 
Overall Percentage   77.4 
Note. a. The cut value is .017 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a Flap 
Speed 
.020 .005 19.003 1 .000 1.020 1.011 1.029 
Constant -8.821 1.055 69.979 1 .000 .000   
Step 2b Flap 
Speed 
.022 .005 21.519 1 .000 1.023 1.013 1.032 
Flap Dist -.045 .021 4.455 1 .035 .956 .917 .997 
Constant -8.592 1.085 62.719 1 .000 .000   
Note. a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Flap Speed.  
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: Flap Dist. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 Constant Flap Speed Flap Dist 
Step 1 Constant 1.000 -.997  
Flap Speed -.997 1.000  
Step 2 Constant 1.000 -.947 -.108 
Flap Speed -.947 1.000 -.208 
Flap Dist -.108 -.208 1.000 
 
 




Change in -2 
Log 
Likelihood df 
Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 Flap Speed -743.511 18.406 1 .000 
Step 2 Flap Speed -742.423 21.199 1 .000 






Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 Variables Late Start(1) .417 1 .519 
High Speed(1) .483 1 .487 
Gear Speed 3.197 1 .074 
Gear Dist 1.072 1 .300 
Flap Dist 4.375 1 .036 
Speed Brake(1) .564 1 .453 
Overall Statistics 13.651 6 .034 
Step 2 Variables Late Start(1) .434 1 .510 
High Speed(1) .094 1 .759 
Gear Speed 1.498 1 .221 
Gear Dist .723 1 .395 
Speed Brake(1) .315 1 .574 






Block 1: Method = Backward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 33.267 7 .000 
Block 33.267 7 .000 
Model 33.267 7 .000 
Step 2a Step -.108 1 .742 
Block 33.159 6 .000 
Model 33.159 6 .000 
Step 3a Step -.243 1 .622 
Block 32.916 5 .000 
Model 32.916 5 .000 
Step 4a Step -.480 1 .488 
Block 32.436 4 .000 
Model 32.436 4 .000 
Step 5a Step -.792 1 .374 
Block 31.644 3 .000 
Model 31.644 3 .000 
Note. a. A negative Chi-squares value indicates that the Chi-squares value has 
decreased from the previous step. 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 1,453.754a .003 .024 
2 1,453.862a .003 .024 
3 1,454.105a .003 .024 
4 1,454.586a .003 .023 
5 1,455.378b .003 .023 
Note. a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has 
been reached. Final solution cannot be found. 
b. Estimation terminated at iteration number 8 because parameter estimates changed by 




Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 13.033 8 .111 
2 11.417 8 .179 
3 13.880 8 .085 
4 15.786 8 .046 





Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 Unstable Approach = Stabilized Unstable Approach = Unstable 
Approach 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 1,041 1,044.661 9 5.339 1,050 
2 1,044 1,042.239 6 7.761 1,050 
3 1,038 1,040.919 12 9.081 1,050 
4 1,040 1,039.678 10 10.322 1,050 
5 1,040 1,038.372 10 11.628 1,050 
6 1,036 1,036.882 14 13.118 1,050 
7 1,034 1,034.959 16 15.041 1,050 
8 1,044 1,032.525 6 17.475 1,050 
9 1,028 1,029.254 22 20.746 1,050 
10 1,015 1,020.510 35 29.490 1,050 
Step 2 1 1,041 1,044.659 9 5.341 1,050 
2 1,045 1,042.231 5 7.769 1,050 
3 1,038 1,040.926 12 9.074 1,050 
4 1,039 1,039.669 11 10.331 1,050 
5 1,040 1,038.385 10 11.615 1,050 
6 1,034 1,036.876 16 13.124 1,050 
7 1,036 1,034.938 14 15.062 1,050 
8 1,042 1,032.510 8 17.490 1,050 
9 1,029 1,029.243 21 20.757 1,050 
10 1,016 1,020.563 34 29.437 1,050 
Step 3 1 1,041 1,044.637 9 5.363 1,050 
2 1,045 1,042.178 5 7.822 1,050 
3 1,037 1,040.858 13 9.142 1,050 
4 1,040 1,039.615 10 10.385 1,050 
5 1,037 1,038.363 13 11.637 1,050 
6 1,038 1,036.872 12 13.128 1,050 
7 1,035 1,034.989 15 15.011 1,050 
8 1,043 1,032.596 7 17.404 1,050 
9 1,031 1,029.334 19 20.666 1,050 
10 1,013 1,020.559 37 29.441 1,050 
Step 4 1 1,042 1,044.523 8 5.477 1,050 
2 1,044 1,042.072 6 7.928 1,050 
3 1,034 1,040.802 16 9.198 1,050 
4 1,043 1,039.626 7 10.374 1,,050 
5 1,038 1,038.401 12 11.599 1050 
198 
 
6 1,035 1,036.928 15 13.072 1,050 
7 1,037 1,035.027 13 14.973 1,050 
8 1,043 1,032.629 7 17.371 1,050 
9 1,029 1,029.403 21 20.597 1,050 
10 1,015 1,020.589 35 29.411 1,050 
Step 5 1 1,041 1,044.357 9 5.643 1,050 
2 1,044 1,042.060 6 7.940 1,050 
3 1,035 1,040.803 15 9.197 1,050 
4 1,043 1,039.633 7 10.367 1,050 
5 1,038 1,038.413 12 11.587 1,050 
6 1,035 1,036.939 15 13.061 1,050 
7 1,037 1,035.042 13 14.958 1,050 
8 1,043 1,032.651 7 17.349 1,050 
9 1,029 1,029.426 21 20.574 1,050 





 Observed Predicted 







Step 1 Unstable Approach Stabilized 7,941 2,419 76.7 
Unstable Approach 81 59 42.1 
Overall Percentage   76.2 
Step 2 Unstable Approach Stabilized 7,937 2,423 76.6 
Unstable Approach 80 60 42.9 
Overall Percentage   76.2 
Step 3 Unstable Approach Stabilized 7,993 2,367 77.2 
Unstable Approach 81 59 42.1 
Overall Percentage   76.7 
Step 4 Unstable Approach Stabilized 7,993 2,367 77.2 
Unstable Approach 81 59 42.1 
Overall Percentage   76.7 
Step 5 Unstable Approach Stabilized 8,003 2,357 77.2 
Unstable Approach 81 59 42.1 
Overall Percentage   76.8 




Variables in the Equation 




Step 1a Late Start(1) -16.908 7,301.899 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .064 .193 .109 1 .741 1.066 .730 1.557 
Gear Speed .015 .005 8.065 1 .005 1.015 1.005 1.026 
Gear Dist -.108 .043 6.277 1 .012 .898 .826 .977 
Flap Speed .016 .005 9.020 1 .003 1.016 1.006 1.027 
Flap Dist -.013 .022 .342 1 .559 .987 .945 1.031 
Speed 
Brake(1) 
-.094 .188 .252 1 .616 .910 .629 1.315 
Constant -9.541 1.167 66.825 1 .000 .000   
Step 2a Late Start(1) -16.886 7,304.596 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
Gear Speed .015 .005 8.092 1 .004 1.015 1.005 1.026 
Gear Dist -.107 .043 6.265 1 .012 .898 .826 .977 
Flap Speed .016 .005 9.059 1 .003 1.016 1.006 1.027 
Flap Dist -.014 .022 .406 1 .524 .986 .945 1.029 
Speed 
Brake(1) 
-.093 .188 .245 1 .620 .911 .630 1.317 
Constant -9.524 1.167 66.612 1 .000 .000   
Step 3a Late Start(1) -16.900 7,301.974 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.998 1 .005 1.015 1.005 1.026 
Gear Dist -.110 .043 6.573 1 .010 .896 .824 .975 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.525 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.015 .022 .459 1 .498 .985 .944 1.028 
Constant -9.603 1.154 69.221 1 .000 .000   
Step 4a Late Start(1) -16.878 7,306.118 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
Gear Speed .017 .005 12.281 1 .000 1.017 1.007 1.026 
Gear Dist -.119 .040 8.722 1 .003 .888 .820 .961 
Flap Speed .015 .005 9.260 1 .002 1.016 1.005 1.026 
Constant -9.788 1.117 76.860 1 .000 .000   
Step 5a Gear Speed .017 .005 12.239 1 .000 1.017 1.007 1.026 
Gear Dist -.120 .040 8.823 1 .003 .887 .820 .960 
Flap Speed .015 .005 9.296 1 .002 1.016 1.006 1.026 
Constant -9.785 1.117 76.781 1 .000 .000   
Note. a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, Flap 








Change in -2 
Log 
Likelihood df 
Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 Late Start -727.285 .816 1 .366 
High Speed -726.931 .108 1 .742 
Gear Speed -730.898 8.041 1 .005 
Gear Dist -730.295 6.835 1 .009 
Flap Speed -731.321 8.888 1 .003 
Flap Dist -727.055 .355 1 .551 
Speed Brake -727.002 .250 1 .617 
Step 2 Late Start -727.330 .798 1 .372 
Gear Speed -730.965 8.067 1 .005 
Gear Dist -730.341 6.820 1 .009 
Flap Speed -731.393 8.924 1 .003 
Flap Dist -727.143 .423 1 .516 
Speed Brake -727.053 .243 1 .622 
Step 3 Late Start -727.458 .810 1 .368 
Gear Speed -731.038 7.971 1 .005 
Gear Dist -730.636 7.166 1 .007 
Flap Speed -731.753 9.400 1 .002 
Flap Dist -727.293 .480 1 .488 
Step 4 Late Start -727.689 .792 1 .374 
Gear Speed -733.357 12.129 1 .000 
Gear Dist -732.316 10.046 1 .002 
Flap Speed -731.783 8.981 1 .003 
Step 5 Gear Speed -733.731 12.084 1 .001 
Gear Dist -732.793 10.209 1 .001 




Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 2a Variables High Speed(1) .109 1 .741 
Overall Statistics .109 1 .741 
Step 3b Variables High Speed(1) .102 1 .749 
Speed Brake(1) .246 1 .620 
Overall Statistics .354 2 .838 
Step 4c Variables High Speed(1) .174 1 .676 
Flap Dist .458 1 .498 
Speed Brake(1) .304 1 .581 
Overall Statistics .818 3 .845 
Step 5d Variables Late Start(1) .400 1 .527 
High Speed(1) .151 1 .698 
Flap Dist .441 1 .507 
Speed Brake(1) .316 1 .574 
verall Statistics 1.219 4 .875 
Note. a. Variable(s) removed on step 2: High Speed.  
b. Variable(s) removed on step 3: Speed Brake. 
c. Variable(s) removed on step 4: Flap Dist. 




Table B5  
Logistic Regression Tables for Moderating Variable Interactions 
Lighting * Late Start 
 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
  Lower Upper 
Late Start(1) -17.093 9,242.314 .000 1 .999 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .059 .193 .093 1 .761 1.061 .726 1.550 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.843 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.026 
Gear Dist -.106 .043 6.108 1 .013 .900 .827 .978 
Flap Speed .016 .005 9.262 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.027 
Flap Dist -.013 .022 .343 1 .558 .987 .945 1.031 
Speed Brake(1) -.099 .188 .275 1 .600 .906 .627 1.310 
Lighting   3.222 2 .200    
Lighting(1) -.277 .322 .739 1 .390 .758 .403 1.425 
Lighting(2) -.334 .196 2.897 1 .089 .716 .487 1.052 
Late Start * 
Lighting 
  .000 2 1.000    
Late Start(1) by 
Lighting(1) 
.803 29,853.365 .000 1 1.000 2.233 .000 . 
Late Start(1) by 
Lighting(2) 
.449 16,109.737 .000 1 1.000 1.567 .000 . 
Constant -9.435 1.169 65.110 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap 







Lighting * High Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.918 7,288.233 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .001 .239 .000 1 .996 1.001 .626 1.601 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.917 1 .005 1.015 1.005 1.026 
Gear Dist -.106 .043 6.163 1 .013 .899 .827 .978 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.299 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.013 .022 .344 1 .557 .987 .945 1.031 
Speed Brake(1) -.097 .188 .268 1 .605 .907 .627 1.312 
Lighting   3.096 2 .213    
Lighting(1) -.261 .377 .479 1 .489 .770 .368 1.613 
Lighting(2) -.399 .233 2.935 1 .087 .671 .425 1.059 
High Speed * 
Lighting 
  .318 2 .853    
High Speed(1) by 
Lighting(1) 
-.054 .722 .006 1 .940 .947 .230 3.902 
High Speed(1) by 
Lighting(2) 
.232 .433 .288 1 .592 1.262 .540 2.949 
Constant -9.437 1.169 65.139 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Lighting * Gear Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.956 7,274.021 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .056 .194 .085 1 .771 1.058 .724 1.546 
Gear Speed .017 .006 8.563 1 .003 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Gear Dist -.107 .043 6.212 1 .013 .899 .827 .977 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.383 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.013 .022 .355 1 .551 .987 .945 1.031 
Speed Brake(1) -.097 .188 .263 1 .608 .908 .628 1.313 
Lighting   .809 2 .667    
Lighting(1) 2.179 2.443 .795 1 .372 8.834 .074 1,060.596 
Lighting(2) .353 1.402 .064 1 .801 1.424 .091 22.230 
Gear Speed * 
Lighting 
  1.116 2 .572    
Gear Speed by 
Lighting(1) 
-.013 .013 .990 1 .320 .987 .961 1.013 
Gear Speed by 
Lighting(2) 
-.004 .008 .243 1 .622 .996 .982 1.011 
Constant -9.807 1.243 62.218 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 






Lighting * Gear Dist 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.955 7,287.515 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .059 .193 .093 1 .761 1.061 .726 1.550 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.868 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.026 
Gear Dist -.113 .048 5.587 1 .018 .893 .814 .981 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.280 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.013 .022 .352 1 .553 .987 .945 1.031 
Speed Brake(1) -.098 .188 .271 1 .603 .907 .627 1.311 
Lighting   1.138 2 .566    
Lighting(1) -.080 .972 .007 1 .935 .923 .137 6.208 
Lighting(2) -.615 .579 1.127 1 .288 .541 .174 1.683 
Gear Dist * 
Lighting 
  .365 2 .833    
Gear Dist by 
Lighting(1) 
-.023 .109 .044 1 .834 .977 .790 1.209 
Gear Dist by 
Lighting(2) 
.033 .063 .270 1 .604 1.033 .913 1.170 
Constant -9.383 1.182 62.972 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 






Lighting * Flap Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.939 7,284.414 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .062 .193 .101 1 .750 1.064 .728 1.554 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.868 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.026 
Gear Dist -.106 .043 6.114 1 .013 .900 .827 .978 
Flap Speed .016 .006 6.243 1 .012 1.016 1.003 1.029 
Flap Dist -.013 .022 .327 1 .567 .987 .945 1.031 
Speed Brake(1) -.099 .188 .276 1 .600 .906 .627 1.310 
Lighting   .813 2 .666    
Lighting(1) 2.254 4.037 .312 1 .577 9.527 .003 26,004.101 
Lighting(2) -1.508 2.526 .357 1 .550 .221 .002 31.235 
Flap Speed * 
Lighting 
  .735 2 .692    
Flap Speed by 
Lighting(1) 
-.011 .018 .390 1 .532 .989 .955 1.024 
Flap Speed by 
Lighting(2) 
.005 .011 .218 1 .641 1.005 .984 1.027 
Constant -9.340 1.415 43.561 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 







Lighting * Flap Dist 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -17.006 7,226.597 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .042 .194 .047 1 .828 1.043 .713 1.525 
Gear Speed .014 .005 6.608 1 .010 1.014 1.003 1.024 
Gear Dist -.098 .043 5.295 1 .021 .907 .834 .986 
Flap Speed .017 .005 10.404 1 .001 1.018 1.007 1.028 
Flap Dist -.062 .031 3.997 1 .046 .940 .885 .999 
Speed Brake(1) -.099 .188 .277 1 .599 .906 .626 1.310 
Lighting   9.327 2 .009    
Lighting(1) -1.759 .879 4.009 1 .045 .172 .031 .964 
Lighting(2) -1.998 .700 8.141 1 .004 .136 .034 .535 
Flap Dist * 
Lighting 
  7.095 2 .029    
Flap Dist by 
Lighting(1) 
.089 .047 3.612 1 .057 1.093 .997 1.197 
Flap Dist by 
Lighting(2) 
.101 .040 6.282 1 .012 1.107 1.022 1.198 
Constant -8.702 1.215 51.300 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap 






Lighting * Speed Brake 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.872 7,230.285 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .051 .194 .068 1 .794 1.052 .720 1.538 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.784 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.107 .043 6.261 1 .012 .898 .826 .977 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.356 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.014 .022 .370 1 .543 .987 .945 1.030 
Speed Brake(1) .271 .250 1.176 1 .278 1.311 .803 2.139 
Lighting   4.739 2 .094    
Lighting(1) -1.236 1.025 1.453 1 .228 .291 .039 2.167 
Lighting(2) .499 .308 2.615 1 .106 1.647 .900 3.013 
Lighting * Speed 
Brake 
  13.359 2 .001    
Lighting(1) by 
Speed Brake(1) 
1.134 1.081 1.102 1 .294 3.109 .374 25.842 
Lighting(2) by 
Speed Brake(1) 
-1.383 .416 11.069 1 .001 .251 .111 .567 
Constant -9.688 1.177 67.780 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Experience * Late Start 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -15.659 23,419.920 .000 1 .999 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .083 .193 .185 1 .667 1.087 .744 1.588 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.683 1 .006 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.100 .043 5.499 1 .019 .905 .833 .984 
Flap Speed .008 .007 1.426 1 .232 1.008 .995 1.022 
Flap Dist -.009 .022 .149 1 .699 .992 .950 1.035 
Speed Brake(1) .026 .197 .017 1 .896 1.026 .698 1.509 
Experience(1) .527 .267 3.887 1 .049 1.693 1.003 2.859 
Experience(1) by 
Late Start(1) 
-.772 14,698.893 .000 1 1.000 .462 .000 . 
Constant -8.706 1.240 49.281 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 






Experience * High Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.923 7,313.335 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .854 .763 1.254 1 .263 2.349 .527 10.476 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.806 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.100 .043 5.565 1 .018 .905 .832 .983 
Flap Speed .008 .007 1.353 1 .245 1.008 .995 1.021 
Flap Dist -.008 .022 .136 1 .713 .992 .950 1.036 
Speed Brake(1) .030 .197 .023 1 .880 1.030 .701 1.515 
Experience(1) .669 .305 4.803 1 .028 1.952 1.073 3.549 
Experience(1) by 
High Speed(1) 
-.443 .428 1.074 1 .300 .642 .277 1.485 
Constant -8.943 1.267 49.842 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Experience * Gear Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.847 7,284.51
2 
.000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .082 .193 .181 1 .670 1.086 .743 1.587 
Gear Speed .002 .021 .009 1 .925 1.002 .962 1.044 
Gear Dist -.098 .043 5.271 1 .022 .907 .834 .986 
Flap Speed .008 .007 1.489 1 .222 1.008 .995 1.022 
Flap Dist -.010 .022 .199 1 .656 .990 .948 1.034 
Speed Brake(1) .020 .197 .010 1 .919 1.020 .694 1.501 
Experience(1) -.634 1.873 .114 1 .735 .531 .013 20.861 
Experience(1) by 
Gear Speed 
.007 .010 .388 1 .533 1.007 .986 1.027 
Constant -6.515 3.719 3.069 1 .080 .001   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Experience * Gear Dist 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.900 7,304.21
1 
.000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .083 .193 .184 1 .668 1.087 .744 1.588 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.767 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.062 .127 .238 1 .626 .940 .732 1.206 
Flap Speed .008 .007 1.426 1 .232 1.008 .995 1.022 
Flap Dist -.008 .022 .136 1 .712 .992 .950 1.036 
Speed Brake(1) .029 .197 .021 1 .884 1.029 .699 1.514 
Experience(1) .710 .651 1.190 1 .275 2.035 .568 7.290 
Gear Dist by 
Experience(1) 
-.022 .070 .097 1 .756 .978 .853 1.123 
Constant -9.078 1.729 27.557 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Experience * Flap Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.885 7,294.947 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .083 .193 .185 1 .667 1.087 .744 1.588 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.682 1 .006 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.100 .043 5.499 1 .019 .905 .833 .984 
Flap Speed .008 .041 .036 1 .849 1.008 .930 1.092 
Flap Dist -.009 .022 .148 1 .701 .992 .949 1.036 
Speed Brake(1) .026 .197 .017 1 .897 1.026 .697 1.509 
Experience(1) .497 4.554 .012 1 .913 1.644 .000 12,368.041 
Experience(1) by 
Flap Speed 
.000 .021 .000 1 .995 1.000 .959 1.043 
Constant -8.650 8.720 .984 1 .321 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Experience * Flap Dist 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.896 7,295.113 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .083 .193 .184 1 .668 1.087 .744 1.588 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.788 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.100 .043 5.547 1 .019 .905 .832 .983 
Flap Speed .008 .007 1.204 1 .272 1.008 .994 1.021 
Flap Dist -.043 .086 .247 1 .619 .958 .809 1.134 
Speed Brake(1) .025 .197 .016 1 .898 1.026 .698 1.508 
Experience(1) .217 .786 .076 1 .782 1.243 .266 5.799 
Flap Dist by 
Experience(1) 
.020 .047 .174 1 .677 1.020 .930 1.119 
Constant -8.069 1.966 16.852 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Experience * Speed Brake 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.885 7,293.491 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .086 .194 .197 1 .657 1.090 .746 1.592 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.758 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.100 .043 5.523 1 .019 .905 .833 .984 
Flap Speed .008 .007 1.485 1 .223 1.008 .995 1.022 
Flap Dist -.008 .022 .144 1 .704 .992 .950 1.035 
Speed Brake(1) 1.007 1.477 .464 1 .496 2.736 .151 49.504 
Experience(1) .982 .740 1.761 1 .185 2.669 .626 11.376 
Experience(1) by 
Speed Brake(1) 
-.513 .759 .456 1 .499 .599 .135 2.652 
Constant -9.645 1.881 26.283 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Duration * Late Start 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.893 8,196.005 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .073 .193 .142 1 .706 1.076 .736 1.571 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.959 1 .005 1.015 1.005 1.026 
Gear Dist -.105 .043 6.030 1 .014 .900 .827 .979 
Flap Speed .016 .005 8.899 1 .003 1.016 1.006 1.027 
Flap Dist -.014 .022 .414 1 .520 .986 .944 1.030 
Speed Brake(1) -.098 .188 .271 1 .603 .907 .627 1.311 
Duration -.244 .211 1.341 1 .247 .783 .518 1.184 
Duration by Late 
Start(1) 
-.105 18,116.856 .000 1 1.000 .900 .000 . 
Constant -9.450 1.174 64.795 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap 





Duration * High Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.889 7,285.372 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) -.159 .232 .471 1 .493 .853 .542 1.343 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.546 1 .006 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.102 .043 5.693 1 .017 .903 .830 .982 
Flap Speed .016 .005 8.715 1 .003 1.016 1.005 1.027 
Flap Dist -.015 .022 .450 1 .502 .985 .943 1.029 
Speed Brake(1) -.093 .188 .244 1 .621 .911 .630 1.318 
Duration -.577 .282 4.186 1 .041 .562 .323 .976 
Duration by High 
Speed(1) 
.924 .440 4.408 1 .036 2.519 1.063 5.968 
Constant -9.291 1.171 62.945 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Duration * Gear Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.909 7,293.349 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .076 .193 .154 1 .695 1.079 .738 1.576 
Gear Speed .016 .006 8.248 1 .004 1.016 1.005 1.028 
Gear Dist -.106 .043 6.134 1 .013 .899 .827 .978 
Flap Speed .016 .005 8.914 1 .003 1.016 1.006 1.027 
Flap Dist -.014 .022 .400 1 .527 .986 .944 1.030 
Speed Brake(1) -.098 .188 .271 1 .603 .907 .627 1.311 
Duration .641 1.439 .198 1 .656 1.898 .113 31.832 
Duration by Gear 
Speed 
-.005 .008 .383 1 .536 .995 .980 1.010 
Constant -9.670 1.224 62.453 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Duration * Gear Dist 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.910 7,298.293 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .072 .193 .139 1 .709 1.075 .736 1.570 
Gear Speed .015 .005 8.032 1 .005 1.015 1.005 1.026 
Gear Dist -.100 .045 4.994 1 .025 .905 .829 .988 
Flap Speed .016 .005 8.867 1 .003 1.016 1.006 1.027 
Flap Dist -.014 .022 .415 1 .519 .986 .944 1.030 
Speed Brake(1) -.097 .188 .264 1 .607 .908 .628 1.313 
Duration .022 .653 .001 1 .973 1.023 .284 3.677 
Gear Dist by 
Duration 
-.031 .072 .183 1 .669 .970 .841 1.117 
Constant -9.509 1.181 64.788 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Duration * Flap Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.935 7,311.348 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .070 .194 .129 1 .719 1.072 .734 1.567 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.822 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.026 
Gear Dist -.105 .043 5.930 1 .015 .901 .828 .980 
Flap Speed .015 .006 6.304 1 .012 1.015 1.003 1.027 
Flap Dist -.014 .022 .422 1 .516 .986 .944 1.030 
Speed Brake(1) -.100 .188 .282 1 .596 .905 .626 1.309 
Duration -1.512 2.623 .332 1 .564 .221 .001 37.658 
Duration by Flap 
Speed 
.006 .011 .236 1 .627 1.006 .983 1.028 
Constant -9.155 1.322 47.934 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Duration * Flap Dist 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.925 7,312.534 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .074 .193 .146 1 .702 1.077 .737 1.573 
Gear Speed .015 .005 8.018 1 .005 1.015 1.005 1.026 
Gear Dist -.106 .043 6.057 1 .014 .900 .827 .979 
Flap Speed .016 .005 8.862 1 .003 1.016 1.006 1.027 
Flap Dist -.017 .024 .519 1 .471 .983 .938 1.030 
Speed Brake(1) -.099 .188 .275 1 .600 .906 .627 1.310 
Duration -.519 .810 .411 1 .522 .595 .122 2.911 
Flap Dist by 
Duration 
.017 .049 .125 1 .724 1.017 .925 1.119 
Constant -9.400 1.183 63.104 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Duration * Speed Brake 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.906 7,309.813 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .071 .193 .133 1 .715 1.073 .735 1.568 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.903 1 .005 1.015 1.005 1.026 
Gear Dist -.105 .043 5.974 1 .015 .901 .828 .979 
Flap Speed .016 .005 8.996 1 .003 1.016 1.006 1.027 
Flap Dist -.014 .022 .424 1 .515 .986 .944 1.029 
Speed Brake(1) -.025 .213 .013 1 .908 .976 .642 1.482 
Duration -.024 .352 .004 1 .947 .977 .490 1.947 
Duration by 
Speed Brake(1) 
-.334 .439 .578 1 .447 .716 .303 1.694 
Constant -9.513 1.177 65.303 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Automation * Late Start 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -16.823 7,702.411 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .046 .194 .058 1 .810 1.048 .717 1.532 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.707 1 .006 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.104 .043 5.904 1 .015 .901 .829 .980 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.344 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.012 .022 .288 1 .591 .988 .947 1.032 
Speed Brake(1) -.078 .188 .170 1 .680 .925 .640 1.338 
Automation(1) 1.128 .338 11.165 1 .001 3.090 1.594 5.989 
Automation(1) by 
Late Start(1) 
-1.416 24,404.703 .000 1 1.000 .243 .000 . 
Constant -9.644 1.168 68.191 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Automation * High Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -17.026 7,235.987 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .069 .201 .118 1 .732 1.071 .723 1.587 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.678 1 .006 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.104 .043 5.879 1 .015 .901 .829 .980 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.349 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.012 .022 .298 1 .585 .988 .947 1.031 
Speed Brake(1) -.078 .188 .171 1 .679 .925 .640 1.338 
Automation(1) 1.224 .402 9.253 1 .002 3.402 1.546 7.486 
Automation(1) by 
High Speed(1) 
-.297 .735 .163 1 .686 .743 .176 3.136 
Constant -9.645 1.168 68.177 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 




Automation * Gear Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -17.078 7,195.16
9 
.000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .047 .194 .058 1 .809 1.048 .717 1.532 
Gear Speed .014 .005 7.170 1 .007 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.104 .043 5.846 1 .016 .902 .829 .981 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.355 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.012 .022 .277 1 .599 .989 .947 1.032 
Speed Brake(1) -.077 .188 .167 1 .683 .926 .640 1.339 
Automation(1) .582 2.192 .070 1 .791 1.789 .024 131.493 
Automation(1) by 
Gear Speed 
.003 .012 .064 1 .800 1.003 .981 1.026 
Constant -9.603 1.179 66.333 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Automation * Gear Dist 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -17.020 7,240.47
3 
.000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .051 .194 .068 1 .794 1.052 .720 1.538 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.803 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.095 .043 4.986 1 .026 .909 .837 .988 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.378 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.013 .022 .324 1 .569 .988 .946 1.031 
Speed Brake(1) -.083 .189 .192 1 .661 .921 .636 1.332 
Automation(1) 3.097 1.323 5.477 1 .019 22.140 1.654 296.294 
Automation(1) by 
Gear Dist 
-.261 .181 2.076 1 .150 .771 .541 1.098 
Constant -9.748 1.170 69.447 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Automation * Flap Speed 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Late Start(1) -17.074 7,199.93
8 
.000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .046 .194 .056 1 .813 1.047 .716 1.530 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.749 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.104 .043 5.916 1 .015 .901 .829 .980 
Flap Speed .017 .006 9.560 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.029 
Flap Dist -.012 .022 .291 1 .590 .988 .947 1.032 
Speed Brake(1) -.080 .188 .180 1 .671 .923 .638 1.335 
Automation(1) 3.305 4.360 .575 1 .448 27.246 .005 140,144.615 
Automation(1) by 
Flap Speed 
-.010 .019 .248 1 .618 .990 .954 1.029 
Constant -9.789 1.203 66.199 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 





Automation * Flap Dist 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -17.208 7,089.102 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .041 .194 .044 1 .834 1.042 .712 1.524 
Gear Speed .014 .005 6.799 1 .009 1.014 1.003 1.024 
Gear Dist -.100 .043 5.493 1 .019 .905 .833 .984 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.781 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.004 .022 .034 1 .853 .996 .954 1.039 
Speed Brake(1) -.081 .188 .185 1 .667 .922 .638 1.334 
Automation(1) 3.512 1.347 6.793 1 .009 33.510 2.389 470.042 
Automation(1) by 
Flap Dist 
-.167 .098 2.923 1 .087a .846 .699 1.025 
Constant -9.713 1.167 69.321 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 
Flap Dist, Speed Brake, Automation, Automation * Flap Dist. 






Automation * Speed Brake 
 
Variables in the Equation 




Late Start(1) -17.142 7,143.270 .000 1 .998 .000 .000 . 
High Speed(1) .048 .194 .061 1 .804 1.049 .718 1.534 
Gear Speed .015 .005 7.731 1 .005 1.015 1.004 1.025 
Gear Dist -.103 .043 5.800 1 .016 .902 .830 .981 
Flap Speed .017 .005 9.385 1 .002 1.017 1.006 1.028 
Flap Dist -.011 .022 .267 1 .605 .989 .947 1.032 
Speed Brake(1) -.149 .194 .591 1 .442 .862 .590 1.260 
Automation(1) .381 .734 .269 1 .604 1.463 .347 6.169 
Automation(1) by 
Speed Brake(1) 
1.061 .827 1.645 1 .200 2.889 .571 14.612 
Constant -9.626 1.166 68.151 1 .000 .000   
Note. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Late Start, High Speed, Gear Speed, Gear Dist, Flap Speed, 
Flap Dist, Speed Brake, Automation, Automation * Speed Brake. 
 
 
 
